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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation is focused on the econometrics of strategic interactions. When
an economic decision has to be analyzed, agents can be modeled as isolated
decision makers. It eases models’ tractability at the cost of being not so close to
reality. A growing literature on economic theory and econometrics is concerned
with this aspect (see Jackson and Zenou; 2014; Benhabib et al.; 2011 for a review).
The dissertation is aimed to contribute to this branch of literature, in particular
to theoretical and empirical econometrics.
Interactions can be embedded in financial and economic models in several
ways. In a model with strategic interactions the outcome of each agent usually
depends on a function of other agents’ outcomes, the so-called endogenous effect,
and on other agents’ characteristics, the contextual effect. An example is the
famous linear-in-mean model, in which the outcome of each agent depends linearly
on the average outcome of the group and the average characteristics of the same
group. Several issues arise with the estimation of interaction models. In his
seminal work Manski (1993) outlined the so-called reflection problem for the
linear-in-mean model. It can be overcome if interactions are sparse, i.e. if they
can be represented by a incomplete network, as Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) have
shown. In other words, in such a network model the reference group is not the
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same for each agent in the group,1 this creates non-linearities which in turn allow
to identify model’s parameters. The econometrics behind this class of models
has the same foundations of the spatial econometric literature see e.g. Lee et al.
(2010).
In this dissertation I will consider interaction models with network structures.
In particular, the specifications considered in this study belong to the family of
spatial autoregressive (SAR) models, in which the information on networks is
summarized in a adjacency matrix, see Cliff and Ord (1973) for a survey.
Even though the reflection problem is not at work for this family of models,
other issues are related to the estimation of parameters.
This work focuses on the three of those: heterogeneity of the endogeneous
effects, endogeneity of the interactions, and unobservability of interacting agents.
Each extension is discussed in a chapter of my dissertation. The first chapter is
a purely theoretical one, the last two also contain empirical applications with a
focus on financial and economic decisions.
The first chapter is about the possible heterogeneity of endogeneous effects. It
generalizes a network model where different groups of individuals are allowed to
exert a different influence and where both within and between groups interactions
can be at work. In particular it studies the identification and estimation of treat-
ment response with heterogeneous spillovers in a network model. It generalizes
the standard linear-in-means model to allow for multiple groups with between
and within-group interactions. It provides a set of identification conditions of
peer effects and consider a 2SLS estimation approach. Large sample properties
of the proposed estimators are derived. Simulation experiments show that the
estimators perform well in finite samples. The model is used to study the ef-
fectiveness of policies where peer effects are seen as a mechanism through which
the treatments could propagate through the network. When interactions among
1Note that the linear-in-mean model is a special case of a network model, when the network
is full, i.e. everybody is connected with everybody.
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groups are at work, a shock on a treated group has effects on the non-treated.
Its framework allows for quantifying how much of the indirect treatment effect
is due to variations in the characteristics of treated peers (treatment contextual
effects) and how much is because of variations in peer outcomes (peer effects).
The second chapter studies the importance of social interactions for the adop-
tion of financial products using a bayesian methodology in order to account for
network endogeneity. It exploits a unique dataset of friendships among United
States students and a novel estimation strategy that accounts for possibly en-
dogenous network formation. It finds that not all social contacts are equally im-
portant: only those with a long-lasting relationship influence financial decisions.
Moreover, the correlation in agents’ behavior only arises among long-lasting ties
in cohesive network structures. This evidence is consistent with an important
role of trust in financial decisions. Repeated interactions generate trust among
agents, which in turn aggregate in tightly knit groups. When agents have to
decide whether or not to adopt a financial instrument they face a risk and might
place greater value on information coming from agents they trust. These results
can help to understand the growing importance of face-to-face social contacts for
financial decisions.
The third chapter is concerned with the consistent estimation of parameters
in a network model when the outcome is not observed for every agent belonging
to the network. An application on the allocation of time in sleep by agents
is also provided. Sleep is a key determinant of educational attainment among
young adults, and carries with it longstanding health implications. It provides
evidence of network effects in adolescent sleeping decisions and develop a novel
econometric approach to estimate network models with sampled observations on
the dependent variable. When accounting for sampling, it finds that the sleeping
behaviour of the friends is important to shape own sleeping behaviour, besides
the impact of individual, family and friends characteristics. Unique information
9
on siblings and their friends allows us to check the robustness of our results to
unobserved family factors.
10
Chapter 2
Identification and Estimation of
Outcome Response with
Heterogeneous Treatment
Externalities
Joint work with Tiziano Arduini and Eleonora Patacchini.
Another version of this chapter has been published as CPR Working Paper No.
167, April 2014.
2.1 Introduction
The program evaluation literature focuses on estimating the program effects with-
out externalities. There is a growing awareness, however, that there may be
indirect effects that are important to measure (see Manski (2013)). Existing
methodological contributions as well as studies collecting empirical evidence are
still scarce. In particular, while there are a few papers about the identification
and estimation of treatment response with interactions (Hudgens and Halloran
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(2008), Miguel and Kremer (2004) and Sinclair et al. (2012) ), to the best of
our knowledge there are no studies that consider the presence of heterogeneous
interactions.
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) estimates the indirect effects of the flagship
Mexican welfare program, PROGRESA, on the consumption of ineligible house-
holds. This study finds that cash transfers to eligible households indirectly in-
crease the consumption of ineligible households living in the same village. These
findings are clearly very important for designing policies as well as developing ex-
periments to evaluate them.1 The framework, however, does not determine how
much of the spillover is due to effects from eligible to ineligible subjects, effects
within ineligible (eligible) subjects and feedback effects. It identifies the pres-
ence of indirect effects by comparing outcomes between untreated household in
untreated villages and untreated households in treated villages. When network
data are available, the analysis can be pushed forward and the heterogeneous
impact of policies can be modeled and quantified.
Heterogeneity can be conceived in different ways. First, treatment hetero-
geneity, when the intensity or type of treatment can differ depending on the
treated unit. Second, treatment effect heterogeneity when the treatment is the
same for each agent but its effect is different depending on her characteristics.
Third, interaction-driven heterogeneity, when the diffusion of the treatment effect
through interactions generates an heterogeneous individual response. This may
be due to both differences in interaction strengths within and between groups
and to network structure, if data on connections are available. Several papers
have focused on the first two types of heterogeneity.2 In this paper we focus on
1More specifically, policy interventions should internalize the externalities that they engen-
der, and experiments to evaluate their effectiveness should consider the effects on the entire
local economy (e.g. the school, the village, the city), rather than focusing on differences be-
tween treatment and control group from the same local entity. When spillovers are at work,
both groups’ performance may change.
2See Imbens and Woolridge (2009) for a revision of recent studies using matching and non-
parametric methodologies to address the second type of heterogeneity. Remarkably, Crump
et al. (2008) proposes a non-parametric test for subpopulation heterogeneity in the effect of the
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the third kind of heterogeneity.
Using a network approach, our analysis brings three contributions to this lit-
erature. First, we derive analytically the bias that arises if spillovers are ignored.
Second, we provide estimands for understanding whether different types of un-
treated - eligible or ineligible- are differently impacted by the treatment. Finally,
our framework allows us to distinguish between different sources of treatment
transmission - in particular, how much of the treatment response is generated by
variations in the charactristics of treated peers( treatment contextual effects) and
how much is due to spillovers through outcomes (peer effects). More specifically,
our paper provides a network-based approach to estimate the average effects of
the treatment in the presence of spillovers on subjects both eligible and ineligible
for a program, accounting for heterogeneous within and between-group spillover
effects. We show that heterogeneity in the effects is both helpful in terms of
identification and harmful for traditional estimation methods. We develop an
estimation approach able to provide reliable estimates of all the cascade effects
that stem from a given network topology.
Interaction among agents can be modeled in several ways. When the exact
topology of connections is know, one possibility is to consider the peer effects
that stem from the given network structure. There is a large and growing lit-
erature on peer effects in economics using network data.3 The popular model
employed in empirical work is the Manski-type linear-in-means model (Manski
(1993)). Three assumptions underlie this statistical model: (i) the network is
exogenous, (ii) the effects of all peers are equal, (iii) peer status is measured
without error. Although these assumptions may be restrictive in empirical anal-
treatment. Firpo (2007) proposed a quantile treatment estimation where the heterogeneity is
given by the position of unit in the pre-treatment outcome distribution. Other papers employ
more complex techniques to allow both the first and second type of heterogeneity. Among
the others, generalized cross-validation statistic (Imai et al. (2013)), boosting (LeBlanc and
Kooperberg (2010)), Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (Chipman et al. (2010)) have been
used.
3See Jackson and Zenou (2014), part III, for a collection of recent studies.
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yses, only a few recent papers consider alternative models and methods in which
some of these assumptions are relaxed. Point (i) has been recently studied by
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2011) who propose
parametric modelling assumptions and Bayesian inferential methods to integrate
a network formation model with the study of behavior over the formed networks.
Point (iii) belongs to another strand of recent literature which looks at the conse-
quences of peer-group misspecification, focusing in particular on sampling issues
(see Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011a), Liu et al. (2013) and Liu (2013a)). In this
paper, we consider the specification and estimation of a peer effects model when
assumption (ii) is removed. Lee and Liu (2010) considers a peer effects model
with one endogenous variable and one adjacency matrix in a multiple network
context, with no between-network interactions. Liu (2013) extends this model to
the case of two endogenous variables and one adjacency matrix. In this paper, we
allow the model to have two endogenous variables, two adjacency matrices, and
both within and between-group interactions. We also consider the generalization
to the case of multiple endogenous variables.4 To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to consider models of peer effects where different peers are allowed to
exert a different influence and where both within and between groups interactions
can be at work.5 We maintain assumptions (i) and (iii).
We show that the multiple group structure of the model requires modifying
the conventional identification conditions (Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and Cohen-
Cole et al. (2012)) and has interesting connections with the concepts of chains
and Tree-indexed Markov chains (see Benjamini and Peres (1994)).
We propose efficient 2SLS estimators using instruments based on the two
reduced forms. We show that the standard IV approximation (Kelejian and
4There is a long tradition in spatial econometrics looking at spatial autoregressive models
with multiple endogenous variables (see Kelejan and Prucha, 2004). In the spatial econometrics
context, however, the adjacency matrix is the same for all endogenous variables, and no groups
are considered.
5Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) also estimate a model with two peer effects, but
without cross effects, using a Bayesian estimation method.
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Prucha (1998), Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and Liu and Lee (2010)) involves a
huge number of IVs, even if we use a low degree approximation of the optimal
instruments.6 For this reason, we consider many-instrument asymptotics (Bekker,
1994) allowing the number of IVs to increase with the sample size.
Differently from Lee and Liu (2010) and Liu (2013b) where the many in-
struments derive from the multiple network framework, in our model the many
instruments derive from the (approximation of the) multiple adjacency-matrix
framework. A multiple matrix framework does not only result in an increasing
number of instruments but also yields multiple approximations of the optimal in-
struments. As a result, we show that the form of the many-instrument bias differs,
though the leading order remains unchanged. We also propose a bias-correction
procedure. Simulation experiments show that the bias-corrected estimator per-
forms well in finite samples. When the number of endogenous variables is allowed
to grow, our estimator remains consistent and asymptotically normal if the num-
ber of endogenous variables grows more slowly than the sample size. Finally, we
investigate the bias occurring when the interaction structure is misspecified. We
derive analytically the bias that occurs when only within-group peer effects are
considered, i.e when interactions between groups are at work but ignored by the
econometrician. We then use a simulation experiment to evaluate this bias in
finite samples.
In the last part of the paper we show the empirical salience of our model for
policy purposes. As highlighted by Manski (2013), the policy maker can rarely
manipulate peer outcomes. Peer effects, however, can be seen as a mechanism
through which the treatment could propagate through the networks. If peer
effects are at work, then the policy intervention has not only a direct effect on
outcomes but also an indirect one through the outcomes of connected agents (i.e.
the so called ”social multiplier”). We show via Monte Carlo simulations that
6See Prucha (2013) for a review of Generalized Method of Moments estimators in a spatial
framework.
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the presence of heterogeneous peer effects and between-group interactions may
create unexpected, or sometimes paradoxical results if the policy maker ignores
the heterogeneity of interactions among groups. Our results can be helpful to
explain why several policy programs do not accomplish the expected goals.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the econo-
metric model. Identification conditions are derived in Section 3, and in Section
4 we consider 2SLS estimation for the model. Section 5 investigates the bias
occurring when the interaction structure is misspecified. We devote Section 6 to
show the importance of our analysis for the identification of treatment response
with spillovers. We first derive estimands for direct, indirect and total effects of
treatment strategies in network settings with interactions. Then we use a simula-
tion experiment to show the extent to which the heterogeneity of the endogenous
effects can affect the outcome response for different groups. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 The Network Model with Heterogeneous Peer
Effects
A general network model has the specification
Y = φGY +Xβ +G∗Xγ + , (2.1)
where Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
′ is an n−dimensional vector of outcomes, G = [gij] is an
n×n adjacency matrix, gij is equal to 1 if i and j are connected, 0 otherwise. G∗
is the row-normalized version of G, where g∗ij = gij/
∑
j gij. X is a n× p matrix
of exogenous variables capturing individual characteristics.  = (1, . . . , n)
′ is
a vector of errors whose elements are i.i.d. with zero mean and variance σ2
for all i. For model (2.1), φ represents the endogenous effect, where an agent’s
choice/outcome may depend on those of his/her peers on the same activity, and
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γ represents the contextual effect, where an agent’s choice/outcome may depend
on the exogenous characteristics of his/her peers. Let X∗ = (X,G∗X) and β∗ =
(β, γ).
Let A and B be two countable sets (types) of individuals (e.g. males and
females, blacks and whites) such that A∩B = ∅ and n = na+nb is the cardinality
of A ∪B, with na and nb being respectively the cardinalities of A and B. Let us
define Y = (Y ′a, Y
′
b )
′, X = (X ′a, X
′
b)
′, and G =
 Ga Gab
Gba Gb
 . For instance, the
subscript a denotes that Y,X ∈ A, G is formed only among nodes of type A and
the subscript ab denotes the fact that links are directed from b to a.7 Appendix
A defines regularity conditions.
Model (2.1) can be written as
Ya = φaGaYa + φabGabYb +X
∗
aβ
∗
a +G
∗
abXbγab + a, (2.2)
Yb = φbGbYb + φbaGbaYa +X
∗
b β
∗
b +G
∗
baXaγba + b, (2.3)
where β∗a = (βa, γa), X
∗
a = (Xa, G
∗
aXa), X
∗
b = (Xb, G
∗
bXb) β
∗
b = (βb, γb), and a
and b are i.i.d errors with variance σ
2
a and σ
2
b , respectively. Let us suppose for
simplicity that σ2a = σ
2
b = σ. Model (2.2) - (2.3) is a generalization of the standard
framework in the sense that it allows endogenous effects to be different within and
between groups. If we stack up equations (2.2) - (2.3) and restrict the endogenous
effect parameters of the two equations to be the same (i.e. φa = φb = φab = φba
), then we obtain model (2.1).
Let us define the following matrices
Aδa = X
∗
aβ
∗
a +G
∗
abXbγab + a,
7More formally, Ya = RaY , Xa = RaX, Ga = RaGR
′
a and Gab = RaGR
′
b, where
Ra = (Ina , Ona,nb) and Rb = (Onb,na , Inb) are matrices that select the nodes in group a and b
respectively. Ok,l is a k × l matrix of zeros.
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Bδb = X
∗
b β
∗
b +G
∗
baXaγba + b,
where A = (Xa, G
∗
abXb, a), δa = (β
∗
a, γab, 1), B = (Xb, G
∗
baXa, b) and δb =
(β∗b , γba, 1). By plugging Yb in equation (2.2) we have
Ya = φaGaYa + φabGab(Jb(φbaGbaYa +Bδb)) + Aδa (2.4)
= (φaGa + φabφbaCa)Ya + φabGabJbBδb + Aδa,
where Jb = (I − φbGb)−1 =
∑∞
k=1(φbGb)
k provided ‖φbGb‖∞ < 1, where ‖·‖∞
is the row-sum matrix norm. The ijth element of Jb sums all k-distance paths
from j to i when i, j ∈ B scaling them by φkb and Ca = GabJbGba.8 Therefore the
reduced form of model (2.2) is
Ya = Ma(φabGabJbBδb + Aδa), (2.5)
where Ma = (I − φaGa − φabφbaCa)−1.9 A sufficient condition for the non singu-
larity of (I − φaGa − φabφbaCa) is ‖φaGa‖∞ + ‖φabφbaCa‖∞ ≤ 1. This condition
also implies that Ma is uniformly bounded in absolute value.
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We note that: (i) we present an aggregate model specification (i.e. G which
multiplies y in model (2.1) is not row-normalized), but the approach applies also
to an average model (i.e. when G which multiplies y in model (2.1) is row-
normalized);11 (ii) our model specification has two groups, but all the assump-
8Ca is a matrix which captures all the indirect connections among nodes of type A passing
through one or more nodes of type B. Note that the ijth generic element of GabGba is equal to
the number of length-2 paths directed from j ∈ A to i ∈ A passing through a node l ∈ B. This
matrix accounts only for distance-2 indirect connections while Ca = GabJbGba captures all the
paths starting from j ∈ A and ending to a generic node in B, eventually passing through other
nodes of type B and finally arriving in i ∈ A scaling them by φb.
9This matrix captures all direct and indirect paths among type A nodes passing through
others type A nodes and type B nodes.
10The assumption is crucial for identification of the model and asymptotic normality of the
estimator (see Appendix A).
11Aggregate and average models are different in terms of behavioral foundations, contextual
effects are supposed to be averages over peers in both cases w.l.o.g. (see Liu et al. (2014forth-
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tions, propositions and proofs can be naturally extended to a finite number of
groups; (iii) we consider a single network, but the approach can be extended to
the case of multiple networks(i.e. a network with several components) with the
addition of network fixed effects in the model specification; (iv) we can also add
a heterogeneous spatial lag in the error term a = ρaWaa + ρabWabb.
12
2.3 Identification
Let us define Za = (GaYa, GabYb, X
∗
a , G
∗
abXb). Equation (2.2) is identified if E(Za)
has full column rank for large n.13 In this section, we find sufficient conditions
for E(Za) to have full column rank.
14 The detailed proof is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 1. Let Xa and Xb have full column rank. If the sequences of {Ma},
{Mb}, {Ja} and {Ja} are UB matrices,15 then E(Za) has full column rank in the
following cases
1. (a) i. βaφa + γa 6= 0,
ii. Ia, Ga and G
2
a are linearly independent.
[and]
(b) i. βbφb + γb 6= 0,
ii. Gab and GabGb are linearly independent.
[or]
2. (a) i. γab 6= 0,
ii. Gab and GaGab are linearly independent.
coming)).
12The resulting model is a SARARMAG(p; q; g) with p = 1, q = 1 and g = 2, where p and
q are respectively the number of spatial lags for outcome and error, and g is the number of
groups (see Kelejian and Prucha (2007)).
13This implies that Assumption 4 in Appendix A holds.
14Symmetric conditions and results hold for equation (2.3).
15In practice we need a series expansion to approximate the inversion of the matrices. We
are grateful to Chihwa Kao for pointing it out.
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[and]
(b) i. γba 6= 0,
ii. Ia, Ga and GabGba are linearly independent.
Note that conditions (1a) are exactly the same identification conditions found
by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) in the case of homogeneous effects (i.e. only one
group). Proposition 1 here is more general as it provides alternative possibilities.
When more than one group is considered we do not need linear independence of a
particular set of matrices - we have multiple sufficient conditions. Even if Ia, Ga
and G2a are linearly dependent we can still identify φa, and the other parameters,
relying on linear independence of chains passing through type B nodes.16 The
set of adjacency matrices’ combinations can be represented as a Tree-indexed
Markov chain- the parameters can be identified because of the multiple branches
of the tree (see Appendix B). Obviously, if Ga, Gba, Gab and Gb are complete and
consequently all products among them are linearly dependent, then the model
remains not identified. However, if group A nodes are in a complete network, but
the matrices representing between-group interactions are sparse (i.e Gab and Gba
are not complete), then identification can be achieved and φa can be estimated
even if Ga is complete. Systems in panels (b) and (c) in Figure 2.1 can be
identified because the adjacency matrix of type B nodes (blue nodes in Figure
2.1) is sparse, whereas systems in panel (a) and (d) cannot. The additional
parameters’ restrictions (condition (1b, 2a or 2b)) are due to an additional vector
in the full rank condition (i.e. E(Gabyb)).
Proposition 1 has a natural interpretation in terms of instrumental variables.
A multiple group framework adds an extra layer of exclusion restrictions. In
fact, multiple sets of matrices provide additional instruments. The intuition is
that when we distinguish nodes in different types, a higher number of possible
16For example, we can take advantage of linear independence of Ia, Ga and GabGba (instead
of Ia, Ga and G
2
a); and Gab and GaGba.
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Figure 2.1: Identification with heterogeneous nodes
network intransitivities are formed. Appendix B provides technical details on the
connection between identification in a single group model and a multiple group
one.
2.4 The 2SLS estimator
Equation (2.2) cannot be consistently estimated by OLS because Gaya and Gabyb
are correlated with a.
17 We consider 2SLS estimation for the model in the spirit
of Lee-Liu (2010). Following the standard technique used in spatial econometrics
literature, we have the following optimal instruments from the two (symmetric)
reduced forms
E(Gaya) = Ga(Ma(φabGabJbE(B)δb + E(A)δa), (2.6)
E(Gabyb) = Gab(Mb(φbaGbaJaE(A)δb + E(B)δa). (2.7)
Recalling that Za = [Gaya, Gabyb, E(A)] is a n × (k + 2) matrix, we have fa =
E(Za) = [E(Gaya), E(Gabyb), E(A)], so from equations (2.6) - (2.7) we have
17From equation (2.5), Gaya = Sa(φabGabJbBδb + Aδa) where Sa = GaMa. OLS is not
consistent because we have E((Gaya)
′, a) = E((Sa(φabGabJbBδb+Aδa))′, a) = E((Saa)′, a),
since we assume that the cov(a, b) = 0 and E(a) = E(b) = 0. It follows that E((Saa)
′, a) =
σ2aTr(Sa) 6= 0. A similar argument holds for Gabyb.
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Za = fa + va = fa + [(φabSaGabJbb + Saa), (φbaSabGbaJaa + Sabb)][e1, e2]
′,
where e1 is a first unit vector of dimension (k+ 2), Sa = GaMa and Sab = GabMb.
These instruments are infeasible given the embedded unknown parameters. fa
can be considered a linear combination of IVs in
H∗∞ = (Sa(GabJbE(B), E(A)), Sab(GbaJaE(A), E(B)), E(A)).
Furthermore, since Sa = GaMa and Sab = GabMb provided ‖φaGa‖∞+‖φabφbaCa‖|∞ ≤
1 and ‖φbGb‖∞ < 1, we have Sa = Ga
∞∑
j=0
(φaGa + φabφbaCa)
j = Ga
∞∑
j=0
(φaGa +
φabφbaGab
∞∑
j=0
(φjbG
j
b)Gba)
j. The same approximation holds for Sab. It follows that
Ca = GabJbGba = Gab(
∞∑
j=0
φjbG
j
b)Gba = Gab(
p∑
j=0
φjbG
j
b + (φbGb)
p+1Jb)Gba.
This implies ‖Ca −
p∑
j=0
φjbG
j
b‖∞ ≤ ‖(φbGb)p+1‖∞‖Ca‖∞ = o(1) as p→∞.
Sa = GaMa = Ga
∞∑
j=0
(φaGa+φabφbaCa)
j = Ga[
p∑
j=0
(φaGa+φabφbaCa)
j+(φaGa+
φabφbaCa)
p+1Sa]→ ‖Sa−
p∑
j=0
(φaGa+φabφbaCa)
j‖∞ ≤ ‖(φaGa+φabφbao(1))p+1‖∞‖Sa‖∞ =
o(1) as p → ∞. Hence, the approximation error by series expansion diminishes
very quickly in a geometric rate, as long as the degree of approximation (p) in-
creases as n increases. We can also replace Sa and Sab by a linear combination.
The instruments become
Ha∞ = (Ga(I,Ga, G
2
a, . . . (Gab(I,Gb, G
2
b , . . . )Gba)) . . . (Gab(I,Gb, G
2
b , . . . )E(B), E(A)),
Hab∞ = (Gab(I,Gb, G
2
b , . . . (Gba(I,Ga, G
2
a, . . . )Gab)) . . . (Gba(I,Ga, G
2
a, . . . )E(A), E(B)),
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with an approximation error diminishing very quickly when K (or p) goes to
infinity, where K denotes the number of instruments. Let us define H∞ =
[Ha∞, H
ab
∞ , X
∗
a , GabXb] as the matrix of instruments and select an na × K sub-
matrix HK based on a p-order approximation of H∞.18 For instance, if we use
the second order approximation of the infinite sums, HK = (H
a
2 , H
ab
2 , X
∗
a , GabXb)
will be the first step best projector. The feasible 2SLS estimator for model (2.2)
is
µˆ = (Z ′aPˆKZa)
−1Z ′aPˆKYa, (2.8)
where µˆ = (φa, φab, β
∗
a, γab) and PˆK = HK(H
′
KHK)
−1H ′K .
2.4.1 Asymptotic Properties
This section derives the asymptotic properties of the many-instrument 2SLS es-
timator for heterogeneous network models. Cohen-Cole et al. (2012) and Liu
(2013b) consider a network model with two endogenous variables and one adja-
cency matrix with multiple networks.19 Our network model requires two endoge-
nous variables, and two different adjacency matrices.20 In Lee and Liu (2010)
and Liu (2013b), the asymptotic approximation of the 2SLS estimator is based
on many-instrument asymptotics, where the many instruments derive from the
multiple network framework. In our model the many instruments derive from the
(approximation of the) multiple adjacency-matrix framework. A multiple matrix
framework results in an increasing number of instruments due to multiple ap-
proximations of the optimal instruments.21 This complicates the derivations of
the asymptotic properties of the many-instrument 2SLS estimator.
The following propositions establish the consistency and asymptotic normality
18Note that K is a function of the degree of approximations p.
19Kelejian and Prucha (2004) considers SAR models with multiple endogenous variables and
a unique weights matrix.
20We consider the analysis with one network only. The extension to multiple networks ex-
tremely complicates the notation burden, but the theoretical results remain basically unchanged.
21See Section 2.4.
23
of the many-instrument 2SLS estimator in equation (2.8). Regularity conditions
together with some discussion can be found in Appendix A. Some useful Lemmas
are provided in Appendix B. All the proofs are listed in Appendix C. Let
Fa = lim
n→∞
1
n
f ′afa,
22
PKSa = Ψa and PKTba = Ξba, where Tab = SabGbaJb.
23
Proposition 2. Under assumptions 1-5, ifK/n→ 0, then√n(µˆ−µ0−b) d→N(0, σ2aF−1a ),
where b = (Z ′aPKZa)
−1[e1, e2]σ2a[tr(Ψa), φbatr(Ξba)]
′ = Op(K/n).
From Proposition 2, when the number of instruments K grows at a slower
rate than the sample size n, the 2SLS estimator is consistent and asymptotically
normal. However, the asymptotic distribution of the 2SLS estimator may not be
centered around the true parameter value due to the presence of many-instrument
bias of order Op(K/n) (see, e.g., Lee and Liu, 2010). We note that the leading
order of the bias is the same as in Lee and Liu (2010) and Liu (2013b). However,
the structure of the bias differs. Here, it depends on multiple approximations of
the optimal instruments (see the beginning of Section 2.4). The condition that
K/n→ 0 is crucial for the 2SLS estimator to be consistent. This appears evident
if we look at the normal equation of our estimator: 1
n
Z ′aPK(Ya − Zaµˆ). When
µˆ = µ0 we have that E(
1
n
Z ′aPK(Ya − Zaµ0)) = [e1, e1]σ2a[tr(Ψa), φbatr(Ξba)]′ =
Op(K/n) by Lemma B.2 in the Appendix. This converges to 0 only if the number
of instruments grows more slowly than the sample size.24 The following corollary
characterizes different scenarios for different rates in which K diverges from n.
Corollary 2.1. Under assumptions 1-5, (i) if K2/n→ 0, √n(µˆ−µ0) d→N(0, σ2aF−1a );
22This is a crucial assumption. See the discussion in Appendix A after Assumption 4.
23To simplify the notation, we assume that n→∞ implies na →∞ and nb →∞.
24Indeed, if we use a fixed number of instruments given by H¯, the asymptotic distribu-
tion will be
√
n(µˆ − µ0) d→N(0, σ2a(limn→∞ 1nf ′aP¯ fa)−1. Note that (Fa − limn→∞ 1nf ′aP¯ fa) =
limn→∞ f ′a(I − P¯ )fa, which is positive semi-definite in general. The 2SLS estimator with fixed
number of instrument is generally not efficient. In order to have efficiency, we need to index
our matrix of instruments with K and let K grow more slowly than the sample size.
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(ii) if K2/n→ c <∞, √n(µˆ− µ0) d→N(b¯, σ2aF−1a ), where b¯ = lim
n→∞
√
nb.
The many-instrument bias of the 2SLS estimator can be corrected by the es-
timated leading-order bias (b) given in Proposition 2. Given consistent estimates
of φˆa, φˆb, φˆab, φˆba, σˆa and σˆb, the bias-corrected 2SLS estimator is
µˆc = (Z
′
aPKZa)
−1[Z ′aPKYa − σˆ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆba(Ξba)]′]. (2.9)
The following proposition shows that the bias-corrected estimator is properly
centered around the normal distribution.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1-5, if K/n→ 0 and φˆa, φˆb, φˆab, φˆba, σˆa and
σˆb are
√
n−consistent initial estimators, then √n(µˆc − µ0) d→N(0, σ2aF−1a ) .
In the next subsection we discuss the case in which the number of endogenous
variables (groups) grows with the sample size.
2.4.2 Estimation with Many Groups
So far, we have assumed that group numerosity does not depend on the sample
size. We believe that, in practice, such an assumption is virtually always satisfied.
For instance, if we increase the size of the sample, we will always have two genders:
male and female. However, for completeness, it is interesting to explore whether
having the number of groups growing together with the sample size affects the
estimator properties.
In the many-instrument literature, Anatolyev (2013) and Imbens et al. (2011)
have relaxed the assumption of a fixed number of exogenous regressors. To the
best of our knowledge, the implications of relaxing the assumption of a fixed
number of endogenous regressors have not been investigated yet.
Let us define g as the number of endogeneous variables and p as the degree
of approximation (see Appendix C for an intuition of p as length of chains).
The following proposition characterizes the rate of divergence of g from n.
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Proposition 4. if K/n→ 0, we have that g = o(n1/p).
This means, that for our estimator to be consistent and asymptotically normal
in this framework with many instruments and many endogenous variables we need
g to grow more slowly than n1/p.
For completeness, let us consider the link between the number of groups (i.e.
endogenous variables) and the many-instrument asymptotics.
In our framework we have that g/K → 0. In order to have a good performance
of the estimator we need K/n → 0. This implies g/n = 1/sg → 0, where sg is
the average size of groups. In words, in order to have a good performance of
the estimators, we need the size of groups to be large enough. Furthermore, in
order to have the estimator properly centered, we need K2/n→ 0. This implies
g2/n = g/sg → 0. Therefore, for asymptotic efficiency, the average size of groups
needs to be large enough compared to the number of groups. These results are
similar to those in Lee and Liu (2010). However, the framework in Lee and
Liu (2010) considers multiple networks embedded in a block-diagonal adjacency
matrix (i.e. G = diag(Ga, Gb)) with the restriction that the within peer effects
are the same for each network, (i.e. φa = φb) and there are no interactions
between networks . If a network is defined as a group, then our framework can be
considered as a generalization. We have different groups, with both within and
between-group interactions. Our adjacency matrix is thus not block-diagonal.
2.4.3 Finite sample performance
In this section, we use simulation experiments to investigate the performance of
the proposed estimator in small samples.
We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation study based on the following model
ya = φaGaya + φabGabyb +X
∗
aβa +G
∗
abXbγab + a,
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yb = φbGbyb + φbaGbaya +X
∗
b βb +G
∗
baXaγba + b,
where Xa, Xb and  ∼ N(0, 1). Borrowing from Lee and Liu (2010), we generate
the G matrix as follows. First, for the ith row of G, we generate an integer
di ∈ [0, 1, ..,m] with a uniform probability function, where m = 10, 20, 30. Then
we set the (i + 1)th, · · · , (i + di)th elements of the ith row of G to be ones. If
(i+ di)th < na, the other elements in that row are zeros; otherwise, the entries of
ones will be wrapped around such that the number of di − na entries of the ith
row will be ones. We partition the matrix into four submatrices Ga, Gb, Gab and
Gba with a random selection of rows and correspondent columns. The identifier
variable used to select the two groups is generated by a Bernoulli distribution
with p=0.5. The number of replications is 1000 and na = nb = 500. We perform
two experiments that are summarized in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Each column
reports mean and standard error (in parenthesis) of the empirical distributions
of different estimators. The first column shows 2SLS few IVs. It is based on
equation (2.8) with the IV matrix HK derived by the first order approximation
of the best instruments (K=24). The second column reports the 2SLS many IVs,
it is derived by the second order approximation of the best instruments (K=84).
Finally, Column 3 shows the 2SLS bias-corrected. It is based on equation (2.9)
with consistent estimates derived from the 2SLS few IVs.
Table 1 reports on the performance of the estimators when changing the den-
sity of the network, i.e. the number of connections. Each panel represents a
different value of m, which indicates the maximum number of connections. The
data are generated with βa = βb = γa = γb = γab = γba = 0.5. The peer effects
parameters are set to: φa = φb = 0.1 and φab = φba = 0.2. The results show
that all estimators perform well, with different nuances. In particular, one can
observe the trade-off between bias and efficiency for the 2SLS many IVs when
network density increases- the higher the density, the higher the gain in terms
of efficiency with respect to the 2SLS few IVs. However, the bias (due to the
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many instruments) increases as well. The bias correction that we propose is thus
particularly beneficial when the network is dense.
Table 2.2 reports on the performance of the estimators when changing the het-
erogeneity within and between-group parameters. The simulation setup remains
unchanged, but we now set the maximum number of connections to 20 and let
the φ parameters vary. In the first panel, we consider φa = φab = φb = φba = 0.1
This is the benchmark framework in which peer effects are homogeneous. In the
second panel, we introduce some heterogeneity in the within-group interaction
effects. We set φa = φb = 0.1 and φab = φba = 0.3. In the third panel, peer
effects are different both within and between groups. We set φa = 0.1, φb = 0.2
φab = 0.4 and φba = 0.05. Table 2 shows that the performance of the estimators
does not depend on the values of the parameters- the ranking of the estimators
in terms of efficiency and bias remains unchanged.
To test the robustness of our results, we have also performed two additional
exercises.25 First, instead of using randomly generated networks, we have used
the Add Health’s sociomatrix26 as an adjacency matrix, thus replicating features
of real-world social networks. Our aim is to understand whether the results of
Table 2.1 are driven by the random generation of links. Second, we use uniform
and gamma distributions to generate the errors of the data generating process.
In doing so, our aim is to investigate whether and to what extent our i.i.d. as-
sumption for the error terms in the derivation of large sample properties affects
the finite sample Monte Carlo results. In both cases, the simulation results are
very similar to those reported here.
25Results available upon request.
26A matrix derived from observed connections among students in the Add Health, a program
project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman,
and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by
grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations.
Special acknowledgment is due to Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in
the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on
the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received
from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
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2.5 Model Misspecification Bias
In this section, we investigate the bias occurring when the interaction structure
is misspecified.
First, we analytically derive the bias that occurs when only within-group peer
effects are considered, i.e. when interactions between groups are at work but
ignored by the econometrician. We then use a simulation experiment to evaluate
this bias in finite samples.
Second, we derive the mapping between the parameters of a model with ho-
mogeneous peer effects and those of a model with heterogeneous peer effects. We
then use a simulation experiment to give an example of parameter mapping when
peer effects are believed to be homogeneous but are actually heterogeneous in the
data generating process (DGP).
Let us suppose the econometrician estimates the following model
ya = (I − φaGa)−1(Xaβa +G∗aXaγa + ), (2.10)
whereas the real DGP is
ya = Ga(Ma(φabGabJbBδb + Aδa), (2.11)
yb = Gab(Mb(φbaGbaJaAδb +Bδa). (2.12)
This model misspecification results in an estimator of the endogenous effect φa
that is inconsistent. First, we are omitting the influence of the outcome of type
B agents. Second, we do not consider the indirect connections among type A
nodes passing through type B nodes. As a result, Gka, with k ≥ 2, is misspecified.
Therefore, the commonly used instrument G2a might not be valid as the exclusion
restrictions might be violated. Third, we misspecify the contextual effects (G∗aXa)
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by ignoring the characteristics of other-type peers. 27
Analytically, the bias is
E(µˆa) = µa + E(Z
′
aPaZa)
−1ZaPa(φabGabyb +G∗abXbγab),
where Za = [Gaya, Xa, G
∗
aXa] and µa = (φa, βa, γa). The bias is positively cor-
related with the direct influence of type B on type A, as captured by the peer
effects from B to A and the influence of the characteristics of type B on type A.
Table 2.3 shows the extent of this bias in finite samples through a Monte Carlo
simulation. Table 2.3 represents the performance of the 2SLS few IVs following
the same experiment design as in the previous section.28 We report on the case in
which the maximum number of connections is 10 for each node (as in panel 2 of
table 2.1).29 The first column reports the real value of the parameters. The second
column shows the performance of the 2SLS estimator in the misspecified model.
When interactions between groups are at work but ignored by the econometrician
it results in the size of the bias derived above. The third column shows the results
of the estimator when the econometrician considers the correct DGP (equations
(2.11) and (2.12)), but does not use the approximation of optimal instruments
(in equation (2.8)). In other words, we consider the case where the traditional
network IV approach is applied mechanically, thus G2aXa and GabGbXb are used
as instruments respectively for GaYa and GabYb. In short, only within-group
instruments are considered. The resulting 2SLS estimator is consistent but not
efficient. The fourth column reports the performance of our 2SLS few IVs (in
equation (2.8)), which considers the Hk matrix derived in Section 2.4(i.e which
27This issue also arises when full information about node characteristics and network structure
is not available. See Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011a), Liu et al. (2013) and Liu (2013a) for
problems related to the use of sampled network data.
28We use the 2SLS few IVs to ease the comparison of 2SLS estimators with the misspecified
set of instruments. Observe that the bias considered here is due to the misspecification of the
model rather than to the many-instrument issue.
29The simulation results in the other cases, i.e. when the maximun number of simulations is
20 or 30, are very similar.
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also includes between group instruments).30 Mean values for each coefficient’s
empirical distribution and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported.
Table 2.3 shows that the bias is large in the second column, especially for the
β coefficients. In the second column the bias is not large, but the problem is
efficiency. Our approach (third column) reveals no bias and improved efficiency.
In our second exercise, we consider the case in which the econometrician esti-
mates a standard network model (model (2.1)) when the real DGP is characterized
by heterogeneous peer effects (model (2.11) - (2.12)).
Let us define the following n× n matrices
G(a) =
 Ga Oab
Oba Ob
 , G(ab) =
 Oa Gab
Oba Ob
 ,
G(ba) =
 Oa Oab
Gba Ob
 , G(b) =
 Oa Oab
Oba Gb
 ,
where Ol is a l × l matrix of zeros and Olk is a l × k matrix of zeros. Let us
suppose for simplicity that β = βa = βb and γ = γa = γab = γba = γb and focus
our attention on the peer effects parameters. In this case model (2.1) can be
written as
Y = φGY +Xβ +G∗Xγ +  (2.13)
= (φaG(a) + φabG(ab) + φbaG(ba) + φbG(b))Y +Xβ +G
∗Xγ + .
Hence, the peer effects parameter, φ, is the following non-linear function of het-
erogeneous peer effects
φ = φaG
−1G(a) + φabG−1G(ab) + φbaG−1G(ba) + φbG−1G(b).
30First order approximation of optimal instruments is considered.
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If φa = φb = φab = φba = φ, then
φaG(a) +φabG(ab) +φbaG(ba) +φbG(b) = φ(G(a) +G(ab) +G(ba) +G(b)) = φG.
Table 2.4 contains the results of a simulation experiment in which we estimate
model (2.13), for different values of φa, φb, φab and φba. The simulation set-up is
as before- the data generating process remains as in equations (2.11) and (2.12)).
The estimator considered is the 2SLS few IVs.
In the first column, we set all the φ parameters equal to 0.1. In fact, the 2SLS
few IVs consistently estimates φ = φa = φb = φab = φba. In the second column,
we add some heterogeneity. We set φab = 0.3 and φba = 0.3, leaving the other
parameters unchanged. The third column corresponds to the case in which all
the φ parameters are different. As expected, as soon as some heterogeneity is
introduced, the estimated value of φ is not informative at all.
2.6 Impact Evaluation and Treatment Effect
Let us now highlight the importance of our analysis for the identification of treat-
ment response with spillovers. Let A be the set of eligible recipients and B the set
of ineligible recipients of a treatment (respectively eligibles and ineligibles here-
after). The treatment is administrated using a randomized controlled experiment.
Having in mind policy interventions such as conditional cash transfer or microfi-
nance subsidies can be useful. Let Ta be the binary treatment vector whose ith
element is Ta,i = {0, 1}, which indicates whether i is treated or not (among the
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eligibles).31 Model (2.2) and (2.3) can be written as
Ya = φaGaYa + φabGabYb +X
∗
aβ
∗
a + δaTa + ρaGaTa +G
∗
abXbγab + a, (2.14)
Yb = φbGbYb + φbaGbaYa +X
∗
b β
∗
b +G
∗
baXaγba +GbaTaρba + b. (2.15)
In this model, the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)32 doesn’t
hold because (i) spillovers are at work and (ii) spillovers are heterogeneous. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that consider violations of the
SUTVA because of (ii). This is surprising given that heterogeneity in spillovers
is naturally implied by differences between eligibles and ineligibles.
Our results in Sections 2.4 provide consistent and efficient estimators for the
parameters of model (2.2) - (2.3).33
2.6.1 Average Treatment Effect with Heterogeneous Spillovers
The Average Treatment Effect in our context can be written as34
31Our analysis can be easily adapted to the case of continuous or multinomial treatment.
It is also useful to recall an assumption already listed in the previous sections for estimator
properties, G ⊥ Ta, which here states that the treatment does not change the network topology.
This assumption relates to Manski (2013) which assumes that reference groups are person-
specific and treatment-invariant (unable to be manipulated by the policy maker).
32Following Rubin (1986), SUTVA states that potential outcomes depend on the treatment
received, and not on what treatments other units receive and that there are no ”hidden treat-
ments”.
33As mentioned in the Introduction, we do not consider direct treatment effect heterogeneity.
This assumption can be relaxed, allowing for a double form of heterogeneity: one coming from
individual characteristics, the other from the interactions. The identification becomes much
more complex. We leave this extension for future research. Following Manski (2013), we also
assume here that the treatment does not change the network topology, i.e. that the policy
maker cannot manipulate reference groups.
34When the treatment is a randomized control experiment, the average treatment effect is
equal to the average treatment effect on treated.
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ATE = E(Yi|i ∈ A, Ta,i = 1, X,G)− E(Yi|i ∈ A, Ta,i = 0, X,G). (2.16)
From the reduced form of equation (2.14)
ATE = δaEET (ma,ii), (2.17)
where ma,ii is the iith element of Ma and EET (·) = E(·|i ∈ A, Ta,i = 1, X,G)
indicates the expected value over the treated eligibles. The Average Treatment
Effect is thus equal to the direct impact of the treatment on the individual i
(i.e. δa) plus the indirect effect of other agents’ spillovers on i triggered by i’s
treatment (but not triggered by other nodes’ treatment)
δaMa = δaIa + δa
∞∑
k=1
(φaGa + φabφbaCa)
k.
Observe that ma,ii is a function of (Ga, Gb, Gab, Gba, φa, φb, φab, φba). This implies
that when network interactions are at work, the ATE depends on network topol-
ogy and strength of outcome spillovers among agents. As a result, an individual
can have a high increase in outcome even if she has a low treatment direct impact
(a low δa) but she is central in the network.
35 Observe that even if δa,i = δa( i.e.
the treatment effect is homogenous) the ATE can be heterogeneous because of the
different position of nodes in the network. Indeed, the ATE can be decomposed
into two parts
ATE = δa︸︷︷︸
DTE
+ δaEET [(diag(Ma − Ia)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
FLTE
. (2.18)
The first part is the Direct Treatment Effect (hereafter DTE), whereas the second
part is the effect of the treatment due to the interactions among agents, i.e.
35Of course the centrality itself is not a sufficient condition, a high level of spillovers is
required.
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the effect of i’s treatment that impact i through other nodes. We denote the
latter effect as Feedback Loop Treatment Effect (hereafter FLTE). The sample
counterpart of equation (2.18) is
ˆATE = µ′t[δˆadiag(Mˆa)]µt
1
nta
= δˆa
1
nta
∑
i∈NTa
ˆma,ii, (2.19)
where NTa is the set of treated individuals which has cardinality n
t
a < na, µt is the
nta×1 selector vector for that units and Mˆa = Ma(φˆa, φˆb, φˆab, φˆba) is the estimated
counterpart of Ma.
Treatment Effect Misinterpretation and Bias When SUTVA holds, ATE =
DTE. If interferences are at work, then ATE 6= DTE. However, the problem is
not only about interpretation. We show below that if spillovers are ignored, then
the parameter estimates can be inconsistent. Suppose that a treatment is admin-
istered to nta < na subjects and we ignore interactions among them. Estimation
of δa is based on the following regression
Ya = Xaβa + Taδa + 
∗
a, (2.20)
where ∗a = ρaGaTa +φaGaYa +φabGabYb + a contains the three relevant spillover
effects omitted:36 (i) the direct treatment spillover from other eligibles ρaGaTa,
(ii)the endogenous outcome spillover from other treated eligibles φaGaYa and (iii)
the endogenous outcome spillover from ineligibles φabGabYb. Misinterpretation
occurs because the estimate of δa is interpreted as a DTE while, if the data
generating process is given by equations (2.14) and (2.15), it is an ATE. Bias
can occur if the treatment is correlated with the three components listed above
36 The other omitted terms, X∗aβ
∗
a and G
∗
abXbγab, are independent from the treatment.
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δˆa = δa + bias = δa + (T
′
aTa)
−1Ta { ρaGaTa
+ φaGaMa[φabGabJb(ρbaGbaTa) + Taδa + ρaGaTa]
+ φabGabMb[φbaGbaJa(δaTa + ρaGaTa) + ρbaGbaTa]}.
The bias is due to the spillover effects coming from the three omitted components
listed before. By correctly specifying the interaction structure we can consistently
estimate the direct treatment effect purged of the influence of the three omitted
components.
It should appear clear from our discussion that, if the spillovers’ coefficients
and the direct treatment effect are positive, neglecting between and within-group
interactions result in an overestimation of the direct treatment effect. Manski
(2013) defines this scenario as Reinforcing Interactions. Of course one can imagine
different scenarios where interactions are not reinforcing and, on the contrary, are
Opposing Interactions.
Our approach has an advantage from this point of view- it allows interactions
between and within groups to be heterogeneous (e.g. Reinforcing Interactions
within groups members and Opposing Interactions between groups). We also note
that, using again Manski (2013)’s terminology, our framework can be adapted to
the estimation of social interaction with leaders and followers, labeling those
agents as groups A and B.
2.6.2 Indirect Treatment Effect
As mentioned before, the Indirect Treatment Effect (hereafter ITE) has been
an object of interest in several papers. Most of the existing papers focus at-
tention on the indirect effect on ineligibles (see, e.g. Angelucci and De Giorgi,
2009). However, when the population is split into two sets, it is also natural and
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interesting from a policy perspective to understand whether different types of
untreated (eligible or ineligible), are differently impacted by the treatment. Let
us define ITEE and ITEI as the Indirect Treatment Effect on Eligibles and the
Indirect Treatment Effect on Ineligibles, respectively.
The Indirect Treatment Effect on Eligibles in our model is
ITEE = E(Yi|i ∈ A,MiT 6= 0∩Ta,i = 0, X,G)−E(Yi|i ∈ A,MiT = 0∩Ta,i = 0, X,G),
(2.21)
whereas the Indirect Treatment Effect on Ineligibles can be defined as
ITEI = E(Yi|i ∈ B,MiT 6= 0, X,G)− E(Yi|i ∈ B,MiT = 0, X,G), (2.22)
where Mi is the ith row of M =

 Ia
Ib
−
 Gaφa Gabφab
Gbaφba Gbφb


−1
, T = [Ta, 0b],
and 0b is a nb × 1 vector of zeros. MiT = 0 indicates that i is not affected by
any of the treated nodes (i.e. that there are no direct and indirect paths in the
networks between i and a treated node).
Let us now suppose that, given our data generating process (equations (2.14)
and (2.15)) we are asked by a policy maker to evaluate the Indirect Treatment
Effects after a treatment administered to the eligibles (i.e. to a subset of A).
From model (2.14) - (2.15) we can derive the following formulas
ITEE = EEu [Mai(φabGabJb(ρbaGbaTa) + δaTa + ρaGaTa)],
ITEI = EI [Mbi(φbaGbaJa(δaTa + ρaGaTa) + ρbaGbaTa)],
where Mai is the ith row of Ma, Mbi is the ith row of Mb , EI(·) = EI(·|i ∈
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B,MiT 6= 0, X,G) indicates the expected value over the (indirectly treated)
ineligibles, and EEu(·) = E(·|i ∈ A,MiT 6= 0 ∩ Ta,i = 0, X,G) indicates the
expected value over (indirectly treated) untreated eligibles. Observe that these
estimands depend on direct and indirect connections because of network-based
spillovers. More formally, they can be decomposed into different parts. For
instance, ITEE may be decomposed into three effects. The first term , δaMa,
captures propagation of the treatment via outcome spillovers.37.
The nice feature of this derivation of ITEI and ITEE is that instead of
simply addressing the question whether an ITE is different from zero, we can
also decompose it into different sources of treatment’s transmission. For instance,
one can find that the treated population has a strong reaction to the treatment
(δa and ρa are high) and transmits it to ineligibles through low magnitude peer
effects (φab is low). The same level of ITEI, however, can also arise from a
scenario where there is a low reaction to the treatment within group (δa and ρa
are low) and a large transmission between groups (φab is high).
Understanding these different channels is paramount for policy purposes.
Most importantly, our framework enables the researcher to distinguish the role of
contextual effects from peer effects in transmitting the treatment. In other words,
one can quantify how much of the effect is generated by the direct effect of the
treatment through exogenous variables (as captured by δa, ρa and ρba) and how
much is due to spillovers through outcomes (as captured by φba, φa, φb and φab).
Note also that having these estimates at hand, one can understand which effects
(within eligibles, within ineligibles and between them) are the dominant ones in
37Given thatMa = (I−φaG−φabφbaCa)−1, we haveMaδa = Iaδa+[(Ia−φaG−φabφbaCa)−1−
I]δa. The first term is the diagonal matrix of treatment direct effects which has (by definition)
no impact on the untreated, while the second term represents the propagation of those effects
through the network via endogenous spillovers (i.e. changes in outcomes due to treatment).
The second term, ρaMaGa, measures the spillover arising from the treatment given to other
units (ρaGa), as well as its amplification through interactions (as captured by Ma). Finally,
φabρbaMaGabJbGba, denotes the spillover accruing to ineligibles distinguished between outcome
amplification (MaGabJb) and (indirect) treatment effect (ρbaGba). A similar decomposition can
be applied to ITEI
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spreading out the policy’s beneficial effect.
We can thus simply use the sample counterpart to estimate the ITEE and
ITEI
ˆITEE = µ′u[Mˆa(φˆabGabJˆb(Gbaγˆba) + βˆa +Gaγˆa)]µu
1
nua
,
ˆITEI = ι′b[Mˆb(φˆbaGbaJˆa(βˆa +Gaγˆa) +Gbaγˆba)]ιa
1
nb
,
where nua < na is the number of eligibles who are untreated, µu is the na × 1
selector vector for that units and ιl is an nl × 1 vector of ones.
2.6.3 Total Treatment Effect
One can also be interested in evaluating the treatment effect on the entire popu-
lation (or network). As the SUTVA has been removed and spillovers are in place,
it is useful to derive the Total Treatment effect (hereafter TTE). Following our
previous notation we have the following definition for TTE
TTE = E(Yi|i ∈ A ∪B,MiT 6= 0, X,G)− E(Yi|i ∈ A ∪B,MiT = 0, X,G).
This represents the treatment effect on a generic individual in the network (eligible
or ineligible). Its sample counterpart is
ˆTTE = ι′

 Ia
Ib
−
 Gaφˆa Gabφˆab
Gbaφˆba Gbφˆb


−1δˆa
 Ta
Ob
+
 Gaρˆa Gab
Gbaρˆba Gb

 Ta
Ob

 ι 1
n
,
where ι is an n× 1 vector of ones. Note that the ˆTTE is basically the weighted
average of ˆATE, ˆITEE, and ˆITEI.
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2.6.4 Control Group
It is well-known that the ATE, ITEE, ITEI and TTE are identified if we
have a control group, i.e. if we can distinguish sample of units who are not
treated (directly or indirectly). This can be quite challenging when estimating
the indirect treatment effects. In a network context, we have two possibilities:
(i) a multiple network-based approach and (ii) topology-driven approach.
In the first case, we have multiple networks, some of which are randomly
treated and others which are not- offering a valid control group. A similar scheme
is often followed for policy design and evaluation in a non-network context.38
The second possibility is unique to a network approach and exploits the ar-
chitecture of networks. When information on actual connections is available and
the direction is known, it may be possible to estimate ATE, ITEE, ITEI and
TTE using only one network. The network topology determines the possibility
of having the control population if there are some nodes in the network that are
not influenced by a treatment to other nodes. For example, let us consider the
network in Figure 2, where the red nodes are treated and the blue ones are not.
According to the directions of the edges (arrows in the picture), the blue node i is
influenced by red nodes whereas the blue node j is not. Therefore, the direction
of the links between nodes stemming from this network topology allows us to
distinguish between indirectly treated nodes (node i) and control group nodes
(node j).39
2.6.5 Policy Experiments
Manski (2013) studies treatment response in settings with endogenous effects. In
this framework, endogenous effects are seen as a mechanism in which the treat-
38For example, in PROGRESA, a set of treated and untreated villages are surveyed (see
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) for more details on the program design).
39Note also that we need these two kinds of nodes to be comparable in terms of characteristics.
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Figure 2.2: Topology-driven policy evaluation design
ments could propagate.40 The main objects of interest are P [Y ] and P [Y (Ta)], the
outcome distributions respectively without and with a treatment Ta administered
to the population. Policy makers are usually interested in comparing these two
distributions since interventions are often finalized to reduce inequality between
a disadvantaged cluster and the rest of the population. The marginal effect of T
on Y accounts for the adjustment of the outcome after a policy intervention.
In this paper, we consider a network framework with heterogeneous peer ef-
fects similar to Manski (2013).41 In this section, we numerically study the empiri-
cal density functions P [Ya]−P [Ya(Ta)] and P [Yb]−P [Yb(Ta)], where the subscripts
indicate the reference to eligible and ineligible populations.
We perform a numerical simulation to asses the extent to which the under-
lining heterogeneity of the endogenous effects can affect the outcome response
for different groups. Our goal is to provide evidence about the individual and
aggregate implications of this heterogeneity. In the simulation experiment below,
we show that for some values of φa, φb, φba and φab it may be (paradoxically)
more convenient to treat a group other than the target one. This has implications
for the study of socio-economic inequality. Importantly, by allowing estimation
of all the different parameters of interest, our model specification can be used to
understand what nodes (or which type of nodes) should be targeted by a social
planner whose final goal is to maximize an aggregate outcome or to converge to
40If a dynamic model is at work, then a social multiplier may also arise in terms of expecta-
tions.
41The framework in Manski (2013) considers only one group, thus homogeneous peer effects
(and no between group interactions).
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a desired distribution of individual outcomes.
We present an experiment where we treat a random sample of nodes and
simulate the treatment’s propagation through a network characterized by hetero-
geneous peer effects. More specifically, we look at the increase of type A and type
B nodes’outcomes once a certain set of nodes receives a treatment42.
Two exercises are implemented. In the first, we evaluate aggregate effects,
i.e. the change in the sum of outcomes (for both type A and type B individuals)
which follows a treatment for different values of peer effects (i.e. φa, φb, φba,
φab). In the second exercise, we look at distributional effects, i.e. at changes in
the empirical distribution of individual node outcomes for different sets of peer
effects parameters following the policy intervention .
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 report on the first exercise. Figure 2.5 depicts the results
when fixing φb = φba = 0.1 and varying φa and φab. We generate a grid of values
for parameters resulting from two sequences: φa = 0.02, 0.04, ..., 0.50 and φab =
0.02, 0.04, ..., 0.50. For each couple (φa, φab) we generate one hundred independent
replications using the same DGP as described in Section 2.4.3 and compute Y sa =∑
i∈A yi and Y
s
b =
∑
i∈B yi. We then select a random sample of one hundred type
A nodes to be treated. This treatment is represented by an na × 1 vector Ta
of zeros for non treated nodes and ones for treated nodes. Finally, we compute
Y s∗a =
∑
i∈A y
∗
i and Y
s∗
b =
∑
i∈B y
∗
i , where y
∗
i = yi +
∂yi
∂Ta
TA. This exercise
represents the case where group A nodes are treated and there are low interactions
42We compute the marginal effect matrix of Ta on Ya multiplied by the treatment vector
∂E(Ya|G,X)
∂Ta
Ta = Ma(φabGabJb(ρbaGbaTa) + δaTa + ρaGaTa).
Note that when there are no interactions between the two groups (or only type A nodes are
considered in the analysis), we have ∂E(Ya|G,X)∂Ta Ta = Sa(δaTa+ρaGaTa), where Sa = (I−φa)−1.
This is the marginal effect matrix in a standard peer effects model.
The marginal effect matrix of Ta on Yb is
∂E(Yb|G,X)
∂Ta
Ta = Mb(φbaGbaJa(δaTa + ρaGaTa) + ρbaGbaTa). (2.23)
Observe that the marginal effect of Ta on Ya is different from the marginal effect of Ta on Yb
-an increase in Ta differently affects nodes depending on their type.
42
between nodes A and nodes B (φba = 0.1).
From equations (2.14) and (2.15) we have
∆yi = y
∗
i − yi =
∂yi
∂Ta
Ta =
{
Mai (φabGabJb(ρbaGbaTa) + (δa +Gaρa)Ta) if i ∈ A
Mbi (φbaGbaJa(δa + ρaGa)Ta + ρbaGbaTa) if i ∈ B
.
Figure 2.5 represents the differences ∆Y sa = Y
s∗
a − Y sa =
∑
∂Ya
∂Ta
Ta and ∆Y
s
b =
Y s∗b − Y sb =
∑ ∂Yb
∂Ta
Ta for all the possible combinations (φa, φab).
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Figure 2.5 shows that ∆Y sa increases steadily with φa (and slightly with φab),
whereas ∆Y sb remains roughly unchanged. These results are not surprising. If
there are no interactions (or low interactions) between the two groups, then there
is no reason why the outcome of group B should change. The variation in the
outcome of the group A depends on the extent of the endogenous effects (φa).
If instead there are interactions between the two groups, then the treatment
response depends on both φa and φab. For example, assuming a positive effect
of the independent variable, if a policy intervention targets a group when the
two groups have the same outcome profile, we expect an increase in inequality in
terms of outcomes between the two types when the within-peer effects (φa) are
high and the between-peer effects (φab) are low.
Figure 2.6 depicts the results when fixing φb = φab = 0.1, and varying φa and
φba. The experiment design remains unchanged. This exercise represents the case
where group A nodes are treated and there are increasing influences within nodes
A and from nodes A and nodes B (φba increasing up to 0.5). Figure 2.6 shows that
an increase of φba is beneficial for ∆Y
s
b , as type B nodes receive an impulse from
type A nodes. Interestingly, type B nodes may actually benefit even more than
A nodes (the treated group). Our results shows that when φba > 0.20, we observe
∆Y sb > ∆Y
s
a . In terms of policy effects, this means that if a policy targets one
43Some combinations are missing in the grid because it is unlikely to draw Ga and Gab such
that ‖φaGa‖∞ + ‖φabφbaCa‖|∞ ≤ 1. These combinations are at the edge of the parameter
space.
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group but peer effects between groups are high, then we can observe increasing
inequality between the two groups, rather than the expected decrease (assuming
that the targeted group has a lower starting outcome). In terms of the estimands
derived in Section 2.6 , note that the blue surfaces in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 are
simply ITEI × nb while the red ones are ITEE × nua + ATE × nta, plotted for
different combinations of parameters.
In the second exercise, we consider four points from the grid formed by φa and
φba and look at the empirical distributions of ∆yi∈A and ∆yi∈B . We estimate
these distributions using a normal kernel density. We consider the case where
φa = 0.1 and φba = 0.1 as a benchmark and then increase the strength of peer
effects among agents in different ways.
In Figure 2.7 we increase the effect within group A only (φa = 0.3.). While
this change is irrelevant for type B nodes, it has interesting implications for the
distribution of outcomes among type A nodes (Panel a). While in the benchmark
model (the single line), the distribution is quasi-bimodal (due to the treated and
non-treated A nodes), an increase of φa smooths the distribution (the bold line).
In other words, the higher the endogenous effects, the more evenly the benefits
of the policy intervention are shared among nodes (individuals).
In Figure 2.8 we increase the between-group effect only (φba = 0.3). Type A
density remains basically unchanged (Panel a) . The impact is instead apparent
on the outcome distribution of type B nodes (Panel b). One can observe an
important shift to the right. This means that non treated type B nodes benefit
more than non-treated type A nodes ( from the treatment to type A nodes).
The red and blue curves in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 are the empirical density func-
tions P [Ya(Ta)−Ya] and P [Yb(Ta)−Yb], respectively. They have ITEE×nua+ATE×ntana
and ITEI as expected values.
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
We generalize the linear-in-means model to the presence of two groups and
between-group interactions. We derive the sufficient conditions to identify the
model and propose efficient 2SLS estimators. We characterize the bias which
arises when interactions are ignored and evaluate it in finite sample using simula-
tion experiments. We illustrate the relevance of these issues for policy purposes.
If peer effects are seen as a mechanism in which the treatments could propagate
through the networks, then accounting for heterogeneous peer effects and between-
group interactions can be helpful in designing and evaluating policy interventions
that alter the outcome distribution. We show that when between-group interac-
tions are strong, an impulse to a given group can engender benefits to another
group which are even higher than those accruing to the target group. Examples
of types of interventions where the local non-target population may also be indi-
rectly affected by the treatment through social and economic interaction with the
target population are widely varied. For example, the recipients of conditional
cash transfers may share resources with ineligible households who live in the same
community or with extended family members, which could affect the incentives
to accumulate human capital (Angelucci et al. (2010)). School vouchers or other
incentives (such as equipment provision) to increase schooling of indigent children
may increase the learning ability of untreated children if, for example, textbooks
or computers are shared among classmates. A number of organizations promote
the deworming of children in the developing world as a public health and devel-
opment strategy. Supplying deworming drugs to a group of children may benefit
untreated children by reducing disease transmission, thus lowering infection rates
for both groups.
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature by providing a framework able
to decompose the treatment response into different components, including the
crucial difference between endogenous effects and effects stemming from exoge-
45
nous variations in the characteristics of the treated.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Assumptions and Discussions
Let us introduce some notation and assume the following regularity conditions:
a sequence of square matrices {A}, where A = [Aij], is defined ”uniformly
bounded in absolute value” (UB) if there exists a constant cb < ∞ (that does
not depend on n) such that ‖A‖∞ = maxi=1,··· ,n
∑n
j=1|Aij| < cb and ‖A‖1 =
maxj=1,··· ,n
∑n
i=1|Aij| < cb. We indicate that {A} is bounded only in row (col-
umn) sum absolute value as UBR (UBC). For the sake of simplicity we will assume
that n→∞ implies na →∞ and nb →∞.
Assumption 2.2. The elements of a and b are iid with zero mean, variance σ
2
a
and σ2b respectively, and zero covariance. Moments higher than the fourth exist.
Assumption 2.3. The elements of Xa and Xb are uniformly bounded constants,
Xa and Xb have full rank k, and lim
na→∞
1
na
X ′aXa and lim
nb→∞
1
nb
X ′bXb are finite and
non singular.
Assumption 2.4. The sequences of matrices {Ga}, {Gab}, {Gb}, {Gba}, {Ma},
{Mb}, {Jb}, and {Ja} are UB.
The first assumption is needed in order to apply the Kelejian and Prucha
(2001) Central Limit Theorem (CLT) of a linear and quadratic form. Assumption
2.3 is standard in the literature. Assumption 2.4 is exploited in Kelejian and
Prucha (1999) to limit the spatial dependence among the units. It rules out any
spatial unit root case. As Lee (2004) pointed out, it plays an important role in
the derivation of asymptotic properties of the estimators for spatial econometric
models. It guarantees that the variance of Ya and Yb is bounded as n goes to
infinity. Observe that this assumption is also crucial for the identification of the
heterogeneous network model, as shown in Proposition 1.
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Assumption 4 is a sufficient condition for identification of the social network
model. For assumption 4 to hold, E(Za) must be full column rank for large
enough na.
Assumption 2.5. Fa = lim
n→∞
1
n
f ′afa is finite and a full rank matrix, Fb = lim
n→∞
1
n
f ′bfb is finite and a full rank matrix.
Since the variance of the structural error is var(va) and the concentration
parameter (which measures the instrument’s strength) is f ′afa/var(va), this as-
sumption implies that the concentration parameter grows at the same rate as the
sample size. Such a rate is assumed in Bekker (1994). Hence, we assume that the
instruments are stronger than assumed in the weak-instrument literature.44 For
the sake of brevity we focus on equation (2.2), and we imply the same argument
holds for equation (2.3).
Assumption 2.6. There exists a K×(k+2) matrix ΘK such that 1n‖E(Za)−HKΘK‖2 →
0 as n,K →∞.
Following Lee and Liu(2010), assumption 5 requires that the (infeasible) best
IV matrix can be well approximated by a certain linear combination of the feasible
IV matrix HK as the number of instruments increases with the sample size. Once
we assume this, we can deal with the approximation of Sa and Sab. We have to
approximate this matrix since we cannot use it as matrix of instruments because
it is formed by unknown parameters. If HK has the following structure then
assumption 5 holds and we can obtain efficiency under certain conditions.
Proposition 5. If ‖φaGa‖∞+‖φabφbaCa‖∞ < 1, let us defineH(p)K = (Ha(p)K , Hb(p)K , X∗a , GabXb)
where
H
a(p)
K = (Ga(Ga, (Gab(Gb, . . . , G
p+1
b )Gba), . . . , (Ga(Ga, (Gab(Gb, . . . , G
p+1
b )Gba)
p+1(E(A), GabJbB),
44See Staiger and Stock (1997) or Baltagi et al. (2012) for a panel data version of weak-
instrument asymptotics. Another interesting extension could be to derive the estimator’s
asymptotic properties under many weak instruments. In doing so, we are allowing the rate
of concentration parameter to be different than the rate of the sample size. Consequently, we
can compare it with the rate in which K increases. See for example, Chao and Swanson (2005)
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H
b(p)
K = (Gab(Gb, (Gba(Ga, . . . , G
p+1
a )Gab), . . . , (Gb(Gb, (Gba(Ga, . . . , G
p+1
a )Gab)
p+1(E(B), GbaJaA),
where p is an increasing integer valued function of K, there exists a K × (k + 2)
matrix Θ
(p)
K such that ‖fa −H(p)K Θ(p)K ‖∞ → 0 as n,K →∞.
Therefore, the 2SLS estimator can be asymptotically efficient when we use an
increasing number of instruments.
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Appendix B: Some Useful Lemmas
Lemma 2.7. Recall that Za = fa+va. Let ef =
1
n
f ′a(I−PK)fa. As K/n = O(1):
(i) Tr(ef ) = o(1) (ii) v
′
aPKva = Op(K). (iii) f
′
aPKva = Op(
√
nK). (iv) ef =
O(tr(ef )). (v)
1
n
Z ′aPKZa =
1
n
f ′afa− ef + 1nf ′aPKva + 1nv′aPKfa + 1nv′aPKva = Op(1).
Proof. (i) See lemma B.3 (i) in Lee and Liu (2010).
(ii) Let us write v′aPKva = 
′
aS
′
aPKSaa + 
′
bJ
′
bG
′
baS
′
abPKSabGbaJbb. Let us
focus on the first term of the sum, since E|′aS ′aPKSaa| = E[tr(|′aS ′aPKSaa|)] =
σ2atr(|PKSaS ′aPK |) = O(K) by lemma B.2 (ii) Lee and Liu (2010), then by
Markov’s Inequality Pr(|aS ′aPKSaa|) ≥ α) ≤ E(|aS
′
aPKSaa|)
α
= Op(K).
For the second part of the sum, given also that SabGbaJb = Tab where Tab is UB,
we can apply the same proof and obtain the same order of probability. We then
have O(f(x))+ O(f(x))=O(f(x)).
(iii) For each j we have by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
|e′jf ′aPKva| ≤
√
e′jf ′afaej
√
aS ′aPKSaa = O(
√
n)Op(
√
K) = Op(
√
nK).
(iv) By lemma A.3 (ii) in Donald and Newey (2001).
(v) 1
n
Z ′aPKZa =
1
n
f ′afa −O(tr(ef )) +Op(K/n) +Op(
√
K/n) = Op(1).
Lemma 2.8. Recall that Za = fa + va, let PKSa = Ψa and PKTba = Ξba . As
K/n = O(1): (i) E(v′aPKa) = σ
2
a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆba(Ξba)]
′. (ii)E(v′aPKa
′
aPKva) =
σ4atr
2([(Ψa), (Ξba)])+O(K). (iii) [Z
′
aPKa−[σ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆbatr(Ξba)]′/
√
(n)] =
f ′aa/
√
n+Op(
√
K/n) +Op(
√
tr(ef )) = f
′
aa/
√
n+Op(1).
Proof. (i) E(v′aPKa) = [e1, e2]E([(φabSaGabJbb+Saa), (φbaSabGbaJaa+Sabb)]
′)PKa =
[e1, e2][E(
′
aS
′
aPKa), E(φba
′
aJ
′
aG
′
baS
′
abPKa)]
′ = σ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆbatr(Ξba)]
′.
(ii) By lemma A.2 in Lee (2001),
E(v′aPKa
′
aPKva) = E([
′
a(Ψa)a
′
a(Ψa)a, 
′
aΞbaa
′
aΞbaa]) =
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(µa4 − 3σ4a)
∑
i
[(Ψa), φba(Ξba)]
2
ii + σ
4
0[[tr
2(Ψa), φbatr(Ξba)]+
tr([(Ψa), φba(Ξba)]
′[(Ψa), φba(Ξba)] + tr([(Ψa)2, (Ξba)2])]
= σ4atr
2([(Ψa), (Ξba)]) +O(K),
where the last equality holds by Lemma B.2 (ii) in Lee and Liu (2010).
(iii) Since Z ′aPK = faa − f ′a(I − PK)+ vaPK, then
(Z ′aPKa − σ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆbatr(Ξba)])′/
√
(n) =
f ′aa/
√
n− f ′a(I − Pa)/
√
n+ [v′aPKa − σ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆbatr(Ξba)]′]/
√
n.
By Lemma 2.7 above and by Lemma B.2 (ii) in Lee and Liu (2010)
√
nf ′a(I −
Pa)a = Op(
√
(Tr(ef ))). By Lemma 2 (i), (ii) and Markov’s inequality for vari-
ance we have 1√
n
[v′aPKa − σ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆba(Ξba)]′ = Op(
√
K/n).
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Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. We need to prove that
E(Za) = (E(Gaya), E(Gabyb), Xa, GaXa, GabXb)
is full column rank. This means that if E(Gaya)d1+E(Gabyb)d2+Xad3+GaXad4+
GabXbd5 = 0 then d1 = d2 = d3 = d4 = d5 = 0, where d1, d2, d3, d4, d5 are
parameters.
By inserting the definitions of E(Gaya) and E(Gabyb) we have:
Ga(Ma(φabGabJbE(B)δb + E(A)δa)d1 +Gab(Mb(φbaGbaJaE(A)δb + E(B)δa)d2
+Xad3 +GaXad4 +GabXbd5 = 0.
More explicitly,
Ga(Ma(φabGabJb(Xbβb +GXbγb +GbaXaγba) +Xaβa +GXaγa +GabXbγab)d1
+Gab(Mb(φbaGbaJa(Xaβa +GaXaγa +GabXbγab) +Xbβb +GbXbγb +GbaXaγba)d2 (2.24)
+Xad3 +GaXad4 +GabXbd5 = 0 .
Let us assume that Ja, Jb, Ma and Mb are invertible and thus
Ja = (φaGa)
−1 =
∞∑
k=0
(φaGa)
k,
Jb = (φbGb)
−1 =
∞∑
k=0
(φbGb)
k,
Ma = (φaGa + φabφbaGabJbGba)
−1 =
∞∑
j=0
(φaGa + φabφbaGab
∞∑
k=0
(φbGb)
kGba)
j,
Mb = (φbGb + φbaφabGbaJaGab)
−1 =
∞∑
j=0
(φbGb + φbaφabGba
∞∑
k=0
(φaGa)
kGab)
j.
Going back to equation (2.25), we obtain
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Ga(
∞∑
j=0
(φaGa + φabφbaGab
∞∑
j=0
(φjbG
j
b)Gba)
j(φabGab
∞∑
k=0
(φbGb)
k(Xbβb +GbXbγb +GbaXaγba))
+Xaβa +GaXaγa +GabXbγab)d1
+Gab(
∞∑
j=0
(φbGb + φbaφabGba
∞∑
k=0
(φaGa)
kGab)
j(φbaGba
∞∑
k=0
(φaGa)
k(Xaβa +GaXaγa +GabXbγab))+
Xbβb +GbXbγb +GbaXaγba)d2 (2.25)
+Xad3 +GaXad4 +GabXbd5 = 0 .
The left side of the previous equation is the sum of products of the matrices
Ga, Gba, Gab and Gb times Xa or Xb weighted by different parameters.
45
Let us define J = (k, p,m) and C(c(1) ∈ A, ·, ..., c(l) ∈ B, J). C is a set of
paths, hereafter called a chain,46 of length l which starts from A and ends at B,
having k links from a type B node to another type B node, p links from a type
A node to another type A node, and m links between nodes of different types.
The concept of chain is particularly useful in our context. Indeed, the product
of adjacency matrices contains the same information of a chain. For instance
Ga ≡ C(c(1) ∈ A, c(2) ∈ A, k = 0, p = 1,m = 0) and GaGab ≡ C(c(1) ∈ A, c(2) ∈
A, c(3) ∈ B, k = 0, p = 1,m = 1). A similar characterization can be written for
all combinations (products) of adjacency matrices considered in equation (2.25).
Taking advantage of this notation, the system in equation (2.25) can be char-
acterized by the following two matrices
45The matrices sequence is multiplied by Xa or Xb depending on the last interaction matrix.
For instance G2aGab is multiplied by Xb while GbGba is multiplied by Xa.
46In this notation a chain includes all possible paths that have common features. For instance,
all of paths starting from A and arriving to B are in the same chain.
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C =
 Ca
Cab
 =

Ia
Ga
G2a
·
Gka
·
GabGba
·
GabGbGba
·
GabG
k
bGba
·
GaGabGbGba
·
GlaGabG
k
bGba
GaGabGbGba
·
GkaGabG
l
bGba
·
C(c(1)≡A,·,c(l)≡A,J)
·
Gab
GaGab
·
GkaGab
·
GabGb
·
GabG
k
b
·
GaGabGbGbaGabGba
·
GlaGabG
k
bGbaGabGba
·
GabGbGbaGaGab
·
GabG
k
bGbaG
l
aGab
·
C(c(1)≡A,·,c(l)≡B,J)
·

,Θ =
 Θa
Θab
 =

d1 d2 d5 d4 d3
0 0 0 0 1
βa 0 0 1 0
βaφa+γa 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
(βaφa+γa)φ
k−1
a 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 γba 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 γbaφb 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 γbaφ
k
b 0 0 0
· · · · ·
βaφbaφabφbφa 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
βaφbaφabφ
k
bφ
l
a 0 0 0 0
βbφbaφabφ
k
b 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
βbφbaφabφ
k
b 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
f(θ,J)g(Φ,J) f(θ,J)g(Φ,J) 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 βb 1 0 0
γab 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
γabφ
k−1
a 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 (γb+βbφb) 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 (γb+βbφb)φ
k−1
b
0 0 0
· · · · ·
γbaφbaφabφb 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
γbaφ
l−1
a φbaφabφ
k
b 0 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 βbφbaφabφaφb 0 0 0
· · · · ·
0 βbφbaφabφ
l
aφ
k
b 0 0 0
· · · · ·
f(θ,J)g(Φ,J) f(θ,J)g(Φ,J) 0 0 0
· · · · ·

,
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where C represents different products of Ga, Gba, Gab and Gb (chains) appearing
in the left side of equation (2.25) and Θ collects the relative coefficients. Θ has
five columns which distinguish the elements that are multiplied by d1, d2, d3, d4
or d5.
The lower panel represents chains starting from A and arriving to B (labeled
as Cab), while the upper panel collects chains starting from A and coming back to
A (labeled as Ca). The generic element of Θ is defined by the following objects,
θ = (θa, θb), where θa = (βa, γa, γab) and θb = (βb, γb, γba); Φ = (φba, φab, φb, φa)
and f(θ, J) = βaIJ,βa(βa) + γaIJ,γa(γa) + γabIJ,γab(γab) + βbIJ,βb(βb) + γbIJ,γb(γb) +
γbaIJ,γba(γba) is a set of indicator functions that take value one if the argument
appears in the corresponding chain and zero otherwise. The function g(Φ, J) =∏
k φ
k
b
∏
l φ
l
a
∏
m(φbaφab)
m keeps track of the number of times the relative chain
passes from one type of node to another scaled by the respective interaction
parameters. Observe that (d1, d2, d3, d4, d5)
′Θ′H∞ = 0 is equal to the condition
E(Gaya)d1 + E(Gabyb)d2 +Xad3 +GaXad4 +GabXbd5 = 0. The elements of H∞
are equal to the elements of C multiplied by Xa or Xb depending on the last
interaction matrix.47
From C and Θ one can argue that the model is identified in the cases listed
in Proposition 1.
Let us focus on case (1). For E(Za) to have full rank, it suffices that Θ has
full rank. This means that we need the linear independence of at least five chains
(rows of C), translating to the linear independence of Ia, Ga, G
2
a, Gab and GabGb.
48 The corresponding five rows of Θ are thus linear independent. Additionally
we need to have five linear independent columns of Θ, so having βaφa + γa 6= 0
and βbφb +γb 6= 0 suffices to reach the full rank condition for Θ and consequently
47Note that H∞ is the IV matrix considered in Section 2.4, which is approximated by HK in
the feasible 2SLS estimation.
48Note that here we need at least three chains from Ca and two from Cab because we are
considering the outcome equation for type A nodes, i.e. the staring point of chains is always a
type A node.
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E(Za). The same argument applies for case (2).
Relationship with chains and trees. In the proof of Proposition 1 we have
established the equivalence between sequences of products of adjacency matrices
and the concept of chains. In order to provide a better intuition behind the multi-
ple sufficient conditions argument note that, according to the proof of Proposition
1 notation, a set of chains with a certain length p can be divided in gp+1 number
of chains, where g is the number of node types. For instance, chains of length 1
can be classified in four categories when nodes are split into two types. following
proof notation we can define C(1) ≡ C(c(1) ≡ a, c(2) ∈ A, 0, 1, 0) ∪ C(c(1) ∈
B, c(2) ∈ B, 1, 0, 0) ∪ C(c(1) ∈ A, c(2) ∈ B, 0, 0, 1) ∪ C(c(1) ∈ B, c(2) ≡ a, 0, 0, 1)
(e.g. Ga ∪Gb ∪Gab ∪Gba = G).
We can see this system of chains as a tree, more specifically as a Tree-indexed
Markov chain. A tree is a graph with a distinguished vertex x0 ∈ g (here a type
A node, the starting point) and the degree of each vertex is at least two (in our
case the number of types, g). Its structure is basically determined by a countable
set of states (in our case the number of types, g) characterized by a transition
probability ({p(x, y)|x, y ∈ g} in our case).49
Let Ta := ∪l,JC(c(1) ∈ A, ·, c(l), J) (Figure 2.3), it is simply the collection of
all possible chains of all possible lengths starting in a type A node. For iden-
tification purposes, we simply need that Ga, Gb, Gab and Gba are not empty
(and not full).50 In words, it means that there are no reasons why two randomly
drawn nodes cannot be connected for each combination type (or that each node
49Given that here we are not interested in determining the transition probability law of a
chain, even if it is simple to estimate and is basically the link formation probability considered
for all of the possible combinations of nodes’ type. Benjamini and Peres (1994) give a detailed
discussion on Tree-indexed Markov chain.
50It is equivalent to say that the probability 0 < P (gij = 1) < 1, i ∈ A,B and j ∈ A,B.
Note that transition probability can be derived from Ga, Gb, Gab and Gba. Here we are simply
excluding the classical linear in mean framework (when the matrices are complete) and the case
in which there are no connections (when the matrices are empty).
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Figure 2.3: Tree of Chains when type A and B nodes are considered (or have connec-
tions)
Figure 2.4: Non-tree of chains when only type A nodes are considered (or have con-
nections)
is connected with all of other nodes).51
An interesting feature of this framework is that, as case (2) tells us, even if Ia,
Ga, and G
2
a are linearly dependent, we can still identify φa and the other param-
eters relying on linear independence of chains passing through type B nodes.52
In other words, we can identify the parameters because of the multiple branches
of the tree (see Figure 2.3).53
51From a Markov Chain perspective again, a more restrictive condition consists in assuming
that the underlying Markov Chain is irreducible and aperiodic. This means that type A are
connected with type B or type A with the same probability (and the same holds for type
B). Thus, in this case tree branches with the same length have the same probability of being
observed. The aperiodicity and irreducibility are not necessary for the identification condition
to hold, but of course are sufficient.
52Holding condition (2) instead of (1). We basically take advantage of linear independence
of Ia, Ga and GabGba instead of G
2
a
53The additional parameter restrictions (conditions (1b, 2a or 2b) in Proposition 1) are
basically due to an additional vector in the full rank condition (i.e. E(Gabyb)).
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Comparison with the identification conditions for homogeneous mod-
els. Let us conclude this discussion by further highlighting the connection be-
tween identification in a single group model and in a multiple group one. Let us
reproduce a single group model by considering only type A nodes. The model is
ya = φaGaya + βaXa + γaGaXa + a. (2.26)
In order to obtain identification we want (E(Gaya), Xa, GaXa) to have full rank.
Given that E(Gaya) = Ga(I−φaGa)−1(βaXa+γaGaXa) = Ga
∑∞
j=0(φaGa)
j(βaXa+
γaGaXa), the matrices used in the proof of Proposition 1 can be written in the
following way
C =
[
Ca
]
=

Ia
Ga
G2a
·
Gka
·

,Θ =
[
Θa
]
=

0 0 1
βa 1 0
βaφa + γa 0 0
· · ·
(βaφa + γa)φ
k−1
a 0 0
· · ·

.
As before, these two matrices respectively represent the chains and their coef-
ficients. According to the proof of Proposition 1, the full rank condition for
(E(Gaya), Xa, GaXa) depends on C and Θ. From C and Θ one can argue that
the model is identified if (see proof of Proposition 1 for details)
1. βaφa + γa 6= 0,
2. Ia, Ga and G
2
a are linear independent.
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These are exactly the conditions of Proposition 1 in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009).
Note that if Ia, Ga and G
2
a are linearly dependent, then G
k
a is also linearly de-
pendent ∀k. Given that here we cannot differentiate nodes, we have Ia ≡ C(0),
Ga ≡ C(1), and G2a ≡ C(2), where C(k) represent the set of chains with length k.
In terms of chains it means that C(k) ≡ {C(k − 1), C(1)} ≡ {C(k − 2), C(2)} ≡
· · · ≡ {C(2), C(k − 2)} ≡ {C(1), C(k − 1)}. In words it means that each chain’s
set can be represented by at least two sets of chains. So each Gka can be repre-
sented by the product of two matrices, GaG
k−1
a , G
2
aG
k−2
a , and so on. This is the
connection to the linear independence of Ia, Ga, and G
2
a as a condition for iden-
tification. In this case, a length l set of chains cannot be separated by node type,
and thus Ta is composed only of one chain (Figure 2.4) instead of multiple chains
(Figure 2.3).54 Therefore, we need Ia, Ga, and G
2
a to be linearly independent in
order to have at least three independent chains in C and consequently identify
the model’s parameters satisfying the restriction βaφa + γa 6= 0.
Proof of proposition 2. By the classical expansion the estimator is
√
n(µˆ− µ0) = 1n(Z ′aPKZa)−1 1√nZ ′aPKa. As Za = fa + va, by Lemma 2.7 (v),
we have 1
n
(Z ′aPKZa) = Fa + op(1). By Lemma 2.8 (iii)
[Z ′aPKa − σ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆba(Ξba)]′]/
√
(n) = f ′aa/
√
n+ op(1)
d→N(0, σ2aFa)
by CLT.
Hence, the proposition is derived by Slutzky theorem
1
n
(Z ′aPKZa)
−1 1√
n
Z ′aPK
d→F−1a ·N(0, σ2aFa) = N(0, σ2aF−1a ).
Proof of proposition 3. Given the proof of Proposition 2, it is sufficient to
54Borrowing from Markov chains vocabulary again, this is because the state that characterizes
the chain is only one (A).
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show that
σˆ2a[e1, e2][tr(Ψa), φˆba(Ξba)]
′/
√
n = op(1).
If we fix Ca, then by Lemma C.12 in Lee and Liu (2008) Mˆa−Ma = Mˆa(φˆa−
φa)Ga+Mˆa((φˆabφˆba−φabφba)Ca). So we can write, tr(Ψˆa)−tr(Ψa) = tr(PK(Sa(φˆ)−
Sa) = tr(PK(Ga(Mˆa−Ma) = tr(PK(Ga(Mˆa(φˆa−φa)Ga+Mˆa((φˆabφˆba−φabφba)Ca) =
(φˆa − φa)tr(PK(Ga(MˆaGa) + (φˆbaφˆba − φabφba)tr(PK(Ga(MˆaCa)).
Since the product of UB matrices is still UB (Kelejian and Prucha 1998),
using the lemma B.2 (ii) in Lee and Liu (2010) and the initial
√
n consistency
assumption, we obtain
√
n(φˆa − φa)tr(PK(Ga(MˆaGa) +
√
n(φˆbaφˆba − φabφba)tr(PK(Ga(MˆaCa))/n =
op(1)O(K/n) + op(1)O(K/n) = oP (K/n).
Finally, we have
√
n(σˆ2a−σ2a)(tr(Ψˆa)−tr(Ψa))/n = op(1)op(K/n) = op(K/n) =
oP (1) as K/n→ 0. The same procedure can be applied for
√
n(σˆ2b −σ2b )(tr(Ξˆa)−
tr(Ξa))/n and for the second element of the stacked vector v.
Proof of proposition 4. Let p be a finite integer. Let us define the number of
instruments equal to
K =
P∑
p=1
gp + o(1),
so that we have
∑P
n=1 g
p = O(gp). Since we assume K/n→ 0, we have∑Pp=1 gp =
o(n) by assumption. This implies that gp = o(n). It follows that g = o(n1/p).
Proof of proposition 5. We prove this proposition for H
a(p)
K . The same ap-
plies for H
b(p)
K . Let Θ
(p)
K be the matrix of true parameters derived from the p-order
expansion of Θ (see Section 2.3). If sup‖φaGa‖∞ + sup‖φabφbaCa‖∞ < 1, then
H
(p)
K Θ
(p)
K = Ga
p∑
j=0
(φaGa + φabφbaC
k
a )
j(φabGabJbE(B)δb + E(A)δa).
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It follows that ‖fa −H(p)K Θ(p)K ‖∞ = ‖(φaGa + φabφbaCka )p+1Sa(φabGabJbE(B)δb +
E(A)δa)‖∞ ≤ ‖(φaGa + φabφbaCka )p+1‖∞‖Sa‖∞‖φabGabJbE(B)δb + E(A)δa‖∞ =
o(1) as p→∞.
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Appendix D: Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications
(1) (2) (3)
10 max connections 2SLS finite IVs 2SLS large IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
φa = 0.1 0.100(0.032) 0.100(0.026) 0.099 (0.027)
φab = 0.2 0.201(0.031) 0.201(0.026) 0.197(0.069)
βa = 0.5 0.501(0.047) 0.501(0.047) 0.501(0.048)
γa = 0.5 0.503(0.081) 0.502(0.078) 0.503(0.076)
γab = 0.5 0.496(0.079) 0.496(0.075) 0.500(0.097)
20 max connections 2SLS finite IVs 2SLS large IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
φa = 0.1 0.098(0.025) 0.098(0.020) 0.100(0.020)
φab = 0.2 0.197(0.023) 0.195(0.019) 0.200(0.019)
βa = 0.5 0.501(0.048) 0.501(0.048) 0.501(0.048)
γa = 0.5 0.506(0.096) 0.506(0.093) 0.503(0.093)
γab = 0.5 0.500(0.097) 0.497(0.093) 0.496(0.093)
30 max connections 2SLS finite IVs 2SLS large IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
φa = 0.1 0.099(0.020) 0.098(0.016) 0.099(0.016)
φab = 0.2 0.198(0.019) 0.195(0.015) 0.199(0.015)
βa = 0.5 0.500(0.048) 0.501(0.047) 0.501(0.047)
γa = 0.5 0.506(0.110) 0.507(0.107) 0.505(0.107)
γab = 0.5 0.500(0.112) 0.498(0.109) 0.497(0.109)
Note: yb is generated with φb = 0.1, φba = 0.2, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5
Table 2.2: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications
(1) (2) (3)
20 max connections 2SLS few IVs 2SLS many IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
φa = 0.1 0.099(0.040) 0.095(0.032) 0.097(0.032)
φab = 0.1 0.101(0.038) 0.101(0.031) 0.099(0.031)
βa = 0.5 0.501(0.047) 0.505(0.047) 0.501(0.047)
γa = 0.5 0.504(0.084) 0.506(0.081) 0.506(0.080)
γab = 0.5 0.497(0.083) 0.497(0.078) 0.498(0.078)
Note: yb is generated with φb = 0.1, φba = 0.1, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5
20 max connections 2SLS few IVs 2SLS many IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
φa = 0.1 0.097(0.029) 0.097(0.022) 0.103(0.022)
φab = 0.3 0.298(0.027) 0.298(0.021) 0.302(0.021)
βa = 0.5 0.501(0.048) 0.501(0.048) 0.501(0.048)
γa = 0.5 0.506(0.077) 0.506(0.075) 0.501(0.075)
γab = 0.5 0.500(0.076) 0.500(0.072) 0.496(0.072)
Note: yb is generated with φb = 0.1, φba = 0.3, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5
20 max connections 2SLS few IVs 2SLS many IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
φa = 0.1 0.099(0.016) 0.097(0.010) 0.091(0.452)
φab = 0.4 0.390(0.012) 0.370(0.008) 0.401(0.064)
βa = 0.5 0.501(0.048) 0.501(0.048) 0.502(0.079)
γa = 0.5 0.505(0.074) 0.504(0.073) 0.502(0.073)
γab = 0.5 0.498(0.070) 0.478(0.069) 0.498(0.582)
Note: yb is generated with φb = 0.2, φba = 0.05, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5
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Table 2.3: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications, 10 max connec-
tions, φb = φab = φba = 0.3 ,βb = 0.5 ,γb = γab = γba = 0.5
2SLS/Misspeficied model 2SLS/misspecified IVs 2SLS/correct model-correct IVs
φa = 0.3 0.3684 (0.0335) 0.2971 (0.0465) 0.2999 (0.0164)
βa = 0.5 0.3856 (0.1804) 0.4865 (0.2233) 0.5097 (0.1489)
γa = 0.5 -0.0016 (0.2315) 0.4929 (0.2102) 0.4963 (0.1765)
Table 2.4: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications, 10 max connec-
tions
(1) (2) (3)
φa = φb = φba = φab = 0.1 φa = φb = 0.1 ,φba = φab = 0.3 φa = 0.1, φb = 0.2, φba = 0.05 , φab = 0.4
φ 0.100(0.020) 0.178(0.021) 0.205(0.022)
β 0.500(0.031) 0.499(0.034) 0.499(0.033)
γ 0.446(0.022) 0.445(0.024) 0.442(0.025)
Figure 2.5: Policy experiment: varying φa and φab
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Figure 2.6: Policy experiment: varying φa and φba
Figure 2.7: Kernel density estimation of empirical distributions of ∆yi∈A and ∆yi∈B,
increasing φa.
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Figure 2.8: Kernel density estimation of empirical distributions of ∆yi∈A and ∆yi∈B,
increasing φba.
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Chapter 3
The Word on Banking: Social
Ties, Trust, and the Adoption of
Financial Products
Joint work with Eleonora Patacchini.
Another version of this chapter has been published as EIEF Working Paper No.
14/04
3.1 Introduction
What factors drive banking decisions? How people choose financial products?
A recent study conducted by the Financial Brand in 2011 reveals that, in the
previous two years, the percentage of consumers choosing online and offline word-
of-mouth (i.e. face-to-face) as the most important driver of banking product and
service purchases has increased significantly, whereas the share of those reporting
past experience as the crucial factor slightly decreased.1 The face-to-face chan-
nel drives about a third of consumers’ checking, savings and mortgage account
1The report is based on the Large Purchase Study conducted by S. Radoff Associates in
summer 2010 on a nationally representative sample of 1,000 U.S. adults aged 18 and up.
66
choices. It also explains about one-quarter of credit card brand choices. When
looking at the factors influencing banking decisions by age groups, the study re-
veals that for young people (18-29 years old), face-to-face communication is the
most important factor. Its share of almost 50% largely dominates both past ex-
perience and online word-of-mouth (both with shares lower than 30%). The low
importance of past experience is expected because of the young age of this group,
but why face-to-face social contacts are more important than online social con-
tacts is not obvious This may be further puzzling for those who think online/social
media has tremendous power to influence a large number of consumers.
Using an unique data set of friendships among a representative sample of
United States students, we investigate the role of social interactions for financial
decisions during the early adulthood.
A major challenge in the empirical analysis of peer effects with non-experimental
data is the ability to distinguish correlations in behaviors of individuals within a
group from correlated preferences of people that sort into the same group. Most
of the existing studies (see Jackson and Zenou; 2014) resort on the use of network
fixed effects to account for sorting into the same network (group formation). The
underlying assumption is that conditional on observed individual characteristics
and network-level unobserved characteristics, peers within networks are chosen
at random. A possible sorting into relationships (peer group formation) along
unobservable (individual-level) characteristics remains a major concern.
In this paper, we use Bayesian inferential methods to integrate network for-
mation with the study of behavior over the formed network. We show that such
an approach not only tackles endogeneity issues arising from sorting into rela-
tionships, but also those related to missing peers and/or missing links between
peers.
Our identification strategy hinges on three main features, which are novel to
the financial literature. First, the uniqueness of our dataset lies in the fact that
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it is based on direct friends’ nominations and provides complete information on
all nominated friends. This allows us to control not only for individual char-
acteristics but also for peers’ characteristics, thus controlling for sorting (into
peer groups) along observed characteristics. Second, because we observe indi-
viduals over networks we can employ a pseudo-panel data method and control
for network fixed effects. As mentioned above, this strategy helps accounting for
sorting along network-level unobserved dimensions, given that the influence of
any factor which is constant across individuals in the same network is washed
away. Third, we account for sorting along individual-level unobserved factors by
modelling jointly network formation and behavior over networks using a bayesian
approach. This strategy enables to control for the influence of individual-level
unobserved factors that might affect both friends’ choice and financial decisions.
This is the important methodological innovation used in this paper.
Our analysis uncovers one main novel and important feature. We find that
not all social contacts are equally important: only those with a long-lasting re-
lationship (strong ties) influence financial decisions. Moreover, the correlation
in agents’ behavior only arises among strong ties in cohesive network structures.
The length of the relationship does not seem to proxy for its intensity. The rich-
ness of our datasets allows us to distinguish between the two effects, finding that
it is the length of time spend together that matters the most.
This evidence is consistent with the literature in finance showing an important
role of trust in financial decisions (see, most notably Guiso et al.; 2008, 2004).2
When agents have to decide whether to adopt or not a financial instrument they
face a risk and they might value more the information coming from agents they
trust. Our analysis thus helps understanding why face-to-face social contacts are
more important than online social contacts. Online word-of-mouth can be seen
2Butler et al. (2012) highlight financial advice as an important example of trust-based ex-
change. In the US, 73% of all retail investors consult a financial advisor before purchasing
shares (Hung et al.; 2008).
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as a less reliable source of information, since the agents spreading the information
are not personally known and consequently not necessarily trustworthy.
Financial and payment instruments are fundamental in the economy smooth
functioning as a support for money and asset transfers among agents. The adop-
tion of novel and technology-based financial instruments are trust-intensive deci-
sions, people might trust other people when collecting private information about
a specific financial product.3 The role of social interactions is thus at the crux of
a full understanding of potential diffusion of technological changes.4
There are only a few papers that look at the importance of social interactions
in finance.
Hong et al. (2004) find that social households, as defined as those who inter-
act with their neighbors or attend church, are more likely to invest in the stock
market than non-social households. They present a model where social investors
differ from non-socials in that their net cost of participating in the market is
influenced by the choices of their peers.5 Their model predicts an higher par-
ticipation rate among social investors than among non-socials, and also that a
social multiplier is likely to arise from the correlation between individual and
peers’ financial decisions. Because of the absence of information on precise social
interaction patterns in their data (i.e. about who interacts with whom), their
empirical analysis focuses on testing the first model prediction only.6 Our anal-
3Algan and Cahuc (2014) characterize trust as an important driver of economic development,
and identify financial markets as one of the main channels through which trust influences eco-
nomic outcomes of a society. The relationship between individual trust and individual economic
outcomes is investigated by Butler et al. (2010).
4Economists have been optimistic that currency will be replaced by technologically more ad-
vanced electronic transfers and e-moneys of assorted varieties (see, e.g. Craig; 1999; Drehmann
et al.; 2002). The cost of a country’s payment system is usually between 2% and 3% of GDP.
Since the cost of an electronic payment ranges between one-third to one-half that of a check or
paper giro payment (see, e.g. Gresvik; 2009; Humphrey and Berger; 1990), promoting a shift
to electronic would reduce this cost. In addition, the use of cash is affected by the extent of
illegal activities including the avoidance of taxes (see, e.g. Humphrey et al.; 1996).
5Specifically, the cost for any social investor in a given peer group is reduced—relative to
the value for an otherwise identical non-social—by an amount that is increasing in the number
of others in the peer group that are participating.
6They provide evidence consistent with a peer-effects story by finding that the impact of
sociability is stronger in states where stock-market participation rates are higher.
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ysis complements their findings, as it provides evidence on the existence and the
extent of the social multiplier in financial decisions. As Hong et al. (2004) argue,
the presence of a social multiplier may help understanding changes in aggregate
stock-market participation over time. If the increase of stock market participa-
tion in the last decades can be associated with a decrease in participation cost,
then social interactions may have had a crucial role by amplifying the cost shock.
Using a high-stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage,
Bursztyn et al. (2012) find that both social learning and social utility channels
have statistically and economically significant effects on investment decisions. In-
deed, a peer’s act of purchasing an asset would affect one’s own choice because
one may acquire information from the choice of the peer (social learning)7 and
because one’s utility from possessing an asset may depend directly on the posses-
sion of that asset by another individual (social utility).8 Although it is virtually
impossible to investigate separately those two mechanisms with non-experimental
data, our paper presents novel evidence that it is not in contrast with any of them.
If one considers the learning mechanism, then our paper reveals that agents learn
more from peers they trust. A social utility -based interpretation instead sug-
gests that long-lasting (and hence trustworthy) social contacts are the relevant
reference group. If a conformism (herding) behavior or conspicuous consumption
is driving the purchase of financial products ( i.e., if it is the behavior relative
to the peers that matters), then it is important to understand who the peers are
with whom each individual is compared to.
Our paper is organized as follows.
We begin by describing our data in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents our
empirical model and identification strategy, whereas Sectin 3.4 discusses our main
estimation results. We collect some additional evidence in Section 3.5. In Section
7Theoretical models of herding and asset-price bubbles focus on learning from peers’ choices
(see, Bikhchandani and Sharma; 2000; Chari and Kehoe; 2004).
8A number of paper consider the ”keeping up with the Joneses” hypothesis in explaining
stock market behavior ( most notably, Gali; 1994; Abel; 1990; Campbell and Cochrane; 1999).
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3.6 we use simulation experiments to show the implications of social interactions
for the adoption of financial products. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Data description
Our analysis is made possible by the use of a unique database on friendship
networks from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent to Adult Health
(AddHealth).9 The AddHealth survey has been designed to study the impact of
the social environment (i.e. friends, family, neighborhood and school) on students’
behavior in the United States by collecting data on students in grades 7-12 from a
nationally representative sample of roughly 130 private and public schools in the
years 1994-1995 (Wave I). Every student attending the sampled schools on the
interview day was asked to complete a questionnaire (in-school data) containing
questions on respondents’ demographic and behavioral characteristics, education,
family background and friendship. A subset of students selected from the rosters
of the sampled schools - about 20,000 individuals - was then asked to complete
a longer questionnaire containing more sensitive individual and household infor-
mation (in-home and parental data). Those subjects were interviewed again in
1995–1996 (Wave II), in 2001–2002 (Wave III), and in 2007-2008 (Wave IV).
From a network perspective, the most interesting aspect of the AddHealth
data is the friendship information, which is based upon actual friend nominations.
Indeed, students were asked to identify their best friends from a school roster (up
to five males and five females).10 This information is collected in Wave I and
9This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan
Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with
cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment
is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. In-
formation on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health website
(http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921
for this analysis.
10The limit in the number of nominations is not binding (even by gender). Less than 1% of
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one year after, in Wave II. As a result, one can reconstruct the whole geometric
structure of the friendship networks and their evolution, at least in the short run.
About 10% of the nominations in our data are not reciprocal, that is there are
cases where agent i nominates agent j as best friend but agent j does not list
agent i among her/his best friends. We consider two agents to be connected if at
least one has nominated the other as best friend. Indeed, even if agent j does not
nominate i as best friend, it is reasonable to think that social interactions have
taken place.11 Such detailed information on social interaction patterns allows us
to measure the peer group more precisely than in previous studies by knowing
exactly who nominates whom in a network (i.e. who interacts with whom in a
social group).
Moreover, one can distinguish between strong and weak ties in the data. We
define a strong tie or relationship between two students if they have nominated
each other in both waves (i.e. in Wave I in 1994-1995 and in Wave II in 1995-
1996) and a weak tie or relationship if they have nominated each other in one
wave only (Wave I or Wave II).
The information about financial decisions is collected in Wave III. Unfortu-
nately, friends’ nominations are not collected in this wave, as some individuals
have left high school. However, more than 80% are still at school and the large
majority of the individuals (more than 75%) declare that they are still in contact
with at least one friend nominated in the past wave. Of course, new friends can be
created at the time of Wave III, and/or friendship relationships between school-
mates may change over time (see Section 3.3.4). The network of social contacts
during high school remains however a good approximation of face-to-face infor-
mation they are (or have been in a recent past) exposed to. The questionnaire
of Wave III contains detailed information on the use of financial and payment
the students in our sample show a list of ten best friends, both in Wave I and Wave II.
11An alternative definition of network link that exploits the direction of the nominations does
not substantially change our results.
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instruments like saving and checking accounts, credit cards, loans, shares of stock
in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or investment trusts. Table 3.4 re-
ports on the financial activity participation of the agents in our sample. More
than 60% of the students have a checking account, a saving account, and a credit
card. About 40% have a credit card debt and more than 30% has a student
loan. Interestingly, 25% of individuals own shares of stock in publicly held cor-
porations, mutual funds, or investment trusts, including stocks in IRAs. For
each individual, we construct an index of financial activity participation using
a traditional principal component analysis, where the loadings of these different
activities are used to derive a total score. Our measure of financial activity is the
first principal component. It explains over one-third of the total inertia.12 The
last column of Table 3.4 shows that each financial activity is positively correlated
with this variable, meaning that the larger the variety of financial products that
an individual uses, the higher the value of our indicator of financial participation.
The index ranges between 0 and 2.64, with mean equal to 1.47 and substantial
variation around this mean value (standard deviation equal to 0.77).
A unique feature of our data is that, by matching the identification numbers
of the friendship nominations to respondents’ identification numbers, one can
obtain information on all nominated friends. Such a data structure thus allow us
to investigate the role of peers’ adoption of financial instruments on individual
decisions.13
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, we provide a heuristic description
of a social network to illustrate the relationship between financial activity and
the network topology. Figure 3.1 shows a representative network. Each node
12PCA uses an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of possibly corre-
lated variables into a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables (called principal compo-
nents). This transformation is defined in such a way that the first principal component accounts
for the largest portion of variability in the data.
13The other existing surveys that report friends’ nomination are ego-networks, i.e. the re-
spondent lists her contacts and some basic characteristics of them (such as gender, education,
employment status). Detailed information about nominated contacts is typically not available.
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represents an agent, with the size of the node proportional to her/his level of
participation to the financial market. The lines represent the connections between
the agents; the thicker they are, the longer the interaction relationship between
pairs of agents. As can be seen from the picture, agents in more cohesive groups
characterized by a relatively high density of ties tend to show a higher and more
similar level of financial activity. This stylized fact motivates our analysis in the
following sections.
The sample of individuals that are followed over time and have non-missing
information for our target variables both in Waves I, II and III consists of 12,874
individuals. As is common with AddHealth data, a further reduction in sample
size is due to the network construction procedure - roughly 20% of the students
do not nominate any friends and another 20% cannot be correctly linked.14 In
addition, in this study we focus on networks with size between 10 to 50 agents to
cope with the computational burden required by the use of Bayesian estimation
procedures. Our final sample consists of 569 individuals distributed over 21 net-
works.15 Nevertheless, we report in Appendix E the results which are obtained
using traditional estimation techniques on the more extensive sample. They re-
main qualitatively unchanged.16 Table A1 in Appendix A gives precise definitions
of the variables used in our study as well as their descriptive statistics.17 Table
A1 in Appendix A also gives details on nomination data. The mean and the
standard deviation of network size are roughly 27 and 13 students, respectively.
On average, these individuals have 23% strong ties and 76% weak ties.18
14The representativeness of the sample is preserved. Summary statistics are available upon
request.
15Our results, however, do not depend crucially on these network size thresholds. They
remain qualitatively unchanged when changing the network size window slightly.
16Even in this case we do not consider networks at the extremes of the network size distribu-
tion (i.e. consisting of 2-3 individuals or more than 400) because peer effects can show extreme
values (too high or too low) in these edge networks (see Calvo-Armengol et al., 2009).
17By comparing those summary statistics with the ones of the original sample, it appears
that the representativeness of the sample is preserved. Results available upon request.
18Information at the school level, such as school quality and the teacher/pupil ratio, is also
available. We do not use it since our sample of networks is within schools and we include fixed
network effects in our estimation strategy.
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3.3 Empirical model and estimation strategy
3.3.1 The network model
Consider a population of n individuals partitioned into r¯ networks. For the nr
individuals in the rth network, their connections with each other are represented
by an nr × nr adjacency matrix Gr = [gij,r] where gij,r = 1 if individuals i and j
are friends and gij,r = 0 otherwise.
19 Let G∗r = [g
∗
ij,r] be the row-normalized Gr
such that g∗ij,r = gij,r/
∑nr
k=1 gik,r.
The financial activity of individual i in network r, yi,r, is given by
yi,r = φ
∑nr
j=1
gij,ryj,r+
∑p
k=1
xik,rβk+
∑p
k=1
(
∑nr
j=1
g∗ij,rxjk,r)δk+ηr+i,r. (3.1)
In this model,
∑nr
j=1 gij,ryj,r denotes the aggregate financial activity of i’s di-
rect contacts with its coefficient φ representing the endogenous effect, wherein
an individual’s choice may depend on those of his/her contacts about the same
activity.20 xik,r indicates the kth exogenous variable accounting for observable dif-
ferences in individual characteristics (e.g. gender, race, education, income, family
background, etc.).
∑nr
j=1 g
∗
ij,rxjk,r is the average value of the exogenous variables
over i’s direct contacts with its coefficient δk representing the contextual effect,
wherein an individual’s financial activity index may depend on the exogenous
characteristics of his/her contacts. ηr is a network-specific parameter represent-
ing the correlated effect, wherein individuals in the same group tend to behave
similarly because they face a common environment. i,r is an i.i.d. error term
with zero mean and finite variance σ2.
Model (4.1) can be extended to the case of heterogeneous peer effects. If we
19For ease of presentation, we focus on the case where the connections are undirected and no
agent is isolated so that Gr is symmetric and
∑n
j=1 gij,r 6= 0 for all i.
20Given we are modeling the financial activity of agents it seems more appropriate to consider
an ”aggregate” model instead of an ”average” one. The first type of models allows the number
of peers to be relevant in shaping the agents’ activity, while the second do not consider this
information, i.e. it uses average values of peers’ activity (see, Liu et al.; 2011).
75
consider that each ”ego-network” (i.e. the social contacts of a specific agent) can
be split into two different types (weak and strong ties), then Model (4.1) becomes
yi,r = φ
S
nr∑
j=1
gSij,ryj,r + φ
W
nr∑
j=1
gWij,ryj,r + x
′
i,rβ (3.2)
+
1
gSi,r
nr∑
j=1
gSij,rx
′
j,rδ
S +
1
gWi,r
nr∑
j=1
gWij,rx
′
j,rδ
W + ηr + i,r,
where gSi,r =
∑n
j=1 g
S
ij,r and g
W
i,r =
∑n
j=1 g
W
ij,r are the total number of strong and
weak ties each individual i has in network r. In this model, φS and φW represent
the endogenous effects (i.e. the effect of strong and weak ties’ financial activity
on one’s own financial choices respectively) while δS and δW capture the impact
of the exogenous characteristics of the peers - which are allowed to have a varying
effect by peer-type.
3.3.2 Identification and estimation
A number of papers have dealt with the identification and estimation of peer
effects with network data (see, e.g. Bramoulle´ et al.; 2009; Liu and Lee; 2010;
Calvo´-Armengol et al.; 2009; Lin; 2010b; Lee et al.; 2010). Below, we review the
crucial issues while explaining how we tackle them.
Reflection problem In linear-in-means models, simultaneity in the behavior
of interacting agents introduces a perfect collinearity between the expected mean
outcome of the group and its mean characteristics. Therefore, it is difficult to
differentiate between the effect of peers’ choice of effort (endogenous effects) and
peers’ characteristics (contextual effects) that do have an impact on their effort
choice (the so-called reflection problem; Manski; 1993). Basically, the reflection
problem arises because, in the standard approach, individuals interact in groups -
individuals are affected by all individuals belonging to their group and by nobody
outside the group. In the case of social networks, instead, this is nearly never true
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since the reference group is individual specific. For example, take individuals i and
k such that gik,r = 1. Then, individual i is directly influenced by yi=
∑nr
j=1 gij,ryj
while individual k is directly influenced by yk=
∑nr
j=1 gkjyj, and there is little
chance for these two values to be the same unless the network is complete (i.e.
everybody is linked with everybody).21
Correlated effects While a network approach allows us to distinguish en-
dogenous effects from correlated effects, it does not necessarily estimate the causal
effect of peers’ influence on individual behavior. The estimation results might be
flawed because of the presence of peer-group specific unobservable factors affecting
both individual and peer behavior. For example, a correlation between the indi-
vidual and the peer-school performance may be due to an exposure to common
factors (e.g. having good teachers) rather than to social interactions. The way
in which this has been addressed in the literature is to exploit the architecture
of network contacts to construct valid IVs for the endogenous effect. Since peer
groups are individual specific in social networks, the characteristics of indirect
friends are natural candidates. Consider the network in Figure 3.2. Individual k
affects the behavior of individual i only through her/his common friend j, and
she/he is not exposed to the factors affecting the peer group consisting of indi-
vidual i and individual j. As a result, the characteristics xk of individual k are
valid instruments for yj, the endogenous outcome of j.
Sorting In most cases, individuals sort into groups non-randomly. For exam-
ple, students whose parents are low-educated (or worse than average in unmea-
sured ways) would be more likely to sort with low human capital peers. If the
variables that drive this process of selection are not fully observable, potential
correlations between (unobserved) group-specific factors and the target regressors
are major sources of bias. The richness of social network data (where we observe
individuals over networks) provides a possible way out by the use of network fixed
21Formally, social effects are identified (i.e. no reflection problem) if I, G, G2 and G3 are
linearly independent, where G = diag(Gr)r=1,..r¯.
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effects. Network fixed effects are a remedy for the selection bias that originates
from the possible sorting of individuals with similar unobserved characteristics
into a network. The underlying assumption is that such unobserved character-
istics are common to the individuals within each network. This is reasonable in
our case study where the networks are quite small (see Section 3).
However, if there are individual-level unobservables that drive both network
formation and outcome choice, this strategy fails. For example, one can envision
the existence of unobservable (or unmeasurable) factors, such as risk aversion or
optimism, which are possibly relevant both in social contexts and for financial
decisions making. Recently, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh
and Lee (2011) highlight the fact that endogeneity of this sort can be included in
the model. Individual-level correlated unobservables would motivate the use of
parametric modeling assumptions and Bayesian inferential methods to integrate
a network formation with the study of behavior over the formed networks. The
next section contains the results which are obtained by applying this approach
to our case.
3.3.3 Endogenous Network Formation
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2011) propose two
slightly different ways to estimate peer effects with unobservables driving both
link formation and outcome.22 In Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) un-
observables are dichotomous and only one network is considered. As we have
multiple networks in our data, we follow Hsieh and Lee (2011).23 They present
a model with one peer-type - which correspond to Model (4.1). We implement
22The Bayesian approach allows to model couple-specific unobserved heterogeneity, for each
possible couple in the sample. A traditional Heckman-type selection model is configured to
capture individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity. The inclusion of alter heterogeneity would
imply the computation of high-dimensional multivariate normal integrals, which is unfeasible
using standard methods.
23Another difference between those two procedures is that Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens
(2013) set the same unobservable in both link formation and outcome equation while Hsieh and
Lee (2011) use different unobservables for those equations and let them to be correlated.
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here an extension of their method to the case of heterogeneous peer effects. If
there is an unobservable characteristic that drives the choice of, say, strong ties
and is correlated with i,r then g
S
ij,r is endogenous - estimates of Model (3.2) are
biased. By failing to account for similarities in (unobserved) characteristics, sim-
ilar behaviors might mistakenly be attributed to peer influence when they simply
result from similar characteristics. Let zi,r denote such an unobserved character-
istic which influence the link formation process. Let us also assume that zi,r is
correlated with i,r in Model (3.2) according to a bivariate normal distribution
(zi,r, i,r) ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
 σ2z σεz
σεz σ
2
ε

 . (3.3)
Agents choose social contacts at two points in time, t-1 and t. At each time, agent
i chooses to be friends with j according to a vector of observed and unobserved
characteristics in a standard link formation probabilistic model
P (gij,r,t−1 = 1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt−1, θt−1) = Λ(γ0,t−1+
∑
k
|xi,r−xj,r|γk,t−1+|zi,r−zj,r|θt−1),
(3.4)
and
P (gij,r,t = 1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, gij,r,t−1, γt, θt, λ) = Λ(γ0,t+λgij,r,t−1+
∑
k
|xi,r−xj,r|γk,t+|zi,r−zj,r|θt),
(3.5)
where Λ(·) is a logistic function. Homophily behavior in the unobserved char-
acteristics implies that θτ < 0, where τ = t − 1, t, this meaning that the closer
two individuals are in terms of unobservable characteristics, the higher is the
probability that they are friends. The same argument holds for observables. If
σεz and θτ are different from zero, then networks g
S
ij,r and g
W
ij,r in model (4.1) are
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endogenous. From Model (3.4) - (3.5), the probability of observing a weak tie is
P (gWij,r = 1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt, θt, λ, γt−1, θt−1)
= P (gij,r,t = 1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt, θt, λ, gij,r,t−1 = 0)× P (gij,r,t−1 = 0|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt−1, θt−1)
+P (gij,r,t = 0|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt, θt, λ, gij,r,t−1 = 1)× P (gij,r,t−1 = 0|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt−1, θt−1)
whereas the probability of observing a strong tie is
P (gSij,r = 1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt, θt, λ, γt−1, θt−1)
= P (gij,r,t = 1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt, θt, λ, gij,r,t−1 = 1)× P (gij,r,t−1 = 1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt−1, θt−1).
In this way, we have modeled the probability of being a strong or weak ties
including unobservables that are allowed to be correlated with the error term in
the outcome equation.24 Joint normality in (3.3) implies E(i,r|zi,r) = σεzσ2z zi,r,
when conditioning on zi,r. Hence, the outcome equation is
yi,r = φ
S
nr∑
j=1
gSij,ryj,r + φ
W
nr∑
j=1
gWij,ryj,r + x
′
i,rβ +
1
gSi,r
nr∑
j=1
gSij,rx
′
j,rδ
S (3.6)
+
1
gWi,r
nr∑
j=1
gWij,r,tx
′
j,rδ
W + ηr +
σεz
σ2z
zi,r + ui,r,
where ui,r ∼ N(0, σ2z − σ
2
εz
σ2z
). Note that if no correlation is at work (σεz = 0),
then estimating equation (3.6) or (3.2) is equivalent. Given the complexity of
this framework, it is convenient to simultaneously estimate the parameters of
equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) with a Bayesian approach. Bayesian inference
requires the computation of marginal distribution for all parameters. However,
since this requires integration of complicated distributions over several variables,
a closed form solution is not readily available and Markov Chain Monte Carlo
24The procedure can be easily extended to include more than one unobservable factor.
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(MCMC) techniques are usually employed to obtain random draws from posterior
distributions. The unobservable variable (zi,r) is thus generated according to
the joint likelihood of link formation and outcome - it is drawn in each MCMC
step together with the parameters of the model. The Gibbs sampling algorithm
allows us to draw random values for each parameter from their posterior marginal
distribution, given previous values of other parameters. Once stationarity of the
Markov Chain has been achieved, the random draws can be used to study the
empirical distributions of the posterior.25
3.3.4 Network topology misspecification
Traditional estimation methods of network models hinges upon the correct speci-
fication of the topology of network contacts (as captured by the adjacency matrix
G).
There are two possible sources of misspecification: (i) missing nodes and (ii)
mispecified links.
The first relates to the definition of each agent’s set of peers. In our appli-
cation, we observe (and make inference on) the connection profile of each agent
at time t=1,2, while the financial decisions are made at time t=3. One can thus
argue that at time t=3 there are agents that are not in our sample but influence
an individual’s financial decisions. An example would be new social ties giving fi-
nancial advice at time t=3. The natural question is thus: how would the presence
of unobservable agents affect our estimation results?
The second stems from the fact that the connections among observed agents
may be misspecified. In our application, some individuals may not report at time
t=1,2 some friends who are relevant for her/his future financial decisions or an ob-
served link at time t=1,2 may not exit anymore at the time the financial decision
25See Appendix B for more details on the estimation procedure. An introduction to Monte
Carlo methods in Bayesian econometrics can be found in Chib (1996) and Robert and Casella
(2004).
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is made (t=3). Therefore, the question here is: how does link misspecification
affect our estimation results?
In this section, we shall show that the bayesian approach that we propose in
Section 3.3.3 is able to take into account a possible network topology misspecifi-
cation.
(i) Missing nodes
Suppose we have two types of agents in our network, observables (O) and unob-
servables (U). Model (4.1) can be written as
yi,r = φo
∑nr
j=1,j∈O
gij,ryj,r + φou
∑nr
j=1,j∈U
gij,ryj,r +
∑p
k=1
xik,rβk + i,r,∀i ∈ O;
yi,r = φuo
∑nr
j=1,j∈O
gij,ryj,r + φu
∑nr
j=1,j∈U
gij,ryj,r +
∑p
k=1
xik,rβk + i,r,∀i ∈ U.
where φo is the intra-observed agents peer effect, φu is the intra-unobserved agents
peer effect, φou and φuo are cross-groups peer effcts - w.l.o.g. we omitt the contex-
tual effects and the network fixed effects in order to avoid cumbersome notation.
In matrix form, we have that
YO = φoG
OYO + φouG
OUYU + XOβ + O,
YU = φuoG
UOYO + φuG
UYU + XUβ + U .
where GO has {gij, i ∈ O, j ∈ O} as a generic element, GU has {gij, i ∈ U, j ∈ U}
as a generic element, GOU has {gij, i ∈ O, j ∈ U} as a generic element and GUO
has {gij, i ∈ U, j ∈ O} as a generic element. The empirical model that we estimate
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is
YO = φoG
OYO + XOβ + 
∗
O,
where
∗O = O + φouG
OUYU = (3.7)
= O + φouG
OUMU(φuG
UOJOXOβ + XUβ)
with MU = (I − φuGU − φouφuoCU)−1 , JO = (I − φoGO)−1 and CU =
GUOGOGOU . As a result, it may be that E(GOYO
′∗O) 6= 0.
The instrumental variables traditionally adopted in the estimation of network
models, i.e. the characteristics of friends of friends, may not be valid.
Specifically,
θ̂2sls = (X
′
OPKXO)
−1
X′OPKYO,
where PK = QK(QK
′QK)−1QK′, and QK = [GO, (GO)
2
, (GO)
3
, ..., (GO)
K
]XO
are the optimal IV for the endogenous variable. If the error term is (3.7), then it
may be that E(QK
′∗O) 6= 0. The intuition is that the error term (3.7) contains
the characteristics of the observed nodes that are used as instruments.26
The bias takes the following form
B2sls = E[(X
′
OPKXO)
−1
X′OPKφouG
OUYU].
It will be different from zero if (i) φou 6= 0 and/or (ii) φuo 6= 0, which
mean no interactions between observable and unobservable friends and/or (iii)
tr
(
GOUMUG
UOJO
) 6= 0, which means that there is at least one unobservable
26To be more precise, in the error term the characteristics of observables nodes XO are
multiplied by φouG
OUMUφuG
UOJOβ i. Therefore the correlation of the error term with the
instrument depends on the structure of the entire network and on the interaction parameters.
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friend that connects two observable friends.
Our Bayesian approach would not be affected by this bias. It is not based
on IVs and it considers the presence of unobervable factors correlated with the
endogenous variable. Such unobservable factors may include those arising from
the presence of missing nodes.
In order to see more clearly why this is the case, let us assume that z as
defined in (3.3) is
z = s+ φouG
OUYU
where s is a vector capturing other unobservables characteristics (which can also
be zero). Let us denote z = s + x˜ + ε˜, where x˜ = φouG
OUMU(φuG
UOJOXOβ +
XUβ) and ε˜ = φouG
OUMU(φuG
UOJOO+
U). For the sake of clarity and w.l.o.g.,
suppose that E(s) = −x˜. The distributional assumption (3.3) implies that
σεz = σεs + φouφu σεtr
(
GOUMUG
UOJO
)
and σ2z = σ
2
s+ σ
2
ε˜−2σε˜s, where σε˜ = σεtr (Ω), Ω = φ2ouφ2uotr
(
(GOUMUG
UOJO)′(GOUMUGUOJO)
)
.
σεz captures the correlation due to the presence of missing nodes. It would
be zero is any of the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) would be zero.
A comparison between the traditional IV estimator and the bayesian estimator
should then be informative on the importance of missing node effects.
In our application, we find no significant difference (see Table 3.5, columns 6
and 7). Going back to condition (i), (ii) and (iii) it is very likely for example that
even if there are relevant missing friends (i.e. φou and φou 6= 0), those missing
friends are not common to any observed individual, given that after they leave
school at wave III they are very likely in different environments.
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(ii) Mispecified links
Suppose we observe all the agents but connections among them can be misspeci-
fied. This is likely to happen in our application since friendship relationships are
collected in a time different from when financial choices are taken. Assume that
the real DGP is
Y = φΓY + Xβ + ,
where Γ is the real adjacency matrix, with generic element equal to γij, which is
unknown to the econometrician. We observe
Y = φGY + Xβ + e,
where G is the observed adjacency matrix, with generic element equal to gij. We
can write G = Γ−Θ + ∆, where Θ is a matrix, with generic element equal to
θij taking value one if the ijth link is not observed but exists (i.e. gij = 0 and
γij = 1) and zero otherwise; ∆ is a matrix with generic element equal to δij
taking value one if the ijth link is observed but does not exist (i.e. gij = 1 and
γij = 0) and zero otherwise. Equation (3.3.4) becomes
Y = φ(G + Θ−∆)Y + Xβ +  (3.8)
= φGY + Xβ + ξ,
where
ξ = + φ(Θ−∆)Y (3.9)
= +φ(Θ−∆)MXβ + φ(Θ−∆)M
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with M = (I − φΓ)−1. Thus, as in the previous case, it may be that E(GY′ξ) 6=
0.27
Also in this case the instrumental variables traditionally adopted in the esti-
mation of network models may not be valid. We have
θ̂2sls = (X
′PKX)
−1
X′PKY,
where PK = RK(RK
′RK)−1RK′, and RK = [G,G
2,G3, ...,GK ]X are the opti-
mal IV for the endogenous variable. If the error term is (3.10), then it may be
that E(R′Kξ) 6= 0.
Our Bayesian approach would instead provide a consistent estimator.28 The
unobservable factor z in (3.3) can be written as
z = s+ φ(Θ−∆)Y
where s is a vector capturing other unobservables characteristics (which can also
be zero). Let us denote z = s + x˜ + ε˜ , where x˜ = φ(Θ−∆)MXβ and ε˜ =
φ(Θ−∆)M.
Assuming w.l.o.g. that E(s) = −x˜, we have
σεz = σεs + φ σεtr ((Θ−∆)M) .
σεz captures the correlation due to the presence of missing links. It would be
zero if (i) Θ = 0 and ∆ = 0, which means no mispecification of the adjacency
matrix and/or (ii) tr ((Θ−∆)M) = 0, which means that there are no loops that
include mispecifiefd links. Therefore, also in this case a comparison between the
27As mentioned in footnote 26, the correlation of the error term with the instrument depends
on the structure of the entire network and on the interaction parameters.
28In a Bayesian estimation, consistency means that the posterior probability of the parameter
is concentrated around the true value as the sample size increases, assuming that the true value
belongs to the parameter space being considered.
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traditional IV estimator and the bayesian estimator should be informative on the
importance of link mispecification.
3.4 Estimation results
The aim of our empirical analysis is twofold: (i) to assess the presence of peer
effects in the adoption of financial products, (ii) to differentiate between the
impact of weak and strong social ties.
3.4.1 Peer effects
Table 3.5 collects the estimation results of model (4.1), that is without distin-
guishing between strong and weak ties. Columns (1) to (6) report the results
when network exogeneity is assumed, with different estimation methods. Col-
umn (7) shows the Bayesian estimation results, which account for a possible
network endogenity. Columns (1) to (3) report OLS estimates with an increasing
set of controls. Column (1) includes individual socio-demographic characteristics
(age, race, gender, education, employment status, occupation, parental education,
marital status, family background variables, etc.), while column (2) extends the
number of control variables to include peers’ characteristics. This specification
addresses the concern that a correlation between own and peers’ behavior is sim-
ply driven by similar (observable) characteristics between peers. Finally, column
(3) adds network fixed effects, thus accounting for any further unobserved factors
common to all individuals in a social group. The issue addressed here is that
correlated actions between connected agents may be simply driven by common
shocks or sorting into groups according to network-specific unobserved charac-
teristics. Column (4) presents the estimation results using ML, that is when the
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simultaneity which is endemic in spatial models is accounted for.29 Columns (5)
and (6) are devoted to the IV estimates. As explained in Section 3.3.2, the IV
strategy that is now standard in network model estimation consists of exploiting
network architecture and uses peers of peers’ characteristics as instruments for
peers’ behavior. Table 3.6 reports the first stage results. The F-statistic con-
firms the relevance of the IVs. Because of the many-IVs bias that may arise
in estimating spatial models with IVs, we follow Liu and Lee (2010) and also
use a bias-corrected IV.30 Finally, column (7) reports means and standard de-
viations of the posterior distributions of the parameters of Model (3.4) - (3.5) -
(3.6), that is with correlated unobservables, estimated by Bayesian methods. We
let our Markov Chain run for 80,000 iterations, discarding the first 7,000, even
though ergodicity of the Markov Chain is achieved quite quickly. It appears that
the Bayesian estimates (column (7)) are remarkably similar to the ones that are
obtained using the IV biased-corrected (column (6)). This suggests that unob-
servable factors influencing the link formation are not relevant in the financial
decisions of agents. Indeed, the estimated correlation between unobservables in
the outcome and link formation equations (σεz) is not significantly different from
zero. For completeness, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the kernel density estimates
of the posterior distributions (left panel) and the Markov chain (right panel) of
φ and σεz. The time-series of the values of the chains (right panel) reveals that
stationarity has been achieved.31 Table 3.5 shows that the coefficients are quite
stable across columns.32 It reveals that the effect of peers’ financial activity on
29Spatial models are simultaneous equation models where peers’ behavior depends on own
behavior. This implies that
∑nr
j=1 gij,ryj,r is correlated with the error term εi,r in equation
(4.1). ML accounts for this simultaneity as it is based on the reduced form. Network fixed
effects cannot be included in the model because the group mean yr is not a sufficient statistics
for ηr when the adjacency matrix is not row-normalized, see Lee et al. (2010).
30See Appendix C for more details. For the sake of brevity, the appendix focuses on the case
with weak and strong ties. The case with one peer effect is just a special case, that is when
φS = φW .
31The kernel densities and the time-series of the values of the chain for the parameters of the
control variables are reported in Appendix D, Figure D1-D3.
32The estimate of peer effects (φ) using OLS is not surprisingly upper-biased. The IV esti-
mates also suffer from a bias due to the large number of IVs, that are employed when estimating
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own activity is significant and positive, i.e. there are peer effects in financial
activity. When observable and unobservable characteristics are controlled for
(estimates in column 7), in an average group of four agents, a standard devia-
tion increase in the level of financial activity of each of the peers translates into a
roughly 22% increase of a standard deviation in the individual’s financial activity.
In terms of the different financial activities embedded in the composite index, the
estimate implies an increase of about 9% in the individual probability of getting
a credit card, 6% in the probability of opening a checking or saving account, 4%
in the probability of buying shares, 3% in the probability of getting a loan, and
8% in the probability of having a credit card debt.33 These are non-negligible
effects, especially given our long list of individual and peers’ controls.34 Observe
that the policy maker can rarely manipulate peer outcomes. Peer effects can be
seen as a mechanism through which an exogenous shock could propagate through
the networks. We devote Section 3.6 to analyze these diffusion mechanisms via
Monte Carlo simulations. Interestingly, parents’ role does not seem to be crucial
for financial activity in our sample of young people. It should be noted that the
majority of individuals in our sample do not live with their parents anymore, and
less than 30% are not employed.
3.4.2 Peer effects by peer-type
Table 3.7 collects the estimation results of Model (3.2). It has a structure similar
to Table 3.5.35 Column (4) shows the Bayesian estimation results, which account
a spatial model (see Appendix C)
33We compute these estimated probabilities using the marginal effect of an increase of the
financial activity index on the probability of adopting each of the different financial products.
Marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean: m(β) = φ(xβ)β, where φ(·) is the normal
probability density function. Results do not change significantly if the average of individual
marginal effects is instead considered.
34Although the computational burden requested by the Bayesian procedure prevents us from
performing this type of estimation on the entire sample, we report in Appendix E, Table E1,
the OLS, ML and IV results for the entire sample.
35For brevity, we do not report here the ML estimation results. They are similar to the
IV-bias corrected estimation results.
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for possible endogeneity of strong and weak tie networks. The results in Table 3.7
do not change qualitatively across columns and reveal that the financial choices
of weak ties have no significant impact on individual financial activity, while
the financial choices of strong ties do have a positive and significant effect on
own ones.36 OLS and IV estimates seem to overestimate the effects. The IV
bias-corrected and Bayesian estimates are very close to each other. This also
means that also unobservable factors influencing the strength of a tie are not
relevant in the financial decisions of agents (σεz is not significantly different from
zero).37 Given that our networks are quite small in size, it is thus likely that
any correlated unobserved factor is already captured by the network fixed effects.
The upper panel of Figures 3.5 shows the kernel density estimates of the posterior
distributions of φS and φW . Two features of note are: (i) the distribution of φW
is centered on zero; (ii) the distribution of φS is shifted towards the right.38 This
confirms that the effect of weak ties is virtually zero and that of strong ties is
different from zero and positive. The lower panels depict the time-series of the
values of the chain, which reveal that stationarity has been achieved.
In terms of magnitude, in an average group of four strong ties, a standard
deviation increase in the financial activity of each of the peers translates into a
27% increase of a standard deviation in the individual’s financial activity. This
yields increases of about 26% in the probability of getting a credit card, 7% in
the probability of opening a checking or saving account, 5% in the probability of
buying shares, 4% in the probability of getting a loan, and 10% in the probability
36When estimating model (3.2) including only strong ties (i.e. gWij,r = 0), we obtain compa-
rable results.
37Observe that we model unobserved factors at the individual level. This means that the
unobserved factors affecting weak and strong tie formation may be different.
38Borrowing from decision theory, we can say that φS stochastically dominates φW , that
is P (φS ≥ x) ≥ P (φW ≥ x),∀x ∈ R (first-order stochastic dominance). Figure 3.5 also
shows that the distribution of φS is negatively (left) skewed. This is due to the condition on
the autoregressive parameter in spatial models (peer effect parameter) that guarantees matrix
inversion in Model (3.2). More specifically, the parameter space is (-0.10,0.10) for our network.
While this is never binding for φW , φS is constrained to be below the upper bound. See
Appendix B for model details.
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of having a credit card debt.
3.4.3 Network Formation
For completeness, Table 3.8 reports on the factors driving link formation in Wave I
and II. It shows the complete list of estimation results of Model (3.4)-(3.5)-(3.6),
that is when network formation and behavior over network are simultaneously
estimated.39 The estimates of the outcome equation (first column) are the ones
in column (4) of Table 3.7. Looking at the estimates of the network formation
model in the last two columns, one can see that all the significant coefficients
are negative. This evidence reveals homophily behavior- the closer two agents
are in terms of observable characteristics the higher is the likelihood of a link
between them. Interestingly, the factors predicting the existence of a link slightly
change between Wave I and Wave II. While family background characteristics
(such as parental education and income) are important in Wave I, when the stu-
dent grows up individual characteristics (such as own income and employment
status) acquire more importance. Importantly, it appears that there are unob-
served factors which are relevant in network formation both for Wave I and II.
Those factors, however, are not correlated with the error term in the outcome
equation. Indeed, the estimate of σεz is not statistically significant. In our case
where networks are quite small, the inclusion of network fixed effects is likely to
control for correlated unobservables. As a result, the use of traditional estimation
strategies with network fixed effects that treat network formation as exogenous
are not likely to produce biased coefficient estimates. This is why our estimates
in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3.5 and in columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.7 are
similar.
39The kernel densities and the time-series of the values of the chain for the parameters of the
network formation equation at time t (equation (3.5)) are reported in Appendix D, Figure D4.
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3.5 Understanding the mechanism
By exploiting the recent advances in the econometrics of social networks, our
estimation strategy accounts for a possible sorting of agents into networks and
controls for unobserved individual characteristics. These unobserved factors pos-
sibly capture characteristics such as risk aversion and optimism. Having thus
ruled out possible effects of confounding factors, we should believe in a causal
effect of peers’ behavior on individual behavior which depend on the length of
the friendship relationship. Thus, the relevant question is why strong ties are
important whereas weak ties are not.
One possibility is that when agents have to decide whether to adopt a financial
instrument, they face a risk and place higher value on information from (or the
behavior of) agents they trust more. Trust has been widely studied as an impor-
tant driver of financial decisions Guiso et al. (2004, 2008) . The greater the trust
in a social tie, the greater the trust in her choice. Repeated interactions play an
important role in determining the level of trust. Several theoretical papers explore
the role of information transmission and trust formation in communities and net-
works. Balmaceda and Escobar (2013) model cohesive communities as complete
social networks emerging from optimal agents’ choices. Agents maximize common
knowledge and consequently minimize defection temptation. In their conceptual
framework where investors observe whether their direct neighbors invest or not,
complete networks are optimal. Their repeated game model with community-
based information flow let trust emerge among agents. The repeated interactions
horizon generates a bilateral incentive in letting relationships with more trusted
agents surviving over time. Karlan et al. (2009) view network connections as a
”social collateral” and argue that the level of trust is determined by the structure
of the entire network. They focus on borrowing and lending optimal choices in
informal contract enforcement by agents joining the network. The utility derived
from links prevents agents from acting unfairly and lets them repay the borrowed
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value. Kandori (1992) focuses on the role of ”social pressure” and ”reputation” in
informal contracts. Rewarded honesty and punished defection incentivize agents
to behave correctly. This incentive is created by repeated interactions among
agents.40 In his model, enforcement mechanisms work best in long-term relation-
ships. Strong correlation patterns in the behavior of connected agents is driven
by the presence and circulation of private information among agents.41,42 Lippert
and Spagnolo (2011) explore scenarios characterized by Word-of-Mouth Commu-
nication. Their game design lets ”network closure” be particularly relevant for
sustainability of agents relationships, providing a micro-foundation for the idea
of ”embeddedness” from Granovetter (1985).
The common vein of these theoretical models is broadly that repeated inter-
actions generate trust among agents, who in turn aggregate in cohesive network
structures. If our indicator of strong ties captures high level of trust between
agents, then an evidence consistent with this line of reasoning should be the find-
ing of an effect of strong ties on individual financial decisions in cohesive network
structures only.
Jackson et al. (2012) use the concept of ”supported” links to define a ”social
quilt”, i.e. a union of groups of agents where everybody is connected with ev-
erybody else (cliques). They provide an analysis of repeated interactions where
an individual’s decisions are influenced by the network pattern of behavior in the
community. Bilateral interactions may not provide natural self-enforcement of
cooperation. Any robust equilibrium network must exhibit a specific trait: each
of its link (bilateral connection) must be ”supported”. That is, if some agent i
40The Folk Theorem in the repeated game literature (Rubinstein (1979), Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986)) provides a formal model of personal enforcement, showing that any mutually
beneficial outcome can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium if the same set of agents
frequently play the same stage game ad infinitum.
41The role of private information in a community of buyers with word-of-mouth communica-
tion is also highlighted by Ahn and Suominen (2001). In this model, buyers receive signals from
other agents and adapt their willingness to buy a seller’s product. This mechanism incentivizes
the seller to produce high quality output.
42See also Greif et al. (1994) for an analysis of the role of bilateral and multilateral reputation
mechanisms in the organization of economic transactions.
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is linked to an agent j, then there must be some agent k linked to both of them.
Agents with ”supported” links tend to form tightly knit groups characterized by
a relatively high density of ties.43
The first panel of Table 3.9 reports the estimation results of Model (3.2)
when strong and weak ties are split according to their level of support. The
results confirm our conjecture. It indeed appears that the significant correlation
between agents’ financial decisions arises among strong ties in highly cohesive
network structures. Observe that the network structure per se is not a relevant
driver of behavior correlation. Indeed, weak ties in highly cohesive networks do
not show any similar behavior. It is only when agents have long-lasting friendship
relationships that a significant relationship arises. This evidence is thus in line
with the idea that a trust-based mechanism is driving our results.
Another possible explanation is that our indicator of strong ties, which is
based on the length of the friendship relationship, simply captures the frequency
of interactions. This story is not in contrast with our trust-based mechanism
described above. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge there is no theoretical
model or empirical evidence indicating that the repeated interactions that gener-
ate trust should be measured using the length or the frequency of the interactions.
However, it is important to understand whether correlated choices of financial
products in social networks are to be found only between agents with long lasting
friendship ties, or if random, intense encounters in a short amount of time could
also be influential. The richness of information provided by the AddHelath allows
us to shed light on this issue. More specifically, the Addhealth questionnaire asks
detailed questions about the frequency of interactions for each nominated friend.
The questions listed are: ”Did you go to {NAME}’s house during the past seven
43An alternative measure of network connectivity is the clustering coefficient. While cluster-
ing is a node-specific measure, support considers pairs of nodes (link-specific measure). Thus,
support is more appropriate in our analysis, which is based on bilateral interaction-types (weak
or strong). Observe that networks with an high level of clustering will necessarily display a
high fraction of supported links, whereas the converse is not true.
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days?”; ”Did you meet {NAME} after school to hang out or go somewhere during
the past seven days?”; ”Did you spend time with {NAME} during the past week-
end?”; ”Did you talk to {NAME} about a problem during the past seven days?”;
”Did you talk to {NAME} on the telephone during the past seven days?”. We
define a high frequency friend if the respondent has shared at least two of these
activities with the friend, and low frequency friend otherwise. The second panel
of Table 3.9 shows the estimation results of Model (3.2) when strong and weak
ties are split according to the frequency of interactions. It appears that the fre-
quency of interactions does not matters at all. The weak tie effect remains not
different from zero, regardless of the strength of interactions, whereas the strong
tie effect remains always statistically significant, with no statistical significance
in terms of magnitude between high and low frequency strong tie.44
3.6 Policy experiments
Using our data and the estimates of the parameters in Model (3.2),45 we per-
form Monte Carlo simulations to asses the extent to which the presence of social
interactions can alter the effect of exogenous shocks on the financial activity of
agents. The simulated shocks are variations in income, which is one of the most
important determinants of financial activity. In a simplistic view, an increase
in income can be interpreted as a decrease in participation cost, ceteris paribus.
Our goal is to provide evidence about the individual and aggregate implications
of strong and weak ties effects.
Our analysis can be used to understand which agents (or which type of agents)
should be targeted to maximize the aggregate financial activity participation or
to converge to a desired distribution of individual financial activity.
Four exercises are implemented. The first three exercises evaluate aggregate
44A formal t-test on the difference between high and low frequency strong ties in a pooled
model with interaction terms returns a value of 1.45.
45The Bayesian estimates in column (4) of Table 3.7 are used.
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effects, i.e. the change in the sum of agents’ financial activity after a given
intervention. In the first exercise the intervention is an increasing income shock
for a fixed number of agents (intensive margin) who have a different number
of strong ties. In the second, the intervention is a fixed income shock for an
increasing number of agents (extensive margin) who have a different number of
strong ties. In the third exercise, we increase the income of a fixed number of
agents who have no strong ties while decreasing the income of agents who have
strong ties and look at the final aggregate financial activity. The fourth exercise
reports on individual effects - we increase the income of a given agent while
decreasing the income of her/his peers and look at the consequences on her/his
individual financial activity.
Figure 3.6 depicts the results for the first two exercises. The surfaces represent
the variation of aggregate financial activity in our sample after the simulated
shocks. Panel (a) depicts the effect of an increasing positive shock of income
(h, x-axis) on aggregate financial activity for agents who have different number
of strong ties (ns, y-axis), holding constant the number of shocked agents. The
shock intensity is administered in terms of the estimated standard deviation in
our sample (std points). Each point of the surface is an average coming from 500
replications, where in each replication we shock a random sample of nodes of the
same numerosity.46 It appears that the higher is the number of strong ties the
shocked agents have, the higher is the aggregate effect of the income shocks. The
amplification effects of strong ties is sizable. Indeed, the aggregate effect of an
income shock of 10 std points administered to agents that have 4 strong ties is the
same as the one of 20 std points administered to agents without strong ties. In
panel (b), we increase the number of shocked agents (nh, y-axis), holding constant
46The number of shocked agents is chosen in a way such that for each category of strong ties
we use a numerosity not larger than the real one. In our case, the minimum number of agents
for each category of strong ties is 13 (when the number of strong ties is equal to 4). We then
shock 13 randomly chosen nodes for each category at each replication. The results, however,
remain qualitatively unchanged when changing the number of shocked nodes.
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the shock intensity.47 It appears that the aggregate financial activity is higher if
the shock is administered to agents with an higher number of strong ties. Indeed,
shocking 10 agents who have 4 strong ties produces the same aggregate result as
shocking 20 agents who have no strong ties. If policy interventions of this type
have a cost, then our results show that targeting highly connected agents can
help cutting costs while maintaining the same efficacy. Peer effects can in fact
act as a mechanism through which a shock is propagated (and amplified) through
the network.
Figure 3.7 shows how the network structure of social ties matters when nega-
tive and positive income shocks hit the population. The surface again represents
the variation of aggregate financial activity. In this numerical experiment, we
increase the income of a fixed number of agents who have no strong ties (i.e. with
no network diffusion of their shock),48 and decrease the income of an increasing
number of agents who have a different number of strong ties (i.e. with network
diffusion of their shock).49 We observe that the higher the number of strong ties
each shocked agent has, the smaller the number of shocked agents needed to ren-
der null the positive shock at the aggregate level. This evidence helps to explain
why some policies targeting a large number of agents did not reach the desired ef-
fects. Even if the observable costs of using, say, a new digital credit card are lower
than the cost incurred when using a traditional product, the social equilibrium
may fail to predict the expected rate of adoption of the new credit card. Social
interaction effects amplify whatever aggregate local preferences are induced by
exogenous cross-product differences in participation costs. Many agents may be
discouraged from adopting the new product largely because they do not know
anybody else that they trust who has adopted the product. From Figure 3.7
47The shock intensity is 2 std points. The results remain qualitatively change when changing
the shock intensity.
48We set this number equal to 13, as in our previous exercise. The qualitative results, however,
do not depend on this number.
49The shocks are symmetrical and equal to +2 std points for agents who have no strong ties
and equal to -2 std points for those who do have strong ties.
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one can see that if highly connected agents have a negative shock, then the ag-
gregate financial activity decreases even if there is a higher number of agents in
the economy that experience a positive shock, provided that those agents have
lower social interactions. For example, Figure 3.7 reveals that if 11 agents who
have 4 strong ties are negatively shocked and 13 agents who have not strong ties
are positively shocked, then the aggregate financial activity on average decreases.
Social interactions may be responsible for this (seemingly) paradoxical result.
In order to better understand this result, in our last simulation exercise we
consider the effects at the individual level of individual and peers’ shocks. Each
point of the surface represented in Figure 3.8 depicts the variation of individual
financial activity after the simulated shocks averaged over 500 replications. In
each replication, we randomly extract an individual i who has a certain number
of strong ties, increase her/his income by a fixed amount, and decrease each of
her/his peer’s income by an increasing amount.50 The exercise is implemented
for agents who have a different number of strong ties. We find that the higher
the number of strong ties the agent has, the lower the magnitude of the negative
shock given to the peers that is needed to cancel the effect of the individual
positive shock. For example, Figure 3.8 shows that if an agent has 1 strong tie,
then she/he needs the peer’s negative shock to be double in absolute value to
counterbalance the effect of her/his positive one. However, if the agent has 4
strong ties, it is enough a negative shock equal to one fifth of one’s own of each
of them .
3.7 Conclusions
In spite of the common consensus about the importance of word-of-mouth on
financial product purchases, the finance literature provides little evidence on the
50We set the individual income shock equal to 10 std points, while the shock given to the
peers varies from -1 to -20 std points. The qualitative results remain qualitatively unchanged
when changing such intensities.
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role of peer-to-peer communications. Much of the debate is about how to use
social media innovatively and effectively. Yet, a large number of consumers rely
on offline word-of-mouth when making banking product and brand choices, in
particular young customers. The scarcity of studies on face-to face peer effects in
finance is mainly motivated by the lack of appropriate data on personal contacts.
In addition, endogeneity and reverse causality issues make the identification and
estimation of peer effects a challenging empirical exercise.
This paper tries to fill this gap. By employing detailed data on each individual
and friends’ financial decisions for a representative sample of US students and a
novel identification strategy, we are able to uncover the existence and extent of
heterogeneous peer effects in financial decisions. Not all social contacts are equally
important. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that when agents have
to decide whether or not to adopt a financial instrument they face a risk and
they might value the information more coming from agents they trust. A social
multiplier may amplify consumers’ preferences towards certain products. Even if
the direct participation costs of adopting, say, a novel digital credit card are lower
than the costs incurred with traditional cards, many consumers may be deterred
from adopting the new technology largely because they do not know anybody
they trust who does so. Thus, if social interaction helps to increase financial
market participation, then an effective policy should not only be measured by its
direct effects but also by the group interactions it engenders.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics
Table A1: Data Description and Summary Statistics
Variables Description Average (Std.Dev.) Min - Max
Financial Variables
Checking Account
Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has a check-
ing account.
0.76 (0.42) 0 - 1
Saving Account
Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has a saving
account.
0.63 (0.48) 0 - 1
Shares
Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has any
shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or
investment trusts, including stocks in IRAs
0.24 (0.43) 0 - 1
Credit Card
Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has credit
card.
0.61 (0.49) 0 - 1
Student Loan
Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has any stu-
dent loans or other educational loans that have not yet been
paid.
0.33 (0.47) 0 - 1
Credit Card Debt
Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent has any credit
card debt.
0.40 (0.49) 0 - 1
Financial Activity Index
The financial activity index is measured using the respondent’s
financial activities listed above. The index is the first principal
component score.
1.47 (0.77) 0 - 2.64
Financial Activity Index of
Peers
Sum of financial activity index of respondent’s peers. 5.76 (1.81) 0 - 15.10
Individual Socio-demographic Variables
Male Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is male. 0.47 (0.49) 0 - 1
Latino Race dummies. “White” is the reference group 0.12 (0.33) 0 - 1
Black // 0.16 (0.37) 0 - 1
Age Grade of student in the current year. 21.65 (1.58) 18 - 27
Mathematics Score
Mathematics score. Score in mathematics at the most recent
grading period, coded as A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1. The variable is
zero if missing, a dummy for missing values is included.
2.15 (1.10) 0 - 4
GPA
The school performance is measured using the respondent’s
scores received in wave II in several subjects, namely English
or language arts, history or social science, mathematics, and sci-
ence. The scores are coded as 1=D or lower, 2=C, 3=B, 4=A.
The final composite index is the first principal component score.
1.42 (0.72) 0 - 3.31
Married Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is male. 0.16 (0.37) 0 - 1
Family Size Number of people living in the household 3.36 (1.96) 0 - 10
Employed Dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is employed. 0.70 (0.46) 0 - 1
Occ. Manager
Occupation dummies. Closest description of the job. Reference
category is ”other occupation”
0.05 (0.23) 0 - 1
Occ. Prof. Tech. = 0.17 (0.37) 0 - 1
Occ. Manual = 0.25 (0.43) 0 - 1
Occ. Sales = 0.20 (0.38) 0 - 1
Income
Respondent’s total yearly personal income before taxes in thou-
sand of dollars, wages or salaries, including tips, bonuses, and
overtime pay, and income from self-employment. Interest or div-
idends (from stocks, bonds, savings, etc.), unemployment insur-
ance, workmen?s compensation, disability, or social security ben-
efits, including SSI (supplemental security income) are included.
14.07 (14.66) 0 - 250
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Family Background
Father Education
Years of education attained by the father of the respondent. The
variable is zero if missing. A dummy for missing values is in-
cluded.
10.73 (6.85) 0 - 19
Parental Income
Total income in thousand of dollars, before taxes of respondent’s
family. It includes own income, income of everyone else in the
household, and income from welfare benefits, dividends, and all
other sources.
49.40 (51.42) 0 - 900
Contextual Effects Average of peers’ characteristics of all listed variables.
Networks
Links in Wave I Number of individual links in Wave I. 2.23 (1.88) 0 - 11
Links in Wave II Number of individual links in Wave II. 2.22 (2.18) 0 - 11
Strong Ties Percentage of strong ties on total individual links. 0.23 (0.27) 0 - 1
Weak Ties Percentage of weak ties on total individual links. 0.77 (0.27) 0 - 1
Appendix B: Bayesian Estimation
Prior and Posteriors Distributions
In order to draw random values from the marginal posterior distributions of
parameters in Model (3.4)-(3.5)-(3.6) we need to set prior distributions of those
parameters. Once priors and likelihoods are specified, we can derive marginal
posterior distributions of parameters and draw values from them. Given the link
formation Model (3.4)-(3.5), the probability of observing a network r at time t-1
and t, Gt−1r and G
t
r is
P (Gt−1r |xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt−1, θt−1) =
∏
i 6=j
P (gij,r,t−1|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt−1, θt−1),
P (Gtr|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, γt−1, θt−1) =
∏
i 6=j
P (gij,r,t|xij,r, zi,r, zj,r, gij,r,t−1, γt, θt, λ).
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Let β∗ = (β, δS, δW ), following Hsieh and Lee (2011) our prior distributions are
zi,r ∼ N(0, 1)
ω ∼ N2K+3(ω0,Ω0)
φS ∼ U [−κL, κL]
φW ∼ U [−κS, κS]
β∗ ∼ N3K+1(β0, B0)
(σ2ε , σεz) ∼ TN2(σ0,Σ0)
ηr|ση ∼ N(0, ση)
ση ∼ IG(ς0
2
,
ζ0
2
)
where ω = (γT , θT , λ, γT−1, θT−1), κL = 1κ − |φW |, κS = 1κ − |φS| and κ =
1/max(min(maxi(
∑
j g
S
ij),maxj(
∑
i g
S
ij)),min(maxi(
∑
j g
W
ij ),maxj(
∑
i g
W
ij ))) from
Gershgorin Theorem, U [·] , TN2(·) and IG(·) are respectively the uniform, bi-
variate truncated normal, and inverse gamma distributions. Those distributions
depend on hyper-parameters (like β0) that are set by the econometrician. It
follows that the marginal posteriors are
P (Zr|Yr,GWr ,GSr , ρ) ∝
r∏
r=1
nr∏
i
φ(zi,r)P (Yr,G
W
r ,G
S
r |Zr, ρ)
P (ω|Yr,GWr ,GSr ) ∝ φ2K+3 (ω, ω0,Ω0)
r∏
r=1
P (GWr ,G
S
r |Zr, ω)
P (φS , φW |Yr,GWr ,GSr ,Zr, β, σ2ε , σεz) ∝
r∏
r=1
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr ,Zr, β∗, σ2ε , σεz)
P (β∗|Yr,GWr ,GSr ,Zr, σ2ε , σεz , φS , φW ) ∝ φ3K+2 (β˜, B˜)
P (σ2ε , σεz |Yr,GWr ,GSr ,Zr, φS , φW ) ∝ φ2T ((σ2ε , σεz), σ0,Σ0)
r∏
r=1
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr ,Zr, β∗, σ2ε , σεz , ση)
P (ηr|Yr,GWr ,GSr ,Zr, φS , φW , σ2ε , σεz , ση) ∝ φ(ηr, η˜r, M˜r)
P (ση |Yr,GWr ,GSr ,Zr, φS , φW , σ2ε , σεz) ∝ ιγ(
ς0 + r
2
,
ζ0 +
∑r
r=1 η
2
r
2
)
where ρ = (ω, φS, φW , β∗, σ2ε , σεz, ση, η), φl(·) is the multivariate l− dimensional
normal density function, φlT (·) is the truncated counterpart, ιγ(·) is the in-
verse gamma density function. β˜ = B˜(B−10 β0 +
∑r
r=1 X
′
rVr(SrYr − σεzZr)),
B˜ = (B−10 +
∑r
r=1 X
′
rVrXr)
−1, η˜r = (σ2ε − σ2εz)−1M˜rl′nr(SrYr − σεzZr − X∗rβ∗),
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and M˜r = (σ
−2
η + (σ
2
ε − σ2εz)−1l′nr lnr)−1, where Vr = (σ2ε − σ2εz)Inr + σ2ηlnr l′nr ,
where X∗r = (Xr,G
∗S
r Xr,G
∗W
r Xr). The posteriors of β
∗,{ηr} and ση are avail-
able in closed forms and a usual Gibbs Sampler is used to draw from them.
The other parameters are drawn using the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm
(Metropolis-within-Gibbs).51
Sampling Algorithm
We start our algorithm by picking (ω(1), φL(1), φS(1), β∗(1), σ2(1)ε , σ
(1)
εz , σ
(1)
η , η(1)) as
starting values. For β∗(1), η(1), φL(1), φS(1) we use OLS estimates, while we set the
variances-covariances σ
2(1)
ε , σ
(1)
εz , σ
(1)
η at 0.52 We ought to draw samples of zti,r from
P (zi,r|Yr, GWr , GSr , ρ), i = 1, · · · , n. To do this, we first draw a candidate z˜ti,r from
a normal distribution with mean z
(t−1)
i,r , then we rely on a M-H decision rule: if
z˜ti,r is accepted we set z
t
i,r = z˜
t
i,r, otherwise z
t
i,r = z
t−1
i,r . Once all zi,r are sampled,
we move to the sampling of β∗. By specifying a normal prior and a normal
likelihood we can now easily sample βt from a multivariate normal distribution. A
diffuse prior for σ2 allows us to sample it from an inverse chi-squared distribution.
We follow the Bayesian spatial econometric literature by sampling φS, φW from
uniform distributions with support [−κL, κL] and [−κS, κS], as defined above. A
M-H step is then performed over a normal likelihood: if accepted, then φS
t
= φ˜S
t
and φW
t
= φ˜W
t
. For network fixed effects we deal again with normal prior and
normal likelihood, so η is easily sampled from a multivariate normal. We sample
σ2ε , σεz from a truncated bivariate normal over an admissible region Ξ such that
the variance-covariance matrix is positive definite. Acceptation or rejection is
determined by the usual M-H decision rule. A detailed step-by-step description
of the algorithm is provided below.
Step 1: Sample Ztr from P (Zr|Yr,GWr ,GSr , ρ).
51See Tierney (1994) and Chib and Greenberg (1996) for details regarding the resulting
Markov chain given by the combination of those two methods.
52The algorithm is robust to different starting values. However, speed of convergence may
increase significantly.
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Propose Z˜tr drawing each z˜
t
i,r from N(z
(t−1)
i,r , ξz), then set z
t
i,r = z˜
t
i,r with
probability αZ or z
t
i,r = z
t−1
i,r with probability 1− αZ where
αZ = min
{
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr , Z˜tr, ρt−1)
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr ,Zt−1r , ρt−1)
nr∏
i
P (gWij,r, g
S
ij,r|z˜ti,r, zt−1j,r , ω)
P (gWij,r, g
S
ij,r|zt−1i,r , zt−1j,r , ω)
φ(z˜ti,r)
φ(zt−1i,r )
}
Step 2: Sample ω˜t from P (ω|Yr,GWr ,GSr ).
Propose ω˜t from N2K+3(ωt−1, ξωΩ0), then set ωt = ω˜t with probability αω or
ωt = ωt−1 with probability 1− αω where
αω = min
{
r∏
r=1
P (GWr ,G
S
r |Ztr, ω˜t)
P (GWr ,G
S
r |Ztr, ωt−1)
φ2K+3(ω˜t, ω0,Ω0)
φ2K+3(ωt−1, ω0,Ω0)
}
Step 3: Sample φ˜S
t
and φ˜W
t
from P (φS, φW |Yr,GWr ,GSr ,Zr, β∗, σ2ε , σεz).
Propose φ˜S
t
from N(φS
t−1
, ξφ) and φ˜W
t
from N(φW
t−1
, ξφ), then set φ
St =
φ˜S
t
and φW
t
= φ˜W
t
with probability αφ or φ
St = φS
t−1
and φW
t
= φW
t−1
with
probability 1− αφ where
αφ= min

r∏
r=1
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr ,Zt−1r , φ˜S
t
, φ˜W
t
, β∗t−1, σ2
t−1
ε , σ
t−1
εz , σ
t−1
η )
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr ,Zt−1r , φLt−1 , φSt−1 , β∗t−1, σ2t−1ε , σt−1εz , σt−1η )
· I(φ˜St ∈ [−κL, κL])I(φ˜W
t ∈ [−κS , κS ])

Step 4: Sample σ˜tε and σ˜
t
εz from P (σ
2
ε , σεz|Yr,GWr ,GSr ,Zr, φS, φW ).
Propose σ˜tε and σ˜
t
εz from N
2((σ2
t−1
ε , σ
t−1
εz ), ξσ,Σ0) , then set σ
t
ε = σ˜
t
ε and σ
t
εz =
σ˜tεz with probability ασ or σ
t
ε = σ
t−1
ε and σ
t
εz = σ
t−1
εz with probability 1−ασ where
ασ = min
{
r∏
r=1
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr ,Zt−1r , φL
t−1
, φS
t−1
, β∗t−1, σ˜tε, σ˜
t
εz, σ
t−1
η )
P (Yr|GWr ,GSr ,Zt−1r , φLt−1 , φSt−1 , β∗t−1, σt−1ε , σt−1εz , σt−1η )
φ2T ((σ˜
t
ε, σ˜
t
εz), σ0,Σ0)
φ2T (σ
t−1
ε , σ
t−1
εz , σ0,Σ0)
I((σ˜tε, σ˜
t
εz) ∈ Ξ)
}
where Ξ is a region in which the variance-covariance matrix is definite properly.
Step 5: Sample β∗t−1, ηt and σtη from conditional posterior distributions.
Step 6: Repeat previous steps updating values indexed with t.
In each of the M-H steps (1-4) the algorithm accepts the new random values
(proposals) if the likelihood is higher than the current one. In the algorithm,
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ξz ,ξω, ξσ, and ξφ are tuning parameters chosen by the econometrician. This
choice determines the rejection rate of proposals in the M-H steps (1-4). We set a
dynamic algorithm for calibrating those tuning parameters so that they converge
to the optimal ones. Optimality means that the proposals are accepted about
50% of the times.53 Figure B1 shows the time-series of rejection rates for all of
the parameters. It appears that convergence is achieved around an acceptance
rate of 50% for all of the parameters.54
53The intuition is that if a tuning parameter is too high, the draws are less likely to be within
”high density regions” of the posterior and then rejection is too frequent. The ”step” is too
long and the chain ”does not move enough”. On the other hand if the ”step” is too short, the
proposal is more likely to be accepted and the chain ”moves too much”. Given that we want a
mixing chain with a balanced proportion of rejections and acceptances, an optimal step must
be chosen. Setting it manually requires a huge amount of time and many manual operations.
The dynamic setting of tuning parameters is as follows:
if tA/t ≤ 0.4 then ξt+1 = ξt/1.1,
if tA/t ≥ 0.6 then ξt+1 = ξt × 1.1,
if 0.4 ≤ tA/t ≤ 0.6 then ξt+1 = ξt,
where tA is the acceptance rate at iteration t. The procedure decreases the tuning parameter
(the ”step”) when proposals are rejected too frequently, while it increases the tuning parameter
when proposals are accepted too frequently. This mechanism guarantees a bounded acceptance
rate and convergence to optimal tuning.
54Given that the rejection rate-based correction of tuning parameters has 0.4 and 0.6 as
boundaries, rejection rates oscillate between these values. The likelihood of reaching the bound-
aries decreases as the number of draws increases and the rejection rates tend to 0.5, as Figure
B1 shows.
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Appendix C: IV Estimation
Let Yr = (y1,r, · · · , ynr,r)′, Xr = (x1,r, · · · , xnr,r)′, and r = (1,r, · · · , nr,r)′.
Denote the nr × nr adjacency matrix by Gr = [gij,r], the row-normalized of Gr
by G∗r, and the nr-dimensional vector of ones by lnr . Let us split the adjacency
matrix into two submatrices GSr and G
W
r , which keep trace of strong and weak
ties, respectively. Then, model (3.2) can be written in matrix form as
Yr = φ
SGSrYr + φ
WGWr Yr + X
∗
rβ
∗ + ηrlnr + r, (3.10)
For a sample with r¯ networks, stack up the data by defining Y = (Y′1, · · · ,Y′r¯)′,
X∗ = (X∗′1 , · · · ,X∗′r¯ )′,  = (′1, · · · , ′r¯)′, G = D(G1, · · · ,Gr¯), G∗ = D(G∗1, · · · ,G∗r¯),
ι = D(ln1 , · · · , lnr¯) and η = (η1, · · · , ηr¯)′, where D(A1, · · · ,AK) is a block diago-
nal matrix in which the diagonal blocks are nk×nk matrices Ak’s. For the entire
sample, the model is thus
Y = φSGSY + φWGWY + X∗β + ι · η + . (3.11)
We use the 2SLS estimation strategy from Liu and Lee (2010), and extend it to
the case of two different network structures. Model (3.11) can be written as
Y = Zθ + ι · η + , (3.12)
where Z = (GSY,GWY,X∗), θ = (φS, φW , β′)′, and ι = D(ln1 , · · · , lnr¯).
We treat η as a vector of unknown parameters. When the number of networks
r¯ is large, we have the incidental parameter problem. Let J = D(J1, · · · ,Jr¯),
where Jr = Inr − 1nr l′nr lnr . The network fixed effect can be eliminated by a
transformation with J such that
JY = JZθ + J. (3.13)
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Let M = (I − φSGS − φWGW )−1. The equilibrium outcome vector Y in (3.12)
is then given by the reduced form equation
Y = M(X∗β + ι · η) + M. (3.14)
It follows that GSY = GSMX∗β + GSMιη + GSM and GWY = GWMX∗β +
GWMιη+GWM. GSY and GWY are correlated with  because E[(GSM)′] =
σ2tr(GSM) 6= 0 and E[(GWM)′] = σ2tr(GWM) 6= 0. Hence, in general, (3.13)
cannot be consistently estimated by OLS.55 If G is row-normalized such that
G · ln = ln, where ln is a n-dimensional vector of ones, the endogenous social
interaction effect can be interpreted as an average effect.
Liu and Lee (2010) use an instrumental variable approach and propose dif-
ferent estimators based on different instrumental matrices, here denoted by Q1
and Q2. In particular, besides the conventional instrumental matrix (Q1 =
J(GX∗,X∗)) for the estimation of (3.13), they propose to use additional instru-
ments (IVs) JGι and enlarge the instrumental matrix Q2 = (Q1, JGι). The
additional IVs of JGι are simply the row sums of G (i.e. the number of links of
each agent). Liu and Lee (2010) show that those additional IVs could help model
identification when the conventional IVs are weak and improve on the estimation
efficiency of the conventional 2SLS estimator based on Q1. As a result, an IV
based on Q2 (rather than Q1) should be preferred. However, the number of such
additional instruments depends on the number of networks. If the number of
networks grows with the sample size, so does the number of IVs. The 2SLS could
be asymptotically biased when the number of IVs increases too quickly relative
to the sample size, i.e. when there are many networks. Liu and Lee (2010) thus
propose a bias-correction procedure based on the estimated leading-order many-
IV bias (IV bias-corrected). The bias-corrected IV estimator is properly centered,
55Lee (2002) has shown that the OLS estimator can be consistent in the spatial scenario
where each spatial unit is influenced by many neighbors whose influences are uniformly small.
However, in the current data, the number of neighbors are limited, so that result does not apply.
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asymptotically normally distributed, and efficient when the average network size
is sufficiently large.56 The (more efficient) IV estimator (based on Q2) and its
bias-corrected version are the IV estimators used in our analysis.
Let us derive those estimators for equation (3.13), i.e. for the model where
agents are heterogeneous and allowed to interact according to different network
structures. From the reduced form equation (3.12), we have E(Z) = [GSM(X∗β+
ι · η),GWM(X∗β + ι · η),X∗]. The best IV matrix for JZ is given by
Jf = JE(Z) = J [GSM(X∗β + ι · η),GWM(X∗β + ι · η),X∗] (3.15)
which is an n× (3m+ 2) matrix. However, this matrix is unfeasible as it involves
unknown parameters. Note that f can be considered as a linear combination of
the vectors in Q0 = J [G
SM(X∗+ ι),GWM(X∗+ ι),X∗]. As ι has r¯ columns the
number of IVs in Q0 increases as the number of groups increases. Furthermore,
as M = (I − φSGS − φWGW )−1 = ∑∞j=0(φSGS + φWGW )j when sup ||φSGS +
φWGW ||∞ < 1, MX∗ and Mι can be approximated by linear combinations of
(GSX∗,GWX∗,GWGSX∗,
(
GS
)2
X∗,
(
GW
)2
X∗,
(
GW
)2
GSX∗,
(
GW
)2 (
GS
)2
X∗, ···)
and
(GSι,GW ι,GWGSι,
(
GS
)2
ι,
(
GW
)2
ι,
(
GW
)2
GSι,
(
GW
)2 (
GS
)2
ι, · · ·),
respectively. Hence, Q0 can be approximated by a linear combination of
Q∞ = J(GS(GSX∗,GWX∗,GWGSX∗, · · ·,GSι,GW ι,GWGSι, · · ·), (3.16)
GW (GSX∗,GWX∗,GWGSX∗, · · ·,GSι,GW ι,GWGSι, · · ·),X∗).
56Liu and Lee (2010) also generalize this 2SLS approach to the GMM using additional
quadratic moment conditions.
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Let QK be an n×K submatrix of Q∞ (with K ≥ 3m+2) including X∗. Let QS be
an n×KL submatrix of QL∞= GS(GSX∗,GWX∗,GWGSX∗, · · ·,GSι,GW ι,GWGSι, · · ·)
and QS an n×KS submatrix of QS∞= GW (GSX∗,GWX∗,GWGSX∗, · · ·,GSι,GW ι,GWGSι, · · ·).
We assume that KL
KS
= 1. Let PK = QK(QK
′QK)−1QK′ be the projector of QK.
The resulting 2SLS estimator is given by
θ̂2sls = (Z
′PKZ)
−1
Z′PKy. (3.17)
Note that, given that we are in a multiple adjacency matrices framework, if the
approximation (KL, KS) is of high order, the many IV problem can arise even
if the number of networks is small. The intuition is the following- the higher
the number of adjacency matrices, the higher the number of adjacency matrices’
combinations needed for approximating JE(Z). This should be clear looking at
(3.16). If we want to approximate Q∞ setting a P -order approximation, we will
have
P∑
p=1
bp matrices to include, where b is the number of adjacency matrices.
The 2SLS estimators of θ = (φS, φW , β′)′ considered in this paper are
(i) IV : θ̂2sls = (Z
′P2Z)−1Z′P2y, where P2 = Q2(Q′2Q2)
−1
2 Q
′
2 and Q2 contains
the linearly independent columns of [Q1,JG
Sι,JGW ι].
(ii) IV Bias-corrected : θ̂c2sls = (Z
′P2Z)−1{Z′P2y−σ˜22sls[tr
(
P2G
SM˜
)
, tr
(
P2G
WM˜
)
,03m×1]
′},
where M˜ = (I− φ˜S2slsGS− φ˜W2slsGW )−1, σ˜22sls, φ˜S2sls and φ˜W2sls are
√
n-consistent ini-
tial estimators of σ2, φS, and φW obtained by Finite-IV. σ˜22sls[tr
(
P2G
SM˜
)
, tr
(
P2G
WM˜
)
,03m×1]
is the empirical counterpart of the theoretical many-IV bias b2sls = σ
2 (Z′PKZ)
−1 [tr (ΨK,L)
, tr (ΨK,S) ,0
′
3m×1 , where ΨK,L = PKG
SM and ΨK,S = PKG
WM.
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Appendix D: Bayesian Estimation - Additional Results
Figure D1: Bayesian Estimation Results
Control Variables (β)
Panel (a)
Panel (b)
Notes: see Figure 3.3.
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Figure D2: Bayesian Estimation Results
Contextual Effects (δ)
Panel (a)
Panel (b)
Notes: see Figure 3.3.
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Figure D3: Bayesian Estimation Results
Network Fixed Effects (η)
Panel (a)
Panel (b)
Notes: see Figure 3.3.
112
Appendix E: Results for the Entire Sample
Table E1: Peer Effects in Financial Decisions
-Entire Sample-
Dependent Variable: Financial Activity Index
OLS OLS OLS ML IV IV bias-corrected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peer Effects φ 0.0520*** 0.0450*** -0.0081 0.0308*** 0.0779*** 0.0451**
(0.0145) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0133) (0.0233) (0.0234)
Male -0.0950*** -0.0980*** -0.1046*** -0.1027*** -0.1095*** -0.1102***
(0.0360) (0.0374) (0.0366) (0.0400) (0.0383) (0.0381)
Latino -0.0089 0.0251 0.0342 -0.0059 0.0228 0.0137
(0.0731) (0.0796) (0.0868) (0.0867) (0.0908) (0.0905)
Black -0.1239*** -0.1267** 0.0419 -0.1706*** 0.0694 0.0559
(0.0466) (0.0583) (0.0886) (0.0648) (0.0927) (0.0924)
Age -0.0094 -0.0051 -0.0172 -0.0956*** -0.0054 -0.0022
(0.0127) (0.0140) (0.0173) (0.0096) (0.0178) (0.0177)
Education 0.1463*** 0.1456*** 0.1261*** 0.1499*** 0.1218*** 0.1246***
(0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Income 6.32E-06*** 6.21E-06*** 5.99E-06*** 9.31E-06*** 6.00E-06*** 6.06E-06***
(1.45E-06) (1.47E-06) (1.47E-06) (1.81E-06) (1.54E-06) (1.53E-06)
Employed 0.2451*** 0.2465*** 0.2773*** 0.2672*** 0.2825*** 0.2854***
(0.0685) (0.0694) (0.0684) (0.0749) (0.0714) (0.0711)
Occ. Manager 0.2112 0.2330 0.2367 0.2513 0.3295** 0.3422**
(0.1712) (0.1700) (0.1817) (0.1872) (0.1629) (0.1718)
Occ. Prof. Tech -0.1247* -0.1310* -0.1238 -0.1205 -0.1122 -0.1191
(0.0756) (0.0764) (0.0750) (0.0807) (0.0787) (0.0784)
Occ. Manual -0.1741*** -0.1864*** -0.1848*** -0.2255*** -0.1818*** -0.1827***
(0.0690) (0.0698) (0.0689) (0.0750) (0.0718) (0.0715)
Occ. Sales -0.0591 -0.0591 -0.0619 -0.0695 -0.0609 -0.0651
(0.0725) (0.0730) (0.0723) (0.0777) (0.0757) (0.0754)
Married 0.3267*** 0.3289*** 0.3719*** 0.3879*** 0.3575*** 0.3618***
(0.0510) (0.0522) (0.0519) (0.0537) (0.0540) (0.0538)
Family Size -0.0247** -0.0230* -0.0233* -0.0346*** -0.0221* -0.0245*
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0125)
Father Education 0.0204** 0.0226*** 0.0069 -0.0016 0.0091 0.0100
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0093)
Parental Income 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Constant -2.1605*** -2.2904*** -2.3642***
(0.3047) (0.3227) (0.4822)
School Performance Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Network Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497
Number of Networks 151 151 151 151 151 151
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Notes: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Dummy variables for missing
Income, Family Size, Father Education, Parental Income and GPA are included. Maximum network
size 400, minimum 4.
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Table E2: Weak and Strong Ties in Financial
Decisions
-Entire Sample-
Dependent Variable: Financial Activity Index
OLS IV IV bias-corrected
(1) (2) (3)
Strong Ties φS 0.0526** 0.1571*** 0.0443**
(0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0221)
Weak Ties φW 0.0228 -0.0700 0.0237
(0.0169) (0.0425) (0.0427)
Male -0.0965*** -0.1005*** -0.0962***
(0.0383) (0.0399) (0.0415)
Latino 0.0407 0.0645 0.0817
(0.0812) (0.0904) (0.0940)
Black -0.1557*** 0.0771 0.0882
(0.0657) (0.0947) (0.0985)
Age -0.0114 -0.0266 -0.0342*
(0.0146) (0.0190) (0.0197)
Education 0.1431*** 0.1227*** 0.1192***
(0.0121) (0.0130) (0.0135)
Income 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Employed 0.2432*** 0.3045*** 0.3115***
(0.0696) (0.0722) (0.0751)
Occ. Manager 0.2493 0.3762** 0.3482**
(0.1703) (0.1681) (0.1711)
Occ. Prof. Tech -0.1337* -0.1363* -0.1342
(0.0770) (0.0798) (0.0830)
Occ. Manual -0.1689*** -0.1958*** -0.2041***
(0.0701) (0.0728) (0.0757)
Occ. Sales -0.0447 -0.0844 -0.0950
(0.0733) (0.0771) (0.0801)
Married 0.3493*** 0.3982*** 0.4052***
(0.0526) (0.0553) (0.0575)
Family Size -0.0236* -0.0267** -0.0268**
(0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0133)
Father Education 0.0178** 0.0044 0.0027
(0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0099)
Parental Income 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Constant -2.0534***
0.3384
School Performance Variables Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Effects Yes Yes Yes
Network Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1497 1497 1497
Number of Networks 151 151 151
Notes: see Table E1.
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Table 3.4: Financial Activity Participation
Percentage of Contribution to the
Agents Possessing Financial Activity Index
Checking Account 76% 0.40
Credit Card 61% 0.57
Saving Account 63% 0.73
Shares 25% 0.80
Student Loan 33% 0.53
Credit Card Debt 41% 0.47
Notes: the Financial Activity Index is obtained using a principal component analysis on the listed variables. It
is the first principal component, which explains 35 % of the total variance.
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Figure D4: Bayesian Estimation Results
Link Formation Control Variables (ω)
Panel (a)
Panel b)
Notes: see Figure 3.3.
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Table 3.6: 2SLS First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: GY
X GX G2X
Variables: X Own Peers Peers of peers
(Exclusion Restrictions)
Male -0.1113 -0.0694 0.0159
(0.0830) (0.0655) (0.0341)
Latino 0.3363** 0.1356 -0.4939***
(0.1731) (0.1441) (0.0674)
Black -0.0420 0.4622*** 0.1238
(0.2032) (0.1874) (0.0968)
Age -0.0294 0.0143 0.0231***
(0.0350) (0.0282) (0.0078)
Education 0.0700*** 0.1323*** -0.0031
(0.0277) (0.0223) (0.0111)
Income 3.61E-07 8.24E-06*** -8.19E-07
(2.68E-06) (3.50E-06) (1.69E-06)
Employed 0.2556 -0.1312 -0.2035***
(0.2114) (0.1583) (0.0842)
Occ. Manager 0.0877 0.3160 -0.1892
(0.2548) (0.2038) (0.1171)
Occ. Prof. Tech. -0.1222 0.1921 -0.0868
(0.2256) (0.1682) (0.0922)
Occ. Manual -0.0747 0.0374 0.0247
(0.2102) (0.1639) (0.0848)
Occ. Sales -0.1370 0.1682 0.0263
(0.2171) (0.1671) (0.0863)
Married -0.2654*** 0.4318*** 0.1468***
(0.1168) (0.0796) (0.0444)
Family Size 0.0359 -0.0389* -0.0423***
(0.0266) (0.0211) (0.0116)
Father Education 0.0317 -0.0065 -0.0051
(0.0202) (0.0146) (0.0073)
Parental Income 0.0006 -0.0021*** -0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0004)
F-stat 10.8892
School Performance Variables Yes
Network Fixed Effects Yes
Number of Observations Yes
Number of Networks Yes
Notes: OLS estimation results, standard errors in parentheses.***
p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Dummy variables for missing values
in variables are included, see Table 3.5. The instrumental set also
includes the individual number of connections. See Appendix C for
further details on IV estimation of spatial models.
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Table 3.7: Weak and Strong Ties in Financial
Decisions
Dependent Variable: Financial Activity Index
OLS IV IV bias-corrected Bayesian
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strong Ties (φS) 0.1686*** 0.1755*** 0.0671* 0.0707***
(0.0318) (0.0398) (0.0402) (0.0158)
Weak Ties (φW ) -0.0335 -0.0295 0.0128 -0.0027
(0.0286) (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0123)
Male -0.0667 -0.0720 -0.0670 -0.0257
(0.0634) (0.0604) (0.0603) (0.0340)
Latino 0.1309 0.1356 0.1580 0.0138
(0.1348) (0.1297) (0.1295) (0.0392)
Black -0.1097 0.2584* 0.3204** 0.0653
(0.1405) (0.1573) (0.1570) (0.0540)
Age 0.0058 0.0104 0.0165 0.0205
(0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0220)
Education 0.1097*** 0.0913*** 0.0996*** 0.1327***
(0.0205) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0169)
Income 3.13E-06 2.63E-06 2.91E-06 3.54E-06**
(2.13E-06) (2.00E-06) (1.99E-06) (1.82E-06)
Employed 0.0711 -0.0313 -0.0131 0.0334
(0.1530) (0.1447) (0.1445) (0.0752)
Occ. Manager 0.2653 0.3662** 0.3461** 0.0935*
(0.1870) (0.1761) (0.1757) (0.0527)
Occ. Prof. Tech. 0.2151 0.2689* 0.2363 0.1332**
(0.1638) (0.1558) (0.1556) (0.0678)
Occ. Manual 0.0139 0.0783 0.0731 -0.0099
(0.1534) (0.1452) (0.1449) (0.0729)
Occ. Sales 0.1197 0.1755 0.1762 0.0760
(0.1560) (0.1501) (0.1498) (0.0717)
Married 0.3849*** 0.4404*** 0.4097*** 0.2248***
(0.0844) (0.0807) (0.0806) (0.0389)
Family Size -0.0063 -0.0116 -0.0143 -0.0200
(0.0199) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0153)
Father Education 0.0229* 0.0016 0.0062 0.0021
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0050)
Parental Income 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Constant -2.0713***
0.5558
σz -0.0338
(0.0643)
School Performance Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Network Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 569 569 569 569
Number of Networks 21 21 21 21
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Notes: see Table 3.5.
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Table 3.8: Network Formation and Financial
Activity
Bayesian Estimation
Outcome Link Formation
(l10ptr10pt)3-4 t− 1 t
Strong Ties 0.0707***
(0.0158)
Weak Ties -0.0027
(0.0123)
Male -0.0257 -0.0831*** -0.1667***
(0.0340) (0.0212) (0.0244)
Age 0.0205 -1.0166*** -1.1772***
(0.0220) (0.0604) (0.0820)
Latino 0.0138 -0.0579*** -0.1441***
(0.0392) (0.0215) (0.0296)
Black 0.0653 -0.1783*** -0.2340***
(0.0540) (0.0408) (0.0578)
Education 0.1327*** -0.1493*** -0.1968***
(0.0169) (0.0266) (0.0317)
Income 3.54E-06** -0.0487 -0.1770***
(1.82E-06) (0.0308) (0.0386)
Employed 0.0334 -0.0290 -0.0647***
(0.0752) (0.0214) (0.0242)
Occ. Manager 0.0935* -0.0069 -0.0418*
(0.0527) (0.0180) (0.0237)
Occ. Prof. Tech. 0.1332** -0.0367* 0.0376
(0.0678) (0.0203) (0.0242)
Occ. Manual -0.0099 -0.0641*** -0.0560**
(0.0729) (0.0220) (0.0259)
Occ. Sales 0.0760 -0.0580*** -0.0051
(0.0717) (0.0183) (0.0241)
Married 0.2248*** 0.0043 0.0008
(0.0389) (0.0195) (0.0237)
Family Size -0.0200 0.0391 0.0548
(0.0153) (0.0255) (0.0343)
Father Education 0.0021 -0.1797*** -0.0658
(0.0050) (0.0587) (0.0910)
Parental Income -0.0004 -0.0379 -0.0453
(0.0005) (0.0294) (0.0354)
Constant -0.7269*** -1.2700***
(0.0712) (0.1028)
Link at t-1 (gij,t−1) 1.4096***
(0.0704)
Unobservables (z) 0.6891*** 0.9642***
(0.0549) (0.0698)
σz -0.0338
(0.0643)
σ 0.7062
(0.3235)
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School Performance Variables Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Effects Yes Yes Yes
Network Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 569 18985 18985
Number of Networks 21 21 21
Notes: see Table 3.5. We report peer effects estimate
when network formation an behavior over network are
jointly considered. Column (1) reports on the results
for Model (2), columns (2)-(3) report on the results for
Model (4)-(5).
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Table 3.9: Understanding the Mechanism
Dependent Variable: Financial Activity Index
Network Topology Frequency of Interactions
(l10ptr10pt)2-4 (l10ptr10pt)5-7
% of links OLS IV % of links OLS IV
bias-corrected bias-corrected
Strong Ties Supported 72% 0.1646*** 0.0691**
(0.0316) (0.0318)
Strong Ties not Supported 28% 0.1923*** 0.0409
(0.0347) (0.0357)
Weak Ties Supported 58% -0.0037 0.0266
(0.0276) (0.0274)
Weak Ties not Supported 42% -0.0575 -0.0053
(0.0318) (0.0314)
Strong Ties High Frequency 78% 0.1589*** 0.0675**
(0.0223) (0.0218)
Strong Ties Low Frequency 22% 0.2543*** 0.0790**
(0.0357) (0.0367)
Weak Ties High Frequency 84% -0.0272 -0.0114
(0.0273) (0.0276)
Weak Ties Low Frequency 16% -0.0318 0.0073
(0.0549) (0.0559)
Male -0.0657 -0.0703 -0.0699 -0.0650
(0.0610) (0.0604) (0.0610) (0.0606)
Latino 0.1756 0.1876 0.1708 0.1837
(0.1313) (0.1293) (0.1315) (0.1298)
Black 0.2567* 0.3269** 0.2504 0.3286**
(0.1548) (0.1575) (0.1540) (0.1564)
Age 0.0102 0.0146 0.0093 0.0113
(0.0266) (0.0261) (0.0266) (0.0263)
Education 0.0935*** 0.0991*** 0.0931*** 0.1005***
(0.0201) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0197)
Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Employed 0.0210 0.0061 0.0075 -0.0102
(0.1476) (0.1449) (0.1475) (0.1453)
Occ. Manager 0.3036* 0.3164* 0.3193* 0.3359**
(0.1786) (0.1757) (0.1787) (0.1764)
Occ. Prof. Tech 0.2472 0.2187 0.2501 0.2187
(0.1571) (0.1555) (0.1567) (0.1557)
Occ. Manual 0.0408 0.0589 0.0483 0.0672
(0.1478) (0.1455) (0.1474) (0.1455)
Occ. Sales 0.1546 0.1633 0.1624 0.1727
(0.1515) (0.1504) (0.1514) (0.1507)
Married 0.4169*** 0.3943*** 0.4211*** 0.4099***
(0.0830) (0.0797) (0.0829) (0.0800)
Family Size -0.0088 -0.0116 -0.0104 -0.0159
(0.0193) (0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0189)
Father Education 0.0042 0.0058 0.0051 0.0044
(0.0144) (0.0140) (0.0145) (0.0141)
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Parental Income -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
School Performance Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contextual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Network Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 569 569 569 569
Number of Networks 21 21 21 21
Notes: see Table 3.5. Percentage of links is referred to the total of same type of tie (strong or weak).
Figure 3.1: Social Ties and Financial Activity
Notes: a network of 49 agents (nodes) is represented. The size of the node is proportional to the agent’s financial
activity; the thickness of lines is proportional to the length of the relationship between agents. Thicker lines
represent strong ties, while thinner ones represent weak ties.
Figure 3.2: Identification with Network Data
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Figure 3.3: Bayesian Estimation Results
Peer Effects (φ)
(a) Posterior Distribution (b) Markov Chain
Notes: panel (a) shows the kernel density estimate of the posterior distribution. Panel (b) shows the Markov
chain draws.
Figure 3.4: Bayesian Estimation Results
Covariance between Unobservables (σ,z)
(a) Posterior Distribution (b) Markov Chain
Notes: panel (a) shows the kernel density estimate of the posterior distribution. Panel (b) shows the Markov
chain draws.
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Figure 3.5: Bayesian Estimation Results.
Strong (φS) vs Weak (φW ) Tie Effects
(a) Posterior Distributions
(b) Markov Chain (c) Markov Chain
Notes: panel (a) shows the kernel density estimates of the posterior distributions. Panel (b) and panel (c) show
the Markov chain draws.
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Figure 3.6: Simulation Results
Income Shocks and Strong Tie Effects
(a) Intensive Margin (b) Extensive Margin
Notes: the surfaces represent
∑
i ∆yi, which is the variation of the financial activity of agent i, yi, after the
shock. ns is the number of strong ties of the shocked agents. In Panel (a) shock intensity (h) goes from 1 to
20 income std points, while the number of shocked agents is constant and equal to 13. For each combination of
(ns, h) the income of a random sample of agents which have a ns strong ties is increased by h. In Panel (b) the
shock intensity is constant and equal to 2 income std points, while the number of shocked agents (nh) goes from
1 to 13. For each combination of (ns, nh) the income of nh agents, which have ns strong ties, is increased by 2
income std points. Each point of the surfaces is the average of 500 replications, in which agents are randomly
sampled. The results remain basically unchanged if we use a different number of shocked agents in panel (a) or
a different shock intensity in panel (b).
Figure 3.7: Simulation Results
Heterogeneous Income Shocks and Strong Tie Effects
Notes: see Figure 3.6. The income of 13 agents with no strong ties is increased by 2 income std points. The
surface represents ∆
∑
i yi when the income of n
−
h agents, who have ns strong ties, is decreased by 2 income
std points.
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Figure 3.8: Simulation Results
Individual vs Peer Income Shocks
Notes: the surface represents ∆yi, which is the variation of the financial activity of agent i, yi, after the shock.
Each point of the surface is the average of 500 replications in which an agent i is randomly sampled. In each
replication, agent i’s income is increased by 10 income std points and the income of all of peers of i is decreased
by h− income std points.
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Figure B1: Bayesian Estimation Results
Acceptance Rates
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Chapter 4
The Allocation of Time in Sleep:
a Social Network Model with
Sampled Data
Joint work with Xiaodong Liu and Eleonora Patacchini.
Another version of this chapter has been published as CEPR Discussion Paper
No. DP9752
“Sleep that knits up the ravelled sleave of care, The death of each day’s life, sore
labour’s bath, Balm of hurt minds, great Nature’s second course, Chief nourisher
in life’s feast.”
Shakespeare, Macbeth
4.1 Introduction
Nearly a third of a person’s life is spent in slumber. In the U.S. those with
insomnia spend about $1 billion a year on prescription sleep aids, and another $1
billion on over-the-counter sleep medications Yaniv (2004). The economic costs,
both direct (expenditure within the health system) and indirect (absenteeism,
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low productivity, and work-related injuries) of sleep disorders in the U.S. in 2004
was estimated to be $109 billion Hillman et al. (2006).
Yet, sleeping behaviour has received relatively little attention in economics.
While sleep is primarily a function of the body’s internal biological clock (cir-
cadian rhythm), individual choice also plays an important role in determining
the timing and duration of sleep. Biddle and Hamermesh (1990) posit a simple
economic model that accounts for the endogenous nature of sleep choice, but
empirical work on the subject has been very limited.
In particular, there is virtually no evidence on the importance of social in-
teractions in shaping sleeping behaviour. In many circumstances, the decision of
agents to exert effort in some activity cannot adequately be explained by their
personal characteristics and the intrinsic utility derived from the activity. Rather,
its rationale may be found in how peers and others value this activity. There is
indeed strong evidence that the behaviour of individual agents is affected by that
of their peers.1 The individual utility when allocating time in work or leisure may
depend on the same choice made by peers. As a consequence, social interactions
might be important for understanding the duration of sleep, which is the residual
activity.2
In this paper, we exploit the unique information contained in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) to provide evidence on
sleeping patterns among adolescents in the U.S. Sleeping behaviour during teenage
years is of particular interest because of its effect on human capital formation.
Research suggests that lack of sleep reduces attendance, increases tardiness, and
lowers grades of adolescent students Eide and Showalter (2012). Furthermore,
lack of sleep in youth is correlated with health and behavioral problems such as
1The integration of models of social interactions within economic theory is an active and
interesting area of research. See the recent Handbook of Social Economics, Benhabib et al.
(2011).
2Biddle and Hamermesh (1990) study the demand for sleep in this perspective without social
incentives.
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moodiness, depression, difficulty controlling behaviour, and increased frustration
- all of which make learning in school difficult (National Sleep Foundation; Mitru
(2002)). Sleep also affects productivity on the job, which in some cases represents
a public safety concern.
The AddHealth data contain unique information on friendship relationships
among a representative sample of students from U.S. high school teenagers to-
gether with basic information on individual, family, neighborhood and school
characteristics (in-school survey). The survey design also includes a question-
naire administered to a random sample of those students collecting information
on more sensitive topics (health issues, crime, drug, sexual behaviour, etc.), in-
cluding time and duration of sleep on week days during the school year (in-home
survey). The use of this additional information, however, comes at a cost. The
in-home sampling scheme may result in missing observations on the behaviour of
friends who were not sampled, and induce measurement error to the endogenous
peer effect variable given by the average behaviour of friends. As a result, the
existing estimation methods for network models of social interactions (see, e.g.
Bramoulle´ et al.; 2009; Lee et al.; 2010) are not generally valid.3
Recently, social network studies have drawn a great deal of attention. Network
models are widely used to represent relational information among interacting
units and the implications of these relations. Most inference for social network
models assumes that the all possible links are observed and that all the relevant
information is available. This is clearly not true in practice, as much network data
is collected though sample surveys. In a recent paper, Sojourner (2013) considers
a linear-in-means social interaction model with missing observations on covariates.
He shows that random assignment of agents to peer groups can help to overcome
the missing data problem. On the other hand, Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011b)
consider the estimation of network models with sampled observations on network
3This issue is typically neglected in most empirical papers using the information on friends
together with the in-home survey in the AddHealth data set.
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links. They propose a set of analytical corrections for commonly used network
statistics and a two-step estimation procedure using graphical reconstruction.
Our case is different. We observe all the network links and the covariates for all
nodes, but we have sampled observations on the dependant variables.
The social network model considered in this paper has the specification of
a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model with group-specific fixed effect. Kelejian
and Prucha (2010) consider the estimation of the SAR model with missing obser-
vations on the dependent variable and covariates. They suggest two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimators that are based on a subset of the sample so that the
dependent variable and covariates are observed, and the spatial lags are either
completely observed or partially observed with an asymptotically negligible mea-
surement error. Our set up is similar to the one proposed by Wang and Lee
(2013a). Wang and Lee (2013a) consider the estimation of the SAR model with
missing observations on the dependent variable for cross-sectional data Wang
and Lee (2013a) and for random effect panel data Wang and Lee (2013b). They
propose the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, the nonlinear
least squares (NLS) estimator, and the 2SLS estimator with imputation. They
show that the three estimators are consistent and robust against unknown het-
eroskedasticity. In this paper, we extend the NLS estimator in Wang and Lee
(2013a) to estimate social network models with network fixed effects and sampled
observations on the dependent variable. While the asymptotic properties of the
proposed estimator is similar to Wang and Lee (2013a) (see Section 4.3.2), this is
the first paper applying this approach to real data and estimating network models
with sampling.
Our results show that the conventional 2SLS is inconsistent without account-
ing for sampling. In our case, 2SLS fails to detect the presence of peer effects.
When sampling is taken into account, we instead find that the sleeping behaviour
of the friends is important in shaping own sleeping behaviour, besides the impact
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of individual and friends characteristics. We use the approach recently proposed
by Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) to investigate testable implications of
network endogeneity, finding no sign of troubling individual level unobservables
that may invalidate our results. Our results are also robust when using an unique
information on siblings to eliminate possible unobserved family factors.
In summary, we make the following contributions to the existing literature:
i) we evaluate the bias of the traditional 2SLS when estimating a social net-
work model with a sampled dependent variable in small samples using a Monte
Carlo experiment;
ii) we develop a correction using a NLS method with network fixed effects,
which is easy to implement in applied work;
iii) we provide the first empirical application of the method to a unique dataset
of friendship networks finding that young adults respond to the sleeping behavior
of their peer group, holding constant other observables. This effect suggests a
group approach to solving behavioral problems associated with sleep deprivation;
iv) we propose a methodology to test the presence of implications of network
endogeneity;
v) we use data on siblings and their friends to account for unobserved family
effects.
The paper is organized as follows. We start our analysis by describing our
data in Section 2. Section 3 presents the network model, together with the iden-
tification and estimation strategy. We discuss our estimation results in Section
4, whereas Section 5 contains some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our data source is the AddHealth data that has been designed to study the im-
pact of the social environment (i.e. friends, family, neighborhood and school)
136
on adolescents’ behaviour in the United States by collecting data on students in
grades 7-12 from a nationally representative sample of roughly 130 private and
public schools in years 1994-95. Every student attending the sampled schools on
the interview day is asked to compile a questionnaire (in-school survey) containing
questions on respondents’ demographic and behavioral characteristics, education,
family background and friendship. Most notably, students were asked to identify
their best friends from a school roster - up to five males and five females. The
limit in the number of nominations, however, is not binding (not even by gen-
der),4 and in the large majority of cases (more than 90%) the nominated best
friends are in the same school. Hence, it is possible to reconstruct the entire ge-
ometry of the friendship networks within each school. In addition, by matching
the identification numbers of the friendship nominations to respondents’ identifi-
cation numbers, one can obtain information on the characteristics of nominated
friends. This sample contains information on roughly 90,000 students. These
features make these data almost unique. It is extremely rare to have informa-
tion on the universe of network contacts (here school friends), together with their
detailed characteristics.5 The survey design also includes a longer questionnaire
(in-home survey) containing questions related to more sensitive individual and
household information which is administered to a subset of adolescents. We use
the core sample of in-home survey which provides information on a random and
self-weighting subset of adolescents, about 12,000 individuals.6 The in-home ques-
tionnaire contains detailed information about the timing and duration of sleep.
The questions has been slightly reformulated over time to measure sleeping pat-
4Less than 1 percent of the students in our sample show a list of ten best friends, less than
3 percent a list of five males and roughly 4 percent name five females. On average, they declare
to have 4.35 friends with a small dispersion around this mean value (standard deviation equal
to 1.41).
5The information on social network contacts collected in other existing surveys is about
”ego-networks”, i.e. the respondent is asked to name few personal contacts and provides (self-
reported) information about an extremely limited number of their charactersitics.
6The core sample contains roughly the 60% of the individuals interviewed in the in-home
survey (which are about 20,000 individuals). The difference is due to the fact that in the in-home
sampling design some types of individuals are oversampled.
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terns more precisely. Indeed, the (in-home survey) students are interviewed again
one year later, in 1995–96 (wave II).7 We derive the information on sleeping pat-
terns by using the wave II question: ”During the school year, what time do you
usually go to bed on week nights?”.8,9
Figure 1 plots the empirical distribution. The graph shows a notable disper-
sion around the mean ”bed time” value (mean equal to 10:37pm and standard
deviation equal to 58.7 minutes). About 50% of the students go to bed between
10pm and 11.30pm.
The implicit assumtion is that very school starts at the same time, so that by
looking at the time teenagers go to sleep we can recover their sleeping duration.
This is not accurate since schools may start at different times, even within the
same school for different grades to minimize cost of busing. However, Edwards
(2012) documents that the nationwide dispersion of school start time is low: the
25 – 75 percentiles interval is 7:55 – 8:30 (35 minutes). The much higher dispersion
in “bed-time” in our sample cannot be explained only by the school start time.
Nevertheless, to address this point we include network fixed effects. Because
friendship networks in our sample are within school and grade, by conditioning
on network fixed effects we compare people with the same school start time.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of students by GPA distinguishing between
students with different sleeping patterns. It appears that students with sleep
deficit (red curve) show a statistically significant lower performance at school.10
7Those subject are also interviewed again in 2001-02 (wave III), and again in 2007-08 (wave
IV). For the purposes of this paper, we do not use this longitudinal information. The friendship
nominations are only collected when the students were at school (i.e. in waves I and II).
8The questions formulated in wave I do not differentiate between the school period and
summer time. The same issue also applies to the other question on sleeping behaviour in Wave
II: ”How many hours of sleep do you usually get?”. Finally, a third question is available:
”Do you usually get enough sleep?”, which measures a subjective perception, thus increasing
measurement errors. In addition, the answers to both questions are not continuos variables, as
requested by the NLS estimation.
9We rescaled each hour in 100 units, so for instance half an hour is transformed to a distance
of 50. We dropped individuals declaring going to sleep before 5pm and after 6am.
10The rejection of the null hypothesis in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms the difference
between these two distributions.
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In other words, a student that goes to bed earlier is more likely to have a higher
GPA.
Table 1 and Figure 3 collects some further evidence on the relationship be-
tween sleeping patterns and other relevant characteristics. We run a principal
component analysis (PCA)11 on body mass index (BMI), GPA, general health,
use of alcohol and cigarette smoking. The first principal component explains over
one third of the total inertia. Table 1 shows that this variation is associated to
differences between two clusters of students, one with high body mass index, poor
school performance, poor general health, drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes
(type A students), and the other with the opposite profile (type B students).
In other words, splitting the population between type A and type B individuals
maximizes the between-group variation and minimizes the within-group varia-
tion. Figure 3 shows that type A students tend to sleep for fewer hours than
type B students. This is in line with an (expected) relationship between sleeping
behaviour and individual socio-economic profile Eide and Showalter (2012).
4.3 Regression Analysis
Our aim is to assess the actual empirical relationship between the individual
sleeping behaviour and the sleeping behaviour of the peers using the unique in-
formation provided by the AddHealth data. This exercise requires facing the
traditional challenges in identifying endogenous social interaction effects, while
also overcoming a further (and so far neglected) issue stemming from the sam-
pling design of the AddHealth survey. We present the network model in Section
3.1, whereas the estimation of network models with sampling on the dependant
variable is considered in detail in Section 3.2.
11PCA uses an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of possibly corre-
lated variables into a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables (called principal compo-
nents). This transformation is defined in such a way that the first principal component has the
largest possible variance (that is, accounts for the largest portion of variability in the data).
139
4.3.1 The network model
Consider a population of n individuals partitioned into r¯ networks. For the nr
individuals in the rth network, their connections with each other are represented
by an nr × nr adjacency matrix G∗r = [g∗ij,r] where g∗ij,r = 1 if individuals i and j
are friends and g∗ij,r = 0 otherwise.
12 Let Gr = [gij,r] be the row-normalized G
∗
r
such that gij,r = g
∗
ij,r/
∑nr
k=1 g
∗
ik,r.
Given the network adjacency matrixGr, we assume yi,r, the sleeping behaviour
of individual i in network r, is given by the following network model
yi,r = φ
∑nr
j=1
gij,ryj,r+
∑p
k=1
xik,rβk+
∑p
k=1
(
∑nr
j=1
gij,rxjk,rγk)+ηr+i,r. (4.1)
In this model,
∑nr
j=1 gij,ryj,r is the average sleeping behaviour of i’s direct friends
with its coefficient φ representing the endogenous effect, wherein an individual’s
choice/outcome may depend on those of his/her friends about the same activ-
ity. xik,r, for k = 1, · · · , p, are exogenous control variables. For k = 1, · · · , p,∑nr
j=1 gij,rxjk,r is the average value of the k-th control variable taking over i’s
direct friends with its coefficient γk representing the contextual effect, wherein
an individual’s choice/outcome may depend on the exogenous characteristics of
his/her friends. ηr is a network-specific parameter representing the correlated ef-
fect, wherein individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they
face a common environment. i,r is an i.i.d. error term with zero mean and finite
variance σ2.
Let xi,r = (xi1,r, · · · , xip,r)′, β = (β1, · · · , βp)′ and γ = (γ1, · · · , γp)′. In matrix
form, (4.1) can be rewritten as
Yr = φGrYr +Xrβ +GrXrγ + ηrlnr + r, (4.2)
12For ease of presentation, we focus on the case where the connections are undirected and no
agent is isolated so that G∗r is symmetric and
∑n
j=1 g
∗
ij,r 6= 0 for all i. The result of the paper
holds for a directed network with an asymmetric G∗r .
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where Yr = (y1,r, · · · , ynr,r)′, Xr = (x1,r, · · · , xnr,r)′, r = (1,r, · · · , nr,r)′, and lnr
is an nr × 1 vector of ones.
Let diag{Aj}mj=1 denote a generalized diagonal block matrix with the diagonal
blocks being Aj’s, where Aj may or may not be a square matrix. Then, for all r¯
networks, we can stack the data such that (4.3) becomes
Y = φGY +Xβ +GXγ + Lη + , (4.3)
where Y = (Y ′1 , · · · , Y ′r¯ )′, G = diag{Gr}r¯r=1, X = (X ′1, · · · , X ′r¯)′, L = diag{lnr}r¯r=1,
η = (η1, · · · , ηr¯)′, and  = (′1, · · · , ′r¯)′.
The identification and estimation of endogenous, contextual, and correlated
effects have been the main interests of social network models. The conven-
tional identification and estimation strategy in the literature (see, e.g. Lee;
2007; Bramoulle´ et al.; 2009; Lee et al.; 2010) relies on the assumption that
E(r|Gr, Xr, ηr) = 0.13 Based on this assumption, Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) show
that if intransitivities exist in networks so that In, G,G
2, G3, are linearly in-
dependent, then model (4.2) is identified. For estimation, we first eliminate the
incidental parameters η using a within-transformation projector J = diag{Jr}r¯r=1,
where Jr = Inr − 1nr lnr l′nr . As JL = 0, premultiplying (4.3) by J , we have
JY = φJGY + JXβ + JGXγ + J.
Let Z = (GY,X,GX) and θ = (φ, β′, γ′)′. For the instrumental variable (IV)
matrix Q = (X,GX,G2X), the two-stage least squares estimator is given by
θˆ2sls = (Zˆ
′JZ)−1Zˆ ′JY, (4.4)
where JZˆ = JQ(Q′JQ)−1Q′JZ is the predicted JZ from the first-stage regres-
13We will investigate the validity of this assumption for this empirical study in Section 4.5.
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sion.
In the following section, we focus on the sampling issue of the network model
that has been largely ignored by the literature.
4.3.2 Estimation of peer effects with sampling
In our and many other studies, the analysis of the network model (4.1) has been
made possible by the use of a unique database on friendship networks from the
AddHealth data.14 As we explain in Section 2, students are asked to identify their
best friends from the school roster in the in-school survey. Thus, we can observe
all friendship links in the networks. However, as some more sensitive individual
information - (i.e. sleeping behaviour) - is in the in-home survey, we only have
this information for the sampled students.15
Without loss of generality, suppose the first mr (mr > 1) individuals in net-
work r are sampled. Suppose we can observe network connections Gr = [gij,r]
and controls xi,r for all individuals in network r, but we can only observe yi,r’s of
sampled individuals. For the sampled individuals, i = 1, · · · ,mr, (4.1) becomes
yi,r = φ
∑mr
j=1
gij,ryj,r + x
′
i,rβ +
∑nr
j=1
gij,rx
′
j,rγ + ηr + 
∗
i,r. (4.5)
By comparing (4.1) and (4.5), we have ∗i,r = φ
∑nr
j=mr+1
gij,ryj,r + i,r. Therefore,
the error term of model (4.5) contains two types of errors - the error due to
unobserved individual heterogeneity i,r and the measurement error due to the
sampling design φ
∑nr
j=mr+1
gij,ryj,r. The measurement error could be correlated
with the control variables and, as a result, the 2SLS given by (4.4) may not be
consistent.
14See, e.g. Lin (2010a), Patacchini and Zenou (2008) and the references herein.
15The use of the core sample is crucial because otherwise the sampled students are not
random.
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To further illustrate this point, we rewrite (4.5) in matrix form. Let
Gr =
 GSr
GNr
 =
 GSSr GSNr
GNSr G
NN
r
 ,
where GSr is an mr ×nr matrix of the first mr rows of Gr and GSSr is an mr ×mr
matrix of the first mr columns of G
S
r . Then, for the sampled individuals, we have
Y Sr = φG
SS
r Y
S
r +X
S
r β +G
S
rXrγ + ηrlmr + 
∗
r, (4.6)
where Y Sr = (y1,r, · · · , ymr,r)′ denotes the mr × 1 vector of observations on the
dependent variable of the sampled individuals, XSr = (x1,r, · · · , xmr,r)′ denotes the
mr×p matrix of observations on the control variables of the sampled individuals,
and ∗r = 
S
r +φG
SN
r Y
N
r with 
S
r = (1,r, · · · , mr,r)′ and Y Nr = (ymr+1,r, · · · , ynr,r)′.
As E(r|Gr, Xr, ηr) = 0, we have
E(∗r|Gr, Xr, ηr) = E(Sr + φGSNr Y Nr |Gr, Xr, ηr) = φGSNr E(Y Nr |Gr, Xr, ηr).
To obtain E(Y Nr |Gr, Xr, ηr), we need to inspect the reduced form equation of the
model. If (Inr − φGr) is nonsingular, the reduced form equation of (4.2) is given
by
Yr = (Inr − φGr)−1(Xrβ +GrXrγ) +
ηr
1− φlnr + (Inr − φGr)
−1r. (4.7)
Let DNr = [0(nr−mr)×mr , Inr−mr ] denote an (nr − mr) × nr matrix of the last
(nr −mr) rows of an identity matrix. Then, it follows from (4.7) that
E(Y Nr |Gr, Xr, ηr) = DNr E(Yr|Gr, Xr, ηr) = DNr (Inr−φGr)−1(Xrβ+GrXrγ)+
ηr
1− φlnr−mr .
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Therefore,
E(∗r|Gr, Xr, ηr) = φGSNr E(Y Nr |Gr, Xr, ηr) = φGSNr DNr (Inr−φGr)−1(Xrβ+GrXrγ)+
φηr
1− φG
SN
r lnr−mr .
As E(∗r|Gr, Xr, ηr) is not zero in general, the 2SLS estimator given by (4.4) may
not be consistent for (4.6).
To avoid the measurement error due to sampling, we consider the NLS ap-
proach suggested by Wang and Lee (2013a) based on the reduced form equation
(4.7). Let DSr = [Imr , 0mr×(nr−mr)] be an mr × nr matrix of the first mr rows of
an identity matrix. Then,
Y Sr = D
S
r Yr = D
S
r (Inr − φGr)−1(Xrβ +GrXrγ) +
ηr
1− φlmr + ur, (4.8)
where ur = D
S
r (Inr − φGr)−1r. As E(ur|Gr, Xr, ηr) = 0, a regression estimator
based on (4.8) would be consistent.
First, to eliminate the incidental parameters ηr, we apply a within transfor-
mation using the projector JSr = Imr − 1mr lmr l′mr so that (4.8) becomes
JSr Y
S
r = J
S
r hr(θ) + J
S
r ur,
where hr(θ) = D
S
r (Inr − φGr)−1(Xrβ + GrXrγ) with θ = (φ, β′, γ′)′. The NLS
estimator of θ is given by
θˆnls = arg min
θ
∑r¯
r=1
[Y Sr − hr(θ)]′JSr [Y Sr − hr(θ)]. (4.9)
Let JS = diag{JSr }r¯r=1 and DS = diag{DSr }r¯r=1. Following a similar argument
in Wang and Lee (2013a), the NLS estimator θˆnls is consistent with an asymptotic
distribution
√
n(θˆnls − θ) d→ N(0,Σnls),
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where Σnls = limn→∞ n(C ′B′BC)−1C ′B′ΩBC(C ′B′BC)−1, with B = JSDS(I −
φG)−1, C = [G(I − φG)−1(Xβ +GXγ), X,GX] and Ω = σ2BB′.16
4.3.3 A simulation experiment
We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation in which we compare the 2SLS estimator
which is commonly used for the estimation of peer effects and the NLS estima-
tor given in (4.9). The setup of our simulations is as follows. The population
numerosity is 500 nodes and the number of separated networks is 50, resulting
in subnetworks of 10 nodes. Each node is allowed to have three connections as
a maximum and zero as a minimum with a uniform distribution within the sub-
network to which it belongs. Links are formed randomly. We consider sampling
rates of 40 percent, 60 percent, 80 percent, 100 percent . For each rate and for
each estimator, we estimate 5,000 times model (4.1) using one variable x. The
control variable x and the network fixed effect η are randomly generated by a nor-
mal distribution N(0, 1). The innovation  is generated by a normal distribution
N(0, σ2). We set λ = 0.3, β = 1.0, γ = 1.0, and σ2 = 2 in the data generating
process.17 Table 2 reports the results of our Monte Carlo study. The NLS esti-
mates roughly coincide with the true parameter values. The 2SLS estimates are
downwards biased, with the magnitude of the bias increasing as the sampling rate
decreases. The NLS and 2SLS have similar performance when all individuals are
sampled (i.e. the sampling rate is zero). We have also repeated our simulations
when varying the maximum number of connections (i.e. the network density) and
using various distributions (other from uniform). The results are stable across
the different specifications.18
16As in Wang and Lee (2013a), we assume the number of sampled individuals is proportional
to n so that the convergence rate of the estimator can be written in terms of n.
17Conclusions of our simulation study are not sensitive to the parameters values. For the
sake of brevity we do not show the output of all simulations.
18We do not report these further results for brevity. They remain available upon request.
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4.4 Estimation Results
Having in mind the simulation results, we move to the empirics and follow the
same comparative approach among different methods.
Our main estimation results are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable
is the time students go to bed. During the school days, this variable captures the
time allocated to sleep - the later a student goes to bed, the lower is her/his sleep
duration. The different columns show the results with an increasing set of con-
trols. In the first specification, we include individual demographic characteristics,
family background characteristics, contextual effects (the average of peers’ char-
acteristics) and network fixed effects. We introduce scores in mathematics and
history/social science in the second specification, and finally we include a risky
behaviour factor in the third specification.19 The results can be summarized as
follows.
First, with the exception of peer effects, point estimates and standard errors
are stable across specifications and estimators. The results are in line with the
expectations. Biddle and Hamermesh (1990) model the demand for sleep as a
function of wage and leisure. In their model, the higher the value of an additional
worked hour (i.e. the higher the wage), the lower is the time allocated to sleep.
Although we deal with students rather than workers, the general mechanisms
still apply. If one interprets the return of school performance as wage, then we
expect a negative correlation between student grade and sleep duration because
incentives to spend hours in studying increase over the school years. Similarly,
if time spent in risky behaviour is seen as leisure time, then an increase in risky
activities should negatively impact the amount of time allocated to sleep.
Second, the peer effect estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero
for all specifications when estimated using the NLS estimator, while it is never
19The Risky Behavior Factor is the score of a factor analysis run on use of alchool, cigarette
smoking and general health. The results are robust to alternativfe sets of controls.
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significantly different from zero when using 2SLS. In addition, our estimator shows
both point estimates and standard errors which are stable across specifications.
In terms of magnitude, in the average group of four people, an additional hour
of sleep of each of the friends translates to about 45 minutes in the individual
sleeping duration.
Note that this empirical evidence is in line with the simulation results, since
the downwards bias here leads the 2SLS to suggest that no peer effect is at work,
unlike with NLS.
In order to better understand the magnitude of the effects, we provide an
evaluation of the individual response to peers’ sleeping variations in terms of
child’s school performance. Our results reveal that in a group of friends, an
additional hour of sleep of each friend translates into about 45 minutes in the
individual sleeping duration. A unit increase in the individual sleeping duration
is associated with a 0.02% increase in GDP,20 which translates into about 1.5%
for a 45 minute increase. Therefore, if a friend sleeps one more hour, then the
individual school performance would increase by roughly 1,5%. This is a small
effect, as it is probably expected.
4.5 Robustness Checks
4.5.1 Endogenous network formation
An important feature of our identification strategy is the use of network fixed
effects. In most cases individuals sort into groups non-randomly. For example,
kids whose parents are low educated or worse than average in unmeasured ways
would be more likely to sort with low human capital peers. If the variables
that drive this process of selection are not fully observable, potential correlations
between (unobserved) group-specific factors and the target regressors are major
20We run a simple regression - (log) gdp on sleep duration and controls .
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sources of bias. It is thus difficult to disentangle the endogenous peer effects from
the correlated effects, i.e. from effects arising from the fact that individuals in the
same group tend to behave similarly because they face a common environment.
Network fixed effect are a remedy for the selection bias that originates from
the possible sorting of individuals with similar unobserved characteristics into
a network. The underlying assumption is that such unobserved characteristics
are common to the individuals within each network. This is reasonable in our
case study where the networks are quite small (see Section 2). However, if there
are student-level unobservables that drive both network formation and outcome
choice, then Gr is endogenous and this strategy fails.
We provide here some evidence that helps to reveal whether in our model Gr
violates the exogeneity condition. The intuition behind the test is to evaluate
whether differences in unobserved factors that drive outcome decisions help also
to explain whether those individuals are friends. Evidence of correlation would
be suggestive that unobserved individual characteristics shape network formation
as well as eduaction achievement which could point to a potential violation of
exogeneity.
Let us consider a network formation model based on homophily behaviors
where the variables that explain gij,r are distances in terms of observed and
unobserved characteristics between students i and j:21
g∗ij,r = α +
M∑
m=1
δmx
m
ij,r + θvij,r + ηr + uij,r, (4.10)
where g∗ij,r is the latent variable, x
m
ij,r is 1 if x
m is a discrete variable and i and
j have the same value (0 otherwise) while it is equal to 1/|xmi,r − xmj,r| if xm is
continuous, vij,r is equal to 1/|vi,r − vj,r|, vi,r and vj,r are the residuals from the
outcome equation (4.8) for individual i and j respectively. θ is the parameter of
21See Jackson (2008) for a discussion on the theorical nature of such model and Currarini et
al. (2009) for an empirical application.
148
interest.
Estimates of expression (4.10) are presented in in Table 4.22 The results show
no sign of correlation between differences in unobserved individual characteris-
tics and link formation. It should also be noted that because there are several
thousands individual-pair observations in a given regression, the power to detect
small departures from zero is quite high.
As a result, conditional on the (unusually) large set of individual characteris-
tics provided by the AddHealth, peer characteristics and network effects, we find
no evidence of network endogeneity.23
4.5.2 Siblings
Let us conclude our analysis with a further robustness check.
The restricted-use version of the AddHealth dataset contains sibling pairs
data. For each respondent, we know who is the sibling, her/his characteristics,
the nominated friends and her/her friends’ characteristics. We exploit this unique
source of information to test whether peer effects are still significantly different
from zero if we introduce sibling fixed effects. If our peer effect estimate is simply
picking up unobserved individual characteristics, then we should find no effect
when washing away the influence of factors that are common for siblings who
grew up in the same family and consequently have been educated by the same
persons, lived in the same neighborhood and more generally faced a wide number
of common shocks.
Almost all our sample of siblings (about 97%) are in the same social network,
i.e. are indirectly connected through a chain of friends. However, they have
different direct friends. So this is the source of variation which is exploited in our
22Both a linear probability and a logit model are estimated.
23Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) suggest the use of a similar diagnostic procedure to
investigate a possible endogenous formation of networks prior to the use of Bayesian estimation
techniques. Indeed, signals of individual-level correlated unobservables would motivate the use
of parametric modeling assumptions and Bayesian inferential methods to integrate a network
formation with the study of behaviour over the formed networks.
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sibling fixed effect strategy.
Table 5 shows the estimation results. The coefficient estimates are reduced
in magnitude and the parameters are less precisely estimated due to the reduced
sample size. However, the substance of the results remain unchanged: the peer
effect estimate remains significantly different from zero when using the NLS esti-
mator in all specifications.
4.6 Conclusions
There is remarkably little evidence on the determinant of individual differences
in sleep duration. By implementing sound econometric techniques, our study is
able to provide novel evidence in this respect. We have two contributions to the
literature. One, we extend the NLS estimator in Wang and Lee (2013a) to esti-
mate social network models with sampled observations on the dependent variable.
Two, we analyze peer effects in sleeping behaviour using a representative sam-
ple of U.S. teenagers, finding not-negligible endogenous effects. That is, besides
the impact of individual and friend characteristics, we show that the sleeping
behaviour of the friends is important in shaping own sleeping behaviour. Unique
information on siblings and their friends allows us to check the robustness of our
results to unobserved family factors.
Adolescent sleep patterns deserve particular attention because of their poten-
tial to affect school performance. Side effects associated with sleep deprivation -
inattention, irritability, hyperactivity, and impulse control problems - are likely
to show up in school. It is important for educators to screen for sleep problems
when concerns exist about a student’s attention or behavior problems. Our anal-
ysis suggests that an effective intervention should not only be measured by the
possible sleep disorder reduction it implies but also by the group interactions it
engenders.
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Table 4.1: Student Characteristics - PCA
results -
Figure 4.1: Kernel Density Estimate of Bed Time
Notes: Kernel = Epanechnikov, bandwidth = 40.429. We report the distribution of student by the time they
go to sleep.
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Table 4.2: Simulation Results
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Table 4.3: Peer effect Estimation Different
method comparison- Increasing set of controls
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Table 4.4: Endogeneous network formation
-Testable implications
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Table 4.5: Robustness Check. Peer Effect
Estimation with Sibling Fixed Effects
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Figure 4.2: Bed Timeand School Performance
Notes: Kernel = Epanechnikov, bandwidth = 17.793. We report the distributions of students by school perfor-
mance as measured by GPA, distinguishing between students that sleep more and less than average. GPA is
the composite score of a factor analysis run on Mathematics score, English score, History/Social Science score
and Science score.
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Figure 4.3: Bed Timeand First PC
Notes: Kernel = Epanechnikov, bandwidth = 40.429. We report the distributions of Type A students (blu line)
and Type B students (red line). Type A students have high body mass index, poor school performance, poor
general health, drink alcohol and smoke cigarettes, whereas Type B students have the opposite profile.
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